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The Keystone of our Science: Exploring the
Premises and Promises of the Book of Mormon for
Psychology and Psychotherapy
Edwin E. Gantt
Brian D. Wages

Brigham Young University

Jeffrey L. Thayne
Utah State University

I

ordinary Latter-day Saints (in general) or Latter-day
Saint scientists and scholars (in particular) have fully
appreciated the intellectual significance that the Book
of Mormon may have for how we understand and
explain ourselves and the world. That is, while most
Latter-day Saints recognize the profound impact that
the Book of Mormon has in the context of religious
history and the prevailing doctrines, practices, and
theologies of the world’s various religions, it seems
all too often the case that there is a hesitancy among
some LDS scholars to seriously engage the Book of
Mormon for the possible intellectual contributions it
might have for our work as professional scholars and
researchers (at least, for those of us in disciplines other
than religious studies). Rather, there seems to be a tendency to see the Book of Mormon as primarily, if not
solely, a religious document meant to ground religious
practice and belief, a work of scripture whose purpose
is only to provide spiritual comfort and understanding
to those in emotional or spiritual need, and not as a
legitimate resource for shaping and guiding academic
research, professional practice, or scholarly thinking in
our various disciplines.
Richard Williams (1998) has argued, borrowing
imagery from the prophet Isaiah, that the message of
the Restoration is, for both the religious and the intellectual world, one of the “turning of things upside
down” (2 Ne. 27:27); wherein the wisdom and learn-

n late November 1841, having spent much of the
day in council with the Quorum of the Twelve
Apostles at the home of Brigham Young, the Prophet
Joseph took occasion to impress upon the brethren
the central importance of the Book of Mormon to the
work of the Restoration. Joseph instructed those in
attendance “that the Book of Mormon was the most
correct of any book on Earth, and the keystone of our
religion, and a man would get nearer to God by abiding by its precepts, than by any other book” (History
of the Church, vol. 4, p. 461). Latter-day Saints are
not only very familiar with this prophetic instruction,
but also take profound joy in knowing that the Lord
speaks to his children in these latter-days through His
chosen prophets and that He has provided us with yet
another powerful testament of the life and mission of
the Savior, Jesus Christ. The Book of Mormon truly
is the keystone of Latter-day Saint religion. As President Ezra Taft Benson once noted, “A keystone is the
central stone in an arch. It holds all the other stones in
place, and if removed, the arch crumbles” and “just as
the arch crumbles if the keystone is removed, so does
all the Church stand or fall with the truthfulness of
the Book of Mormon” (Benson, 1992, p.2). Clearly,
then, the Book of Mormon is a book like no other.
Despite the common LDS understanding of the significance that the Book of Mormon has for religious
thought and practice, it is not always the case that
1
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ing of the world is turned on its head as basic assumptions and accepted knowledge of secular disciplines
is brought into question by the light of the revealed
word of God. We are in considerable agreement with
Williams on this point, firmly convinced that the
Book of Mormon contains not only a message and
insights that has revolutionized (and will continue to
revolutionize) the landscape of the religious world,
but which can also radically revitalize and re-envision
the world of secular learning by challenging certain
widely-held assumptions and perspectives at the heart
of our academic disciplines. In other words, not only
is the Book of Mormon of profound religious and
spiritual significance, it is also of profound intellectual
significance—that is, if scholars are prepared to seriously consider it as such.
In this paper, we hope to offer an example of how
Latter-day Saint researchers and scholars in academic disciplines might not always be taking the Book
of Mormon seriously in their scholarship, and how
they might do otherwise. We will do this by highlight
some prevailing ideas in the discipline of psychology,
and how the Book of Mormon might invite Latterday Saint scholars to conscientiously dissent from the
prevailing tenets of psychological research, and offer
an alternative perspective instead. Although there
are any of a number of conceptual places where one
might begin to explore the possibility of a psychology
grounded in the teachings of the Book of Mormon, we
will begin this foray into the topic by discussing the
general contours of the philosophy of naturalism, and
the determinism and moral relativism that are implied
in the philosophy of naturalism (at least insofar as it
is commonly articulated in contemporary psychological theory and practice). At each point, by way of contrast, we will describe how the Book of Mormon—if
we take it seriously—invites Latter-day Saint psychologists and scholars to develop an alternative approach
in their theorizing and practice.
We will argue that a psychology grounded in the
revealed doctrines of the Book of Mormon is one
that embraces not only the fundamental reality of the
God of the Restoration, but also His continual, active
and dynamic involvement in the lives of His children
and the world He has organized for them. Further,
we will maintain that such a psychology is one that
grounds human nature in moral agency and, thereby,

is a psychology capable of articulating a vision of personhood wherein human actions are not taken to be
merely the mechanical byproducts of various natural
forces operating on material conditions, but are rather
fundamentally meaningful and genuinely morally significant. Lastly, we will argue that a psychology that is
solidly grounded in the revealed doctrines of the Book
of Mormon will acknowledge that Christ’s life, sufferings, death, and resurrection are relevant in addressing
all forms of human suffering—and that moral truth
and human conscience is not always a mere human
construct or natural phenomenon, but is at times a
divine bestowal of discernment and understanding.
These three examples are just a few of the many ways
in which taking the Book of Mormon seriously might
lead Latter-day Saints to propose radically different
accounts of human behavior and fundamentally different approaches to therapy.
The Scope and Purpose of the Analysis

Because psychology is a large and sprawling discipline,
often noted for its contentiousness and lack of theoretical harmony, it would be misleading to say that
all psychologists assume naturalism, or would arrive
at the conclusion of necessary determinism or moral
relativism. Therefore, we will of necessity speak about
general trends and sometimes unarticulated assumptions, without always acknowledging more nuanced
positions or the psychologists who might see themselves as exceptions to the trends we describe. There is,
we realize, a danger in such an approach, insofar as it
may strike some readers as being overly critical or nitpicky; while, at the same time, striking others as much
too broad and sweeping.
In response to the former, we can only say that the
intention of our analysis is not simply to pick at nits or
to be critical simply for the sake of being critical. We
do not seek to dismiss out of hand all of the valiant
and illuminating work of those who have committed
themselves to the study of human behavior solely because there is good reason to be skeptical regarding
some of their assumptions and claims regarding the
fundamental nature of human nature. Oddly, despite
the high value that most academics place on skepticism and critical reflection, many seem to experience
something akin to an allergic reaction when critical ex2
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amination is offered from a serious and believing religious perspective. Indeed, while critical examinations
of religious beliefs and practices that are grounded
in a secular perspectives and the concerns of professional scholarship are generally taken to be legitimate
enterprises at the outset, many academics are less
than eager to critically reflect on academic disciplines,
their assumptions and theories and practices, from
an explicitly religious worldview or forthrightly theistic perspective. However, we believe that a healthy
dialogue between mutually respected and respectful
partners will do much to further the work of truth in
both areas. Indeed, we would argue that just such a
dialogue should be a centerpiece of academic life and
education.
In contrast to those worried the possible excesses
of sustained critical reflection, there are others who
may be concerned that an analysis such as the one we
propose here will be too general or abstract (or philosophical) to do any specific or practical good. In response, we can only confess that our analysis will and
must be very general and sweeping in nature. However,
given that what is intended here is a brief exploration
of certain basic principles and foundational assumptions upon which more specific details of a psychology grounded in Book of Mormon teachings must inevitably hinge, a fairly general mode of analysis is not
necessarily a bad thing—especially insofar as such an
analysis may provide some orienting sense of what, in
fact, the real issues at stake happen to be. We hope that
our brief exploration into the possible contributions
that the Book of Mormon might make to a psychology interested in “getting it right”—at least as far as
questions concerning the nature of human nature and
how persons ought most truthfully to be understood
and carefully studied—is that such an exploration will
ultimately provide the impetus for more detailed and
critically informed work in the future, work that can
perhaps shed necessary light on specifics and practice.

has written, “science’s central dogma” (Leahey, 1992, p.
379; see also, Hunter, 2007). Indeed, as others have
pointed out, “Within Western culture, naturalism has
become the default position for all serious inquiry”
(Dembski, 1998, p. 14; see also MacIntyre, 2009;
Marsden, 1997; Wilkens & Sanford, 2009). Naturalism is, thus, both the ontology and the epistemology
(and, in some quarters, the ethics) out of which almost
all contemporary intellectual discourse originates, as
well as the presumptive context or background framework in which it takes place. According to such a perspective, nature is all there is—or, more accurately, all
there is that can be known is that which is natural.
Nature is taken to be self-sufficient and natural events
are thought to be necessarily fixed and determinate,
governed by independent, rationally discernable (via
scientific inquiry) but non-intentional (i.e., undirected) laws and principles. Of course, there is nothing
in this philosophy that assumes that all such laws or
principles have already been discovered or discerned,
only that such laws exist and govern all natural events.
Ultimately, naturalism does maintain that such events
are the only sort of events there are—or, at least, the
only sort of events that can truly matter to science because they are the only sort of events that can be measured or known with any degree of reliability.
Psychology as a social science—that is, as a science of the social patterned in its assumptions and
methods after the more established natural sciences
(Smith, 1997)—constitutes the attempt to account
for the meaning and nature of human mind and behavior solely in terms of natural events governed by
natural laws (see, e.g., Davis & Rose, 2000; Evans &
Rooney, 2008; Heiman, 2001). For psychologists
operating within the naturalistic framework it seems
clear that since human beings are part of the natural
world, “who we are and what we do must ultimately
be understood in naturalistic terms” (Dembski, 1998,
p. 14). This interpretation of human being in naturalistic terms is not meant, however, to crudely deny
our humanity—though such criticisms of naturalism
have been made (see, e.g., Craig & Moreland, 2000;
Goetz & Taliaferro, 2008; Olafson, 2001). After all,
most contemporary psychologists (rightly) see their
theorizing and research as a continuation of the tradition of humanistic thought whose roots lie in the
Renaissance and Enlightenment periods of Western

Psychology and the Philosophy of Naturalism

The philosophy of naturalism essentially claims that
natural laws and/or principles ultimately govern all the
events of nature, including our bodies, behaviors, and
minds (see Griffin, 2000; Leahey, 1992; Slife, 2004;
Viney & King, 2003). Naturalism is, as one historian
3
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intellectual history (Smith, 1997). Rather than denying our humanity, then, conceptualizing psychology as
a species of natural science, and committing it to naturalistic forms of inquiry and explanation, is to “reinterpret our humanity as the consequence of brute material processes that were not consciously aiming at us”
Dembski, 1998, p. 14). “Thus,” as noted psychological
methodologist Gary Heiman (2001) puts it:

lation about ultimate metaphysical truths or religious
realities. Thus, while it is admitted that individual
scientists certainly possess their own individual theological biases and values, methodologically naturalistic
science itself is taken to be a fundamentally “a-theistic”
enterprise. That is, methodologically naturalistic science is a-theistic in the same way that it is a-moral:
the methods of science neither assume nor entail any
particular theological or moral views. Science, on this
model, is a form of inquiry concerned only with what
is demonstrably the case and never with what ought
to be or might be the case. Science, according to the
tenets of methodological naturalism, is simply a “set
of empirical, analytical, self-critical techniques for establishing facts” (Allen, 1995, p. 3). Furthermore, only
once the relevant facts of the world have been established in an objective fashion ought one then engage
in the inherently biased, value-laden, and fundamentally extra-scientific enterprise of theoretical reflection
and ethical or metaphysical speculation (theological
or otherwise).
However, the philosophical and theological waters
are much deeper and more treacherous here than they
might at first appear. As many philosophers of science
(see, e.g., Feyerabend, 1988; Gadamer, 2005; Kuhn,
1970; Polanyi, 1962) have shown over the course of
the last century, a defining feature of any method—be
it scientific or otherwise—is the profound influence
that its basic philosophical assumptions and pre-investigatory biases play in both the formulation of the
method and the interpretation of the findings it generates. In other words, all methods not only entail certain
constitutive assumptions and values, but these very assumptions and values actually give rise to the methods
themselves. Indeed, the common notion that objectivity and value-neutrality are and ought to be the hallmarks of scientific investigation is itself a philosophic
assumption that reflects a certain set of defining values
(Slife & Whoolery, 2006). More importantly for the
present analysis, however, is the recognition that theological neutrality as a defining methodological value of
contemporary science also reflects a particular value or
set of values regarding the nature of God and the relevance of divine activity to scientific understandings
of the world (Larmer, 2012). In other words, to make
the claim that a sufficient explanation of some event
in the world can be offered without needing to con-

in the same way that the ‘law of gravity’ governs the behavior of planets or the ‘laws of aerodynamics’ govern
the behavior of airplanes, psychologists assume there
are laws of nature that govern the behavior of living
organisms. Although some laws do not apply to all
species (for example, laws dealing with nest building
among birds do not apply to humans), a specific law
does apply to all members of a group. Thus, when psychologists study the mating behavior of penguins, or
the development of language in people, they are studying laws of nature. (p. 7)

Indeed, many contemporary psychologists, both researchers and practitioners, would readily agree that
psychology is best defined and understood as the scientific study of mind and behavior for the express purpose of discovering those laws of nature which ultimately account for all human action and meaning (see,
e.g., Coon & Mitterer, 2010; Passer & Smith, 2010;
Pastorino & Doyle-Portillo, 2008).
It is important to take a moment here and consider
what the philosophy of naturalism has to say about
the nature of God and His involvement in the world.
Many scholars would argue there is nothing inherent
in the formulation of naturalism described above that
necessarily excludes or denies the existence of God
(see, e.g., Padgett, 2003). Unlike more encompassing
formulations of naturalism (i.e., metaphysical or ontological naturalism) in which the existence of God
or any other sorts of supernatural beings is actively
denied at the outset and only natural or material entities are admitted to exist, the form of naturalism most
often defending in psychology is what is most commonly known as “methodological naturalism” (Porpora, 2006), This form of naturalism is usually thought
to represent a more epistemologically modest form of
naturalism. As such, methodological naturalism reflects an epistemological view that restricts scientific
work to practical methods for acquiring empirically
verifiable knowledge, and actively discourages specu4
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sider or account for the possible involvement of God is
to already have made the fundamentally non-neutral
theological assumption that God is in some profound
sense passively uninvolved in the way the world works,
and, therefore, conceptually unnecessary to any viable
account of it.
In short, then, while the postulation of God’s existence might be important for those who want to
know the ultimate—though ultimately unconfirmable
—“why” of the world and the whence from which it
comes, for the methodological naturalist God’s existence is simply not relevant to providing an adequate
account of how things are in the world. Thus, while
naturalism, at least as discussed here, does not necessarily entail any claim about the non-existence of God,
it does “affirm that if God exists, he was marvelously
adept at covering his tracks and giving no evidence
that he ever interacted with the world” (Dembski,
1998, p. 14; see also, Porpora, 2006). God, in such a
scheme, may well exist, but if He does, He does so in
such a way as to be essentially irrelevant to any understanding of the world and His people. In this way,
even when naturalistic accounts of the universe downplay the strictly deterministic and law-like nature of
the world and focus more explicitly on the method, it
generally assumed that all of human activity, tradition,
and social discourse can be accounted for through entirely “natural” theories and explanations—explanations that have no need for the existence of God for
them to work. Ultimately, such a God might as well be
non-existent because He is, for all meaningful intents
and purposes, so profoundly passive as to be entirely
uninvolved with the world (expect perhaps, one might
speculate as Deists do, at the moment of creation),
and, thus, a sort of unnecessary theoretical “add-on,”
perhaps meant to help religious believers feel better
in some way. In the end, though, including such a profoundly passive and uninvolved God in one’s scientific
accounts really does little to expand our knowledge
of the universe or its workings. As one scholar trenchantly puts it, “It remains logically permissible for
the scientific naturalist to affirm God’s existence but
only by making God a superfluous rider on top of a
self-contained account of the world” (Dembski, 1998,
p. 14). One cannot help recalling the famous French
mathematician Simon Laplace’s bold response to the
Emperor Napoleon when he was asked where the

Creator was in his recently published account of the
mechanics of the universe: “Sire, I had no need of that
hypothesis!”
The Book of Mormon and God’s Activity in the World

A sharp contrast to such a passive God can be seen
in the understanding of God, and his relationship to
mankind and the world, found in the Book of Mormon. The central message of the Book of Mormon
is not only that the Creator is not a hypothesis—scientific or otherwise—but an actual person, the living
Christ who is continually involved in the lives of His
children and the events of His creations, and, indeed,
one in whom His children have much need. Not only
does the Book of Mormon teach that God created the
world for His children (1 Ne. 17:36), but also that He
is the “light and life of the world” (Mosiah. 16:9), the
very power by which the heavens and the earth and all
that are in them are sustained from moment to moment. Indeed, as Alma testifies to the anti-Christ Korihor, “all things denote that there is a God; yea, even
the earth, and all things that are upon the face of it,
yea, and its motion, yea, and also all the planets which
move in their regular form do witness that there is a
Supreme Creator” (Alma 30:44). And, again, in the
12th Chapter of Helaman, we read:
For behold, the dust of the earth moveth hither and
thither, to the dividing asunder, at the command of our
great and everlasting God. Yea, behold at his voice do
the hills and the mountains tremble and quake. And
by the power of his voice they are broken up, and become smooth, yea, even like unto a valley. Yea, by the
power of his voice doth the whole earth shake; Yea, by
the power of his voice do the foundations rock, even
to the very center. Yea, and if he say unto the earth—
Move—it is moved. Yea, if he say unto the earth—
Thou shalt go back, that it lengthen out the day for
many hours—it is done; And thus, according to his
word the earth goeth back, and it appeareth unto man
that the sun standeth still; yea, and behold, this is so;
for surely it is the earth that moveth and not the sun.
And behold, also, if he say unto the waters of the great
deep—Be thou dried up—it is done. (Hel. 12:8-16)

Clearly, this speaks to a God who is intimately involved in the events of the world He has organized.
Likewise, in the Book of Mormon we read of a God
who is intimately involved in the social and interper5
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sonal affairs of His children, directing and guiding,
blessing and punishing, inviting and protecting them
as they navigate the challenges and vicissitudes of life
in the mortal sphere. The God of the Book of Mormon, unlike the absent or passive and uninvolved God
of methodological naturalism, is a God who has descended from on high to be among mankind, to suffer
as they suffer, to rejoice with them, to experience their
pains and temptations, trials and grief so that “he may
know according to the flesh how to succor his people
according to their infirmities” (Alma 7:12).
The word “succor” employed here by Alma is not
a word one hears much anymore—at least, in common daily conversation—but it is one that is rich in
poignant imagery in this context. A quick consult
of Noah Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the
English Language teaches that to succor is to “to run
to support; hence, to help or relieve when in difficulty,
want or distress; to assist and deliver from suffering.”
The conceptual and practical implications of this doctrine, not only for an understanding of the meaning of
the Atonement of Christ but also for any meaningful
account of human psychology and suffering—particularly in the context of healing in psychotherapy—are
multiple and deep, and deserve thoughtful exploration
by faithful Latter-day Saint psychologists. Suffice it to
say that the Book of Mormon attests on almost every
page to a God who is familial, familiar, and faithfully
involved in His children’s lives, continually seeking
them out and inviting them to a more fruitful and intimate relationship with him. We believe that the reality
of such a God demands that LDS psychologists and
psychotherapists engage in a careful re-examination of
their commitment to methodological naturalism, especially if they are to take the Book of Mormon and
the Restoration in these latter-days seriously, both intellectually and spiritually.

and does not depend on an individual’s choice or ‘free
will” (Heiman, 2001, p. 7). Human beings, in this perspective, are simply natural objects—albeit very, very
complex ones—which behave as they do because they
must given the particular physical contexts in which
they are found and the particular natural forces that
happen to be operating on them. While few psychologists believe that all of the determinants of human
behavior can be fully identified or known, most of
them nonetheless “have faith” that human events “can
be predicted, but only with a probability greater than
chance” (Goodwin, 2010, p. 10). In other words, there
are epistemological limits to our understanding of the
determinants of behavior, but at the ontological level
determinism is take to be a fundamental and necessary assumption of all legitimate psychological science.
Indeed, for many psychologists, the very possibility
of achieving psychology’s central scientific goals (i.e.,
explaining, predicting, and controlling human behavior) is necessarily predicated upon the assumption of
an underlying natural and lawful deterministic order
that can be discovered through rational and experimental inquiry, and which is ultimately responsible for
all of our behaviors, thoughts, and feelings (Goodwin,
2010; Heiman, 2001). As Slife, Mitchell, & Whoolery (2004) show, “From laws of gravity to principles
of pleasure (psychoanalysis), reinforcement (behaviorism), and organismic enhancement (humanism),
these types of natural laws and principles supposedly
govern all aspects of human beings, including our
bodies, minds, and even spirits” (p. 36). To abandon
or refuse such a foundational thesis in psychology,
some psychologists argue, would bring all rational and
scientific inquiry into the causes of human behavior
and the nature of human nature to a screeching halt. If
determinism is not true, Goodman (2010) asks, “then
how can we ever know anything about behavior” (p.
10)? Echoing this sentiment, Heiman (2001) argues:

Psychology and Determinism

If, instead, we assumed that organisms freely decide
their behavior, then behavior truly would be chaotic,
because the only explanation for every behavior would
be ‘because he or she wanted to.’ Therefore, we reject
the idea that free will plays a role. After all, you cannot
walk off a cliff and ‘will’ yourself not to fall, because
the law of gravity forces you to fall. Anyone else in the
same situation will also fall because that is how gravity
operates. Likewise, we assume that you cannot freely

One major implication of the philosophy of naturalism—whether endorsed in the extreme terms of an
ontological materialism or in more limited purview
of the methodological naturalism discussed above—
is the assumption of determinism. As typically formulated by psychologists, determinism is the notion
that “behavior is solely influenced by natural causes
6
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inexplicable chaos of random individual whim. Thus,
it comes as no surprise that, when confronted with a
“Sophie’s Choice” such as this, many psychologists opt
for the explanatory coherence and predictive power
promised by determinism—an explanatory coherence
seemingly attained in the more established natural sciences that psychology seeks to emulate.
Clearly, in the deterministic perspective of naturalistic psychology, the language and concepts of moral
agency have no legitimate intellectual place. This is not
to say that the experience of agency or conscious will
is not taken to be real, or that psychologists deny that
persons do actually experience themselves as moral
agents. Rather, it is to say that such subjective experiences are usually interpreted as being “illusions,” and,
thus, the sort of thing best accounted for in terms of
underlying psychological or biological mechanisms
and processes (see, e.g., Modell, 2008; Wegner, 2002).
As such, genuine moral agency, and the meaning attendant to it, play no significant role in the contemporary psychological understanding of human actions,
their origins, or their meaning because moral agency
is held to be merely a subjective experience, the necessitated product of some more objective and fundamental underlying causal process whose specification
and prediction is the proper aim of scientific inquiry.
As we noted above, psychology is often noted for its
contentiousness and lack of theoretical harmony, so it
would be misleading to say that all psychologists are
committed to deterministic or reductive forms of explanation (see, e.g., Dawda & Martin, 2001; Sappington, 1990). Some scholars in psychology have persistently argued for the scientific viability and ontological
reality of human agency (see, e.g., Baer, Kaufman, &
Baumeister, 2008; Baumeister, 2008; Frie, 2008;
Gantt, 2002; James, 1897/1956; Kelly, 1963; Martin,
Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003; May, 1981; Rychlak,
1983, 1994; Slife & Fisher, 2000; Williams, 1992).
However, despite the impressive and thought-provoking efforts of such scholars, they have for various reasons remained firmly in the minority of the discipline
and made little headway in changing the discipline’s
basic commitment to one or another form of deterministic explanation.
Other scholars have sought for a way out of the free
will/determinism debate by either advancing some
form of compatibilism (or “soft determinism”) or en-

choose to exhibit a particular personality or respond
in a particular way in a given situation. The laws of behavior force you to have certain attributes and to behave in a certain way in a given situation. Anyone else
in that situation will be similarly influenced, because
that is how the laws of behavior operate. (p. 7)

Ultimately, then, everything that we do, think, or
feel—both individually and collectively—is the result
of our inescapable entanglement in an “intricate web
of causal forces” (Wilkens & Sanford, 2009, p. 102),
the pervasive presence and power of which we human
being are (in the best of circumstances) only vaguely
aware and about which only a naturalistic science of
psychology can teach us.
A classic illustration of this sort of thinking can be
found in Stanley Milgram’s description of the nature
of social psychological inquiry:
The social world does not impinge on us as a set of
discrete variables, but as a vibrant, continuous stream
of events whose constituent parts can be dissected only
through analysis, and whose effects can be most compellingly demonstrated through the logic of experiments. Indeed, the creative claim of social psychology
lies in its capacity to reconstruct varied types of social
experience in an experimental format, to clarify and
make visible the operation of obscure social forces so
that they may be explored in terms of the language of
cause and effect. (p. xix)

He further elaborates:
The implicit model for experimental work is that of
the person influenced by social forces while often believing in his or her own independence of them. It is
thus a social psychology of the reactive individual, the
recipient of forces and pressures emanating from outside oneself. (p. xix)

Obviously, as the possessor of such powerful and difficult to obtain knowledge, the psychologist is guaranteed a place of respect in the community. Indeed, it is
just such an assumption that seems to constitute the
discipline’s primary justification for itself (see, Bakan,
1974 for a fuller discussion of this point).
As was clearly implied in the comments by Goodman (2010) and Heiman (2001) cited above, the only
alternative form of explanation to a deterministic one
that is even thought possible in this perspective is that
behavior—if it is considered agentic in any meaningful way—is nothing more than an impenetrable and
7
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gaging in the intellectual schizophrenia of relegating
agency to the sidelines of science because it is incompatible with the mechanical worldview of their discipline, even as they endorse the reality of agency in
their personal lives (Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister,
2008; Sappington, 1990). Neither of these approaches, however, provides for an intellectually satisfying
resolution to the knotty problem of the relationship
between human agency and mechanical determinism
(Shariff, Schooler, & Vohs, 2008). For, on the one
hand, despite a long and storied history of argument
for the compatibility of necessary determinism and
meaningful moral agency, the precise fashion in which
genuinely meaningful agency can coexist in a world of
natural law and determinate necessity has never really been made clear (Kane, 2011). In the end, moral
agency is either reduced to a species of indeterminism—and, thus, by nature inexplicable, whimsical, and
non-rational—or it is asserted to be some sort of mysterious ontological “add-on” that occupies some special
(though difficult to defend) space in a fundamentally
mechanical world. In the former case, while the possession of agency preserves a measure of freedom and
responsibility in human action, human acts are ultimately rendered meaningless or absurd, irrational and
intellectually indefensible by virtue of their lack of
meaningful connection to what would otherwise be
relevant events in the world (e.g., one’s past, one’s present context of relationships, one’s embodiment, etc.).
And, in the latter case, agency becomes little more
than one more unnecessary hypothesis, a sort of prescientific hold-over from a less enlightened age—the
sort of conclusion it is usually hoped can be avoided in
the first place. Of course, refusing to seriously address
the question of moral agency by (intellectually speaking) sticking one’s head in the sand—that is, believing
in agency or not believing in it depending on whether
one happens to be standing in the lab or in the living room—is to commit oneself to serious intellectual
hypocrisy.

viable alternatives. A central message of the Book of
Mormon is that moral agency is not something that
one can “take or leave” in the quest to understand human nature and meaning, nor is it simply an “add-on”
that can be sprinkled on top of fundamentally deterministic accounts of personhood so as to soften the
nihilistic blow of mechanisim. Rather, the Book of
Mormon teaches that moral agency is fundamental
to human nature and that any science, any psychology, any cosmology that does not admit this fact will
not only be inadequate to the task of making sense of
human beings, but also profoundly misleading about
them. Indeed, as Williams (2005) has argued:
Perhaps no question regarding our fundamental human nature is more important than the question of
agency. No issue takes us closer to the center of our
being. Agency is a genuine watershed issue because
the position we take on the issue of whether we are
moral agents determines to a great extent the positions
we must take on most other questions of psychological and therapeutic relevance. I think it is not an overstatement to say that, in the social sciences, it will be
very difficult to get other questions right unless and
until we get the question of agency right. Agency is the
hinge on which our understanding of all other psychological phenomena turns. At the same time, no concept
in the contemporary social sciences has shown itself to
be more resistant to clarity, closure, or even consensus
than has the concept of human agency. (p. 117)

While space constraints will not permit a full exploration of an approach to human agency that answers
the various issues of determinism, indeterminism,
and compatibilism, we believe that it will nonetheless
be fruitful to point out some of the ways in which the
Book of Mormon positions moral agency as fundamental to human existence. Additionally, we will show how
taking the Book of Mormon seriously also demands
that Latter-day Saint psychologists take moral agency
seriously in their theoretical, methodological, and practical endeavors as psychologists, if they hope to make
any genuine sense of what it means to be human.
In perhaps no other passage of scripture is the centrality of moral agency to human nature more clearly
articulated than in Lehi’s discourse to his sons just
prior to his death in the second chapter of 2 Nephi.
Here Lehi is teaching his sons that “there is a God,
and he hath created all things, both in the heavens and

The Book of Mormon and Moral Agency

For the Latter-day Saint psychologist who wishes to
take the teachings of the Book of Mormon seriously,
neither of these two options—sloppy compatibilism
or naive hypocrisy—are intellectually or spiritually
8
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the earth, and all things that in them are, both things to
act and things to be acted upon” (2 Ne. 2:14). In short,
to be human, according to Father Lehi, is not to be
one more object in a world of objects, “tossed to and
fro, and carried about by every wind” (Eph. 4:14) of
causality, regulated by the impersonal and mechanical laws of behavior that are so fervently postulated in
contemporary scientific psychology. As Elder Maxwell
(1976) noted years ago, “environment and heredity by
themselves do not account for all human differences”
(p. 591). Indeed, Lehi’s son Jacob, apparently having
taken his father’s teachings to heart, later exhorts us to
“cheer up your hearts, and remember that ye are free
to act for yourselves—to choose the way of everlasting
death or the way of eternal life” (2 Ne. 10:23).
The question of how to make sense of human behavior (in a way that is viable for a scholarly enterprise such as psychology) while taking moral agency
seriously is a complicated question. Many Latter-day
Saint psychologists have already tackled the issue, and
most agree that agency would need to be conceptualized as something more than “indeterministic” or
“random” behavior (see, e.g., Judd, 2005; Gantt, 2002;
Williams, 2005; Yanchar, 2011). That is, agency is not
“noise in the data,” so to speak, or some mysterious
“proportion of variance” (Miller & Atencio, 2008), but
is a fundamental feature of human behavior even when
human beings behave in predictable ways. Williams
(1992, 2002, 2005), for example, has offered a conceptual framework for understanding agency that preserves meaningful connections between human action
and its antecedents while simultaneously preserving
possibility in human action. “Mechanical and biological
links,” he explains, “are clearly destructive of agency, as
are stimulus-response links governed by environmental forces requiring no active participation by an agentic person . . . . Yet, even if nature and nurture fail to
preserve agency, it does not follow that all meaningful
links between antecedents and events destroy agency”
(2005, p. 127). He describes the connections between
past events and human action as being less a matter
of the workings of efficient causal forces and more
something akin to the “strong relationship that exists
between the plot of a novel and any number of subplots” (p. 127). That is, if one were to change the plot,
the nature of the subplots would dramatically change
as well—but it does not follow that the plot causes

the subplots, or that the subplots were necessitated by
the plot. In the same way, we can talk meaningfully
about how an individual’s choices might be different
had antecedent events or conditions occurred differently without, thereby, implying that the individual’s
choices were necessitated by those antecedents.
We share this example simply to highlight that capable Latter-day Saint thinkers have already made some
progress in the effort to develop a robust conception
of moral agency that does not eliminate a psychologist’s ability to make predictions about human behavior or talk meaningfully about the antecedents of that
behavior. Further, it is possible to talk meaningfully
about a study of human behavior that does not rely
on the sloppy compatibalistic language of “influence”
rather than strict causation. That is, it may very well
be possible to develop a robust study of human behavior that does not rely on deterministic or causitive narratives—that is, a study of human behavior that does
not depict human beings as puppets being controlled
by strings of variables. Human beings certainly act in
a context that provides meaningful antecedents to human choice, and changes to that context may very well
lead to different choices and outcomes—but psychologists can still nonetheless conceptualize human beings as the agents of their actions. Human action does
not need to be seen as necessitated by its antecedents.
For these reasons and more, we argue that Latter-day
Saint psychologists have a number of conceptual tools
that they can use to take the Book of Mormon seriously in their theorizing and practice.
Psychology and Moral Relativism

It is important to recognize that with the adoption
of necessary determinism rather than moral agency
as the principle conceptual bedrock from which inquiry in psychology is to proceed, a thorough-going
moral relativism becomes all but an unavoidable logical consequence. Once human action is stripped of its
fundamentally relational, agentive, and moral qualities, and instead is understood as merely the necessitated outcome of intrinsically non-relational, nonagentive, and non-moral conditions, states, variables,
or mechanical processes, it can no longer be seen to
be genuinely meaningful or moral in nature. That is
not to say that persons would experience their lives
9
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as without meaning, but rather that once a necessarily deterministic account is invoked to explain our behaviors, thoughts, and feelings, then any experiential
meaning they might have is rendered suspect, reduced
to being merely a subjective matter and, thus, in an
important sense, not really real. As numerous scholars
have shown, meaning in human behavior and experience requires genuine possibility (see, e.g., Ekstrom,
2001; Gantt & Williams, in press; Martin & Sugarman, 1999; Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003;
Williams, 1992, 1994, 2005; Yanchar, 2011). That is
to say, for an event (behavioral or emotional or cognitive) to be considered truly meaningful it must be genuinely possible for that event to have been otherwise
than it was. Events that are necessarily determined to
be as they are, and which cannot, therefore, be in any
way otherwise than they are, have no genuine meaning. Such events simply are.
In the case of human behavior, then, only if persons
are in some fundamental sense capable of being otherwise than they are, or doing otherwise than they do, is
it defensible to say that there is any genuine meaning
in what they are or do. Insofar as most psychological
theories of human nature deny the reality of moral
agency in their accounts of human nature, they cannot help but encourage a dangerous and virulent form
of nihilism. Indeed, once the conceptual door is shut
on the possibility of meaning and moral agency in our
psychological accounts of human beings, their actions,
and relationships, the door to nihilism would seem to
be the only one left open.
Parasitic on an embrace of nihilism is moral relativism. If thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, as well as the
social and moral relationships that both give rise to
and context for such things, are nothing more than
the necessitated outcomes of underlying causal conditions—be they environmental, genetic, or some complex combination of the two—then not only does it
no longer make sense to ascribe meaning to human
actions, it is no longer legitimate to make distinctions
of moral worth among them. For, if one’s behaviors are
not the sort of thing over which one has any genuine control and in the origination of which one has
no real participatory role because they are just occurrences produced by forces outside of awareness and
control, then it is no longer possible to claim that any
particular act one might commit is in any way morally

superior to any other act one might happen to commit
(Gantt & Williams, in press; Robinson, 2002; Williams & Gantt, 2013).
As with the question of meaning, the question of
moral qualities and distinctions is bound up with the
possibility of possibility, with the reality of moral agency. For example, society condemns all sorts of criminal
acts, and rightly punishing their perpetrators, precisely
to the extent that (and only insofar as) genuine alternatives to committing a given criminal act were available
to the criminal in question. The ascription of moral
culpability hinges on the fact that the criminal chose to
engage in a criminal act rather than in an act of honesty,
charity, or self-control. Indeed, if it can be shown that
the accused was in some sense unable to entertain alternatives, as in cases of severe mental disorder or external
duress, society does not hold them accountable for their
crimes. Likewise, if the behaviors, thoughts, and feelings in which people engage cannot be otherwise than
they are, and the shaping of how they are is something
in which they do not actively participate in meaningful, originative ways, then these acts are neither good
nor bad nor indifferent in their very nature. Such acts
simply are what they are and it would be as illegitimate
to consider them worthy of either moral praise or condemnation as it would be illegitimate to consider the
reflexive eye blink accompanying a sneeze to be worthy
of moral praise or blame.
Further, in less strict modes of naturalism—where
the possibility of agency is sometimes admitted, even
if conceptualized as indeterminism and random activity—the nature of morality itself is often thought to
be accounted for by means of entirely natural explanations (see, e.g., De Caro & Macarthur, 2010; Dennett,
2003; Ekstrom, 2001; Strawson, 2008). Psychologists
and others have striven to find naturalistic accounts
for the moral norms that afflict our conscience. Some
psychologists propose evolutionary accounts for the
origins of morality, while others find sociological accounts more to their tastes (see, e.g., the essays in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012). In nearly every case, however, moral norms are thought of as either the product of
human evolution that only serve the survival interests
of the species, or as the product of complex and abstract social forces that—if not also developed in the
interests of the survival of the community—were developed to advantage powerful social groups over less
10
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powerful parties. In neither case, however, is the idea
of an active, involved, and loving God deemed necessary to developing an adequate account of the origins,
nature, or meaning of our moral sensibilities.
Given this reduction of moral truth in naturalistic
accounts, it is entirely understandable that “psychology has come to compete for and in large measure
usurp the cultural and intellectual space once occupied
by religion, literature, and moral philosophy” (Gantt,
2005, p. 53). In fact, Gantt (2005) explains, “It has become commonplace in our society to believe that psychologists not only hold the keys that will unlock the
mystery of suffering but also possess the techniques
necessary for eliminating it. Because of this assumption, psychologists are often afforded the sort of status and respect that was in earlier times reserved for
priests and prophets” (p. 53). Indeed, much of modern psychotherapy seems to revolve around discerning the variables that account for a client’s suffering,
and adjusting those variables as necessary to alleviate
that suffering. In this way, a person’s moral choices
are often sidelined as fundamentally irrelevant to his
or her qualitative experience of life. In fact, in many
psychotherapeutic traditions it is deemed unethical
to bring moral or religious beliefs into the consulting
room—the presumption being, at least it seems, that
any healing the client undergoes must be occur in the
absence of any (explicit) moral distinctions between
right and wrong.

solely to the ability to do whatsoever one might wish.
Rather, Lehi instructs his sons that agency is not simply the capacity to do whatever we might happen to
want to do, with no moral strings attached and personal preference the sole criteria for action, but that
agency is fundamentally moral agency and, thus, is
about doing what one ought to do (see also Williams,
2005, p. 118).
For moral agents to know what one ought to do,
however, requires access to a source of truth and a
world in which to operate where there is a genuine
moral topography and the consequences of one’s acts
are respected. Thus, Lehi states:
And the Messiah cometh in the fullness of time, that
he may redeem the children of men from the fall. And
because that they are redeemed from the fall they have
become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act
for themselves and not to be acted upon, save it be by
the punishment of the law at the great and last day,
according to the commandments which God hath
given. Wherefore men are free according to the flesh;
and all things are given them which are expedient unto
man. And they are free to choose liberty and eternal
life, though the great Mediator or all men, or to choose
captivity and death, according to the captivity and
power of the devil; for he seeketh that all men might
be miserable like unto himself. (2 Ne. 2:26-27).

Rather, to be human is to be at the very root the sort
of being who is capable of acting for the sake of genuinely meaningful moral purposes and in truly morally meaningful ways (Gantt & Williams, in press;
Williams & Gantt, 2013). Further, our freedom lies
in being able to choose between good and evil – a
moral distinction that is eliminated in deterministic
accounts of human behavior.
Further, the moral norms that so often afflict our
conscience do not always have natural origins—that
is, their origins cannot be found solely in the chanceridden processes of evolution or human invention.
Rather, the Book of Mormon speaks frequently about
heavenly messengers that communicate moral instruction to mankind, as well as about a universal dispensation of moral discernment through the light of Christ:
“For behold, the Spirit of Christ is given to every man,
that he may know good from evil” (Moroni 7:16).
Psychological theories that do not acknowledge the
inherency of human conscience, its divine origins, and

The Book of Mormon and Moral Accountability

Latter-day Saint psychologists who wish to take the
Book of Mormon seriously will notice, however, that
the Book of Mormon is laced with moral imperatives,
and saturated with warnings about the consequences
of moral transgression. This is closely related the issue
of moral agency. Lehi, for example, teaches that “the
Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself ” and that “man could not act for himself save it
should be that he was enticed by the one or the other”
(2 Ne. 2:16). However, Lehi is at pains to show that
this capacity to act, to be “enticed by the one or the
other,” is not simply a matter of being free to choose
whatsoever one might wish from amongst competing
alternatives that have no intrinsic moral distinctions
between them, as though moral agency were limited
11
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our innate ability to discern between right and wrong
in our daily activities, cannot fully account for human
behavior (such as seemingly ceaseless attempts to rationalize and justify wrong action).
Further, in the world depicted by the Book of Mormon, our actions and choices have inescapable consequences in our lives. While not all unhappiness and
suffering in the world is the result of sin (or, at least,
the sin of the afflicted party), it does seem that the
Book of Mormon teaches that sin often leads to suffering (see, e.g., Alma 41:10-11). It may very well be
that some of the distress for which many people seek
the help of psychologists can (and ought to) be addressed in moral terms. Further, the Book of Mormon
strongly implies that seeking communion with God
ought to be a first step in addressing and responding
to the suffering of others, regardless of the source and
cause of that distress. Indeed, Elder Jeffrey R. Holland
may have articulated one of the implications that the
Book of Mormon has for the discipline of psychology (were we to take the Book of Mormon seriously)
when he taught:

the same time relegate Christ and His suffering to the
sidelines of psychotherapy theory or practice.
A Quick Word about the Natural Man

Clearly, any psychology grounded in the truth claims
and intellectual insights of the Book of Mormon
must ground itself in the reality of moral agency and,
thereby, reject the presumption that human beings can
be adequately studied and accounted for by means of
fundamentally naturalistic or necessarily deterministic forms of inquiry and explanation. Likewise, any
Latter-day Saint wishing to take the Book of Mormon seriously as an intellectual guide for psychological study must also be willing to radically rethink the
very foundations of his or her science, its aims, implications, and basic conceptions of human nature in
light of the Book of Mormon’s unrelenting claims that
moral agency is not only central to human existence
but to the very plan of salvation itself. Perhaps, given
the relativistic implications that inherently attend any
psychology grounded in the philosophy of naturalism
and necessary determinism, it is no surprise that Elder Boyd K. Packer (2004) remarked that “The study
of the doctrines of the gospel will improve behavior
quicker than a study of behavior will improve behavior” (p. 70).
We have occasionally heard the argument advanced
that despite the significant differences between the
grounding assumptions of the Gospel of Jesus Christ
and the theories of mainstream psychology, the Gospel
does not so much function to replace or overturn secular psychology so much as it provides needed qualifications to an otherwise limited perspective. In other
words, secular psychology is reasonably accurate in its
account of human nature—or, at least “good enough”
insofar as it goes—but is limited somewhat because
its findings apply only to the “natural man” (Mosiah
3:19) and not to the humble and penitent follower
of God who has been “spiritually born of God” and
experienced a mighty change of heart (Alma 5:14).
The argument here seems to be, as Smith and Draper
(2005) suggest, that “unlike many other doctrines of
the gospel, the scriptural portrayal of ‘the natural man’
does not seem to conflict with the way human nature
is depicted in many of the major theories of psychology, which often view humans as determined by bi-

Are you battling a demon of addiction – tobacco or
drugs or gambling, or the pernicious contemporary
plague of pornography? Is your marriage in trouble
or your child in danger? Are you confused with gender identity or searching for self-esteem? Do you—
or someone you love—face disease or depression or
death? Whatever other steps you may need to take to
resolve these concerns, come first to the gospel of Jesus Christ. Trust in heaven’s promises. In that regard
Alma’s testimony is my testimony: “I do know,” he says,
“that whosoever shall put their trust in God shall be
supported in their trials, and their troubles, and their
afflictions.” (Holland, 2006, p. 70)

That is, while not implying that all emotional and
mental distress or suffering is the consequence of sin
on the part of the sufferer, we can still readily acknowledge that Jesus Christ, His life, death, and resurrection, is relevant in addressing all forms of suffering in
this world. The Book of Mormon teaches that God
condescended to become man (1 Nephi 11:26) and
suffered “pains and afflictions and temptations of every kind,” so that, as noted earlier in this paper, he
might know “how to succor his people according to
their infirmities” (Alma 7:11-12). We do not believe
that we can take the Book of Mormon seriously and at
12

The Keystone of our Science

Gantt, Wages, Thayne

ology or history” (p. 186). Indeed, as they also point
out, “one cannot readily imagine a better description of
fallen man’s tendencies than ‘stimulus-response, stimulus-response’” and that ”extensive study of the natural
man could very well lead one to believe that agency
is illusory, truth is relative, and meaning is contextual
when not entirely irrelevant” (Smith & Draper, 2005,
pp. 186-187). Accordingly, mainstream psychology is
“the study of the natural man”—and legitimately so—
but is restricted somewhat in its scope and, therefore,
somewhat incomplete because “it has not yet considered our divine origin and potential” (Smith & Draper, 2005, p. 187, italics in the original).
We believe, however, that generous defenses of contemporary psychological conceptions of human nature, and the theories and treatments that flow from
such conceptions, may be based on an overly hasty
reading of King Benjamin’s statements about the
natural man that are found in the Book of Mosiah. In
Mosiah 3:19, one of the more famous scriptural passages in the Book of Mormon, we read:

his very nature. Rather, King Benjamin states that it is
by virtue of the Fall of Adam that man has become as
he chooses to be.
The fundamental reality of human nature presumed
throughout King Benjamin’s discourse is moral agency. Note, for example, how he teaches that the natural
man is and will always be an enemy to God “unless
he yields to the enticings of the Holy Spirit” and “putteth
off the natural man” (Mosiah 3:19, emphasis added).
Yielding oneself to the enticing and persuasion of another—in this case the Holy Spirit—is something
only moral agents can do. Natural objects subject to
the compelling forces of natural laws and deterministic processes do not yield to invitations—no matter
how complex or sophisticated their chemical interactions and organic composition might happen to be—
because such objects are capable only of responding
as they must in consequence of the causal forces and
conditions operating on them and governing them. To
yield, to submit, to be willing to submit, to be enticed
by, or to “putteth off ” what one is doing (i.e., rebelling
against God), on the other hand, requires moral agency and possibility, genuinely meaningful relationships
and a vibrant moral context in which such relationships can arise and flourish.
The main point here, then, is that psychology—at
least as found in its mainstream and more popular
contemporary formulations—is NOT the study of
the natural man and does not embody simply a limited perspective that is otherwise viable quite simply
because naturalistic psychology has not even managed
to get the nature of the natural man right in the first
place. In its embrace of the philosophy of naturalism,
and its subsequent rejection of moral agency as fundamental to human nature, contemporary psychology
is not so much the study of the natural man as it is
the study of the natural man from the sinful and false
perspective of the natural man. That is, the very psychological theories we find scattered across the landscape
of contemporary social science, assuming necessary
determinism, psychological egoism, radical materialism, atheism, nihilism, and moral relativism as they do
—and as the naturalistic perspective entails—are precisely the sort of accounts of human beings that one
would expect to find being championed by a rebellious
mankind seeking to evade the moral responsibility incumbent in our mortal existence as moral agents.

For the natural man is an enemy to God and has been
from the fall of Adam, and will be, forever and ever,
unless he yields to the enticings of the Holy Spirit,
and putteth off the natural man and becometh a saint
through the atonement of Christ the Lord, and becometh as a child, submissive, meek, humble, patient, full
of love, willing to submit to all things which the Lord
seeth fit to inflict upon him, even as a child doth submit to his father.

Easily the most striking thing about this verse—at
least in relation to the present analysis—is the central role that moral agency plays in King Benjamin’s
description of the “natural man.” In stark contrast to
what one finds in much of contemporary psychological theory, there is no mention here of the natural man
being a natural object compelled to act as he does (i.e.,
selfishly, immorally, etc.) by natural laws or the deterministic forces of biology or culture. Rather, for King
Benjamin, the natural man is defined from the outset
in terms of willful rebellion, disobedience, and pridefulness—all of which are fundamentally agentic and
moral events. After all, one cannot genuinely rebel or
disobey unless one can just as well obey or conform.
While the natural man is defined here as an enemy
to God, it is not the case that we must read into this
passage of scripture that man is an enemy to God by
13
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The argument we are making here should not be
seen as advocating the wholesale rejection of the findings and insights of psychologists and other social
scientists, nor should it be read as demanding a fullblown and entirely unique LDS psychology and psychotherapy. Rather, we wish only to draw attention to
the fact that the Book of Mormon contains certain basic and significant truth claims about the nature of human nature and that LDS psychologists would do well
to carefully and deeply consider such claims as they
evaluate rival claims of the naturalistic psychologies
in which they have been trained. Such consideration
would seem to require, at the very least, a thoughtful
and penetrating sifting of theories, methods, and practices that are founded upon (often hidden) naturalistic
assumptions that deny or minimize the reality of moral agency and meaning. Somewhat more expansively, it
may also require the formulation and championing of
alternative modes of research and practice that are not
only more attentive to the fundamentally moral and
meaningful nature of human agency, but which also
rigorously articulates a genuinely theistic framework
within which to approach the study of human behavior (for examples of initial forays in this direction, see
Coe & Hall, 2010; Jones & Butman, 2011; Larmer,
2012; Slife, Reber, & Lefevor, 2012).

ciplinary and cultural assumptions that human behavior is fundamentally grounded in psychological egoism, or that religious faith is a matter of “mere belief ”
absent legitimate evidence and that scientific reason
produces the only form of reliable knowledge, or that
personhood can be adequately accounted for as the
mere byproduct of brain function and evolutionary
genetics. A defense of such assertions, however, must
be left for another time. Suffice it to say that the Book
of Mormon truly is a book like no other, and as such
demands the most careful and respectful attention
from LDS scholars regardless of their particular discipline of study—and not only for its spiritual insights
and truth, but also for its intellectual possibilities and
depth. Echoing Brother Joseph, the Book of Mormon
truly is “the most correct of any book on Earth” and
abiding by its precepts will not only bring one “nearer
to God” but will also bring them nearer to themselves.

Conclusion

Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Free will in scientific psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(1), 14–19.
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ence deity in the world in terms of His immanence
and transcendence. The phenomenologist Jean-Luc
Marion utilizes these terms to describe the Christian
experience of God-in-the-world, and applies this term
to our experiencing the world itself as well (Marion,
1998; 2002; 2004; 2007). Immanence, in this case, refers to the way in which God presents himself in the
world, the way in which we feel Him or see His hand
active in our world and relationships. Imagine a cup
full of water, so full that the water level sits above the
rim of the cup, and the slightest motion causes that
water to run down the edges. This metaphor sits close
to a theist’s experience of the Holy Spirit in the world,
always cusping and sometimes flowing over in the
form of love, comfort, revelation, miracles, etc. However, we also experience God as transcendent, the Being
beyond infinite depth, that the more we experience of
His love, the more we grow in awareness that He loves
beyond what we can fathom.
Joseph Smith referred to the Book of Mormon as
the “keystone of our religion” (History of the Church,
vol. 4, p. 461), but the heart of that keystone is the
atonement of Jesus Christ. All sense of Christian
truthfulness arises from the atonement, and a uniquely Mormon sense of this truthfulness we find in the
text itself and in the writings of latter-day prophets.
Sterling McMurrin, a philosopher of Mormonism,

s a Latter-Day Saint and psychologist, I greatly
enjoyed reading Gantt, Wages, and Thayne’s article regarding the Book of Mormon as a guide for
Mormons in the diverse fields of psychology (as the
“keystone” of our science, therapy, etc.). Although generally and largely in agreement with these authors, I
would like to offer a friendly critique to extend this
thinking into a way in which LDS professionals (particularly therapists) might practice their Christianity
in non-Christian settings and do so ethically before
non-Christian peers and in a way non-Christian peers
might actually understand.
As practicing Christians, Mormons hold to a particular sense of truth or truthfulness; we believe that
truth arises from a relationship with God, and that
sense of truth perpetuates throughout the lives of His
children because we all live always already in-relation
with Him. For example, in 3 Ne. 13: 4 & 8, Christ
tells the people that God “seeth in secret” and that
He “knoweth what things ye have need of before ye
ask Him.” In the Book of Alma, Ammon tells King
Lamoni, “He looketh down upon all the children of
men; and he knows all the thoughts and intents of the
heart” (Alma 18: 32). On God’s side, He is relating
to all of His children, intimately aware of them and
blessing them. Granted, His children do not always
reciprocate that awareness, most living insouciant to
His presence. Those aware of Him, however, experi17
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describes four different ways Mormons understand
the workings of the atonement.
The first understanding, and perhaps the simplest, is
the “substitution” understanding of the atonement. At
its most basic, this understanding entails Christ substituting Himself for us and taking upon Himself all
of the suffering warranted by our sins or failings. This
model in the minds of Christians begged the question, “Who requires or enforces the suffering placed
upon Christ as He substituted Himself for us?” Although I would argue that mortality entails suffering
by its very nature (rain falls on the righteous and unrighteous alike—see John 16:33), others inspired by
other scripture presented the second and third models
of the atonement. In the second model, or “ransom”
model, the devil has legitimate claim over those who
sin, so God the Father paid the ransom for all by giving the devil His Son. Satan, however, could neither
bind nor hold Christ, but Christ did take on the requisite amount of suffering (an infinite suffering for an
infinite atonement) to satisfy Satan’s legitimate claim.
In the third model, called the “satisfaction” model, it
is the perfect nature of God that makes His presence
intolerable to the unclean, so by following Christ and
partaking of the atonement, we can be clean like Him
and become at-one again with God. The fourth and
most modern consideration of the atonement McMurrin calls the “moral” model. In this model, Christ
learned of all suffering through his mortal ministry,
the ordeal in Gethsemane, and culminating with His
death on the cross. By learning all suffering, Christ
knew perfectly how to succor all suffering, and He offers Himself as a moral guide relative to how His followers should treat one another, and advocates for us
to the Father because He understands our suffering
perfectly (McMurrin, 2000). In each of the four cases,
Christ, through His infinite love for us, suffered that
we will not have to suffer eternally. For His followers
who understand His atonement, they find comfort in
the presence of His spirit. Although free from eternal
suffering, they still suffer the vicissitudes of mortality,
so Christ counsels them to love and serve one another
as He serves His people (Mosiah 4:15; 23:15; Alma
13:28). Christ made it clear that in order to be counted among his followers, we should love one another
as He loved us ( John 13: 34-35), and that this love
encompasses all people ( John 3: 14).

Moral agency, from the perspective of the Restored
Gospel, entails the fundamental moment-to-moment
engagement with others either in a way that facilitates the power of the atonement, or one that inhibits the power of the atonement. Put simply, moral
agency entails loving more or loving less (compared
to Christ) as we relate to others in our world. This
sense of truthfulness that we love like Christ is an inrelation sense of truth, not a static sense of truth. We
live in a world of others, in-relation to them, and in a
world of God, in-relation to Him. This epistemology
is an epistemology of practice, not an epistemology
of empirically received knowledge. From the perspective of an epistemology of practice, knowledge becomes
a process (a going and trying and trying again) not a
static thing (once we receive it we know it). This process unfolds in the present context and in-relation to
it, there is no knowledge apart from the context of
knowing (Polkinghorne, 1992). For example, “love thy
neighbor,” one of the two most important and emphasized of Christ’s commands (Mark 12:31), does not
work under the mainstream psychology epistemology of received knowledge. Although we may receive
knowledge of these words, their application requires
an epistemology of practice and a moral agent to apply
them. As we love our neighbors at church, at home,
at work, the way in which we love fits the context of
the loving. We love our children, for example, differently than we love our colleagues, and we love our colleagues differently than we love our clients. We love
our colleagues enough to go to a dinner party at their
house and to take joy in their company. We love our
clients differently, however; even when they earnestly
invite us to such events, we gently remind them of our
role of therapist, and the importance of our remaining
outside their social circle so we can provide succor for
them which those inside their circle cannot provide.
Our knowledge proves constantly approximate,
never fully certain, because the present context eternally unfolds and changes, and with it our exercise of
moral agency eternally unfolds and changes (Cook &
Wagenaar, 2012). Because of this we often experience
tentativeness and humility relative to what the best
moral choice may be relative to how we treat our clients, our research subjects, and our colleagues. This
same humility applies to the persistent question in
our daily professional activities, “To what end do I do
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this? Is this a good end?” As well as, “How should I
work with this patient? What sorts of studies should
I undertake? How should I interpret my data?” We
understand the worth of these moral “shoulds” as we
ask ourselves these questions in terms of Christ’s example, even what we consider “true.” As therapists, we
do not counsel our clients to live a life that would lead
to further bondage in sin, and as researchers we do
not pursue methods of predicting and controlling others psychologically contrary to Christ’s example. As St.
Paul blessed the saints in Ephesus, “That Christ may
dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and
grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with all
saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and
height; and to know the love of Christ which passeth
knowledge, that ye might be filled with all fullness of
God” (Eph. 3: 17-20, emphasis in original). The love
of Christ is truth for a Christian, informing their moral agency in their world, a knowledge that constantly
unfolds in our ever-changing contexts.
This understanding of truthfulness leaves practicing
Saints in a difficult position relative to their work in a
secular setting. The significant majority of psychologists, for example, do not participate in religious faith,
leaving the faithful significantly in the minority (Plante, 2008). Although the American Psychological Association affirms the importance of religious diversity
(APA, 2002), they do not specify that Christian epistemologies are welcome in the research and practice
of psychology. The reason they do not include diverse
epistemologies rests upon the difference between psychology’s definition of knowledge and Mormonism’s
(or most religion’s). This difference runs very deep.
For example, Gerald Corey, whose textbooks instructors commonly use for counseling and psychotherapy
training, cautions his readers quite strongly to never
impose their own value system on the client, and to be
aware of their own values. In addition, the therapist
should support the client’s values, regardless of the
values of the therapist, and that it is the therapist’s job
to manage any difficulty arising from a difference between the client’s values and their own (Corey, 2012).
Managing these moral differences at work can be easy
when the moral differences are slight or irrelevant (like
when a client’s value system may differ in many ways,
but the treatment goals work for both therapist and
client), but can be quite challenging when the moral

differences are large (when the treatment goals cause
the therapist to compromise something he/she believes to be true).
By way of example, many years ago in my own clinical training I had clients (and still have clients) who
live a different lifestyle than the ones supported in the
Book of Mormon. I once counseled a client who lived
with his girlfriend, and although I did not think cohabitation before marriage was ideal (which I kept to
myself, given that it was irrelevant to the client’s presenting problem), both he and I felt motivated to help
him improve his patience, understanding, and compassion for his girlfriend. My supervisor at the time
expressed her worry that as a Mormon, I would pressure this client to conform to the principles of Mormonism. Only after listening to several tapes of our
therapy did her worry decrease.
At the same time I counseled a client who struggled
with his sexual orientation relative to his Evangelical
faith. This client felt very strong same-sex attraction
to other men in his church, and he knew that a few
of them felt same-sex attracted as well. He felt very
ashamed and guilty because of his ongoing temptation to reach out to these men sexually. Without critical reflection, I processed with him the value of his
faith and the worthiness of his very difficult struggle.
My supervisor expressed her displeasure upon listening to these tapes and gave me very explicit and direct
instruction that should I wish to pass my practicum
course, I should encourage him to explore his sexuality with other men. I pointed out to her that counseling him to explore sexual behavior with other men
only addresses one part of the problem, and she deftly
countered that only exploring sources of succor in his
faith did so as well. She elaborated that much of his
shame and guilt arose from his religious understanding of his sexuality, causing incongruence between his
feeling (sexual attraction to other men) and his thinking (that he should not feel that way nor act upon
it). She maintained that to resolve the incongruence
he should follow with what he “naturally values” by
“listening to his body.” Only then could he achieve
“healthy sexuality” (sexual feeling and behavior without ambivalence or intra-psychic conflict). She worried out loud that my Mormonism prevented me from
counseling him in a healthy way because I imposed
my religious values upon him. Highly anxious about
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passing my practicum, but also feeling greatly conflicted
by her requirements relative to my own values (and the
client’s expressed values), I asked for a compromise. I
would present both sides of the issue and ask the client to explore them with me, namely the advantages
and disadvantages of pursuing an Evangelical Christian
model of chastity, and the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing sexual contact with other men. Although still torn, I also felt relief when my supervisor
reluctantly relented, reminding me to provide her with
a tape of that next session. I left feeling like the “intellectual hypocrite” Gannt, Wages, and Thayne refer to.
What I learned all those years ago in my clinical
training is that Mormons who work in highly secular settings (like psychology/psychotherapy) can find
themselves trapped between seemingly mutually exclusive and mutually incompatible truth claims presented by their faith and their professional field. From
these mutually exclusive claims to truth arise equally
exclusive moral claims about what we should be doing as a field in our research and practice. As Gantt,
Wages, and Thayne pointed out, the moral agency described in the Book of Mormon based in the atonement stands in stark contrast to the determinism arising from naturalism, and both present different moral
implications for research and practice. In the case of
my experience in supervision with this client, I learned
that some psychologists fear religious therapists imposing their values on their clients, so much so that the
APA includes carefully crafted language about the role
of these values in therapy in their code of ethics (APA,
2002). Likewise, I also learned that secular psychology not only assumes very strong moral positions, but
that psychotherapy entails these moral positions constantly and un-ambivalently (Burns, Goodman & Orman, 2013; Tjeltveit, 2003; 2004; Tjeltveit, Fiordalisi,
& Smith, 1996; Richardson, Fowers & Guignon,
1996). I will discuss which moral values (specifically)
after tracing a brief history of these moral positions.
On the surface, these two moral epistemologies
(Mormonism and secular psychology) seem radically
incommensurable, and to a degree they are (Draper,
2004; Draper, 2009). Both moral epistemologies arise
from deeply rooted philosophical and historical traditions that have pulled increasingly apart. Naturalism, as Gantt, Wages, and Thayne discuss, arises from
the natural magic of the medieval age. Slowly refined

through the enlightenment, philosophical naturalists
shared a desire for knowledge to be certain (if I mix
substance A and B together I know I’ll get C), replicable (every time I mix A and B together I get C),
and universal (anyone who mixes A and B together
will get C) (Robinson, 1995). By the modern age,
anything uncertain, non-replicable, and non-universal
became devalued in their search for certain, replicable,
and universal truth (Taylor, 2007). In parallel fashion,
Christianity also developed, but rather than embracing a naturalistic form of certainty epistemologically,
Christian thinkers instead embraced an epistemology of faith that is uncertain (hence the need for faith
itself ), non-replicable (people do not always “feel the
spirit” or receive revelatory confirmation of questions
all the time or in the same way), but still universal in
a way (all people are children of God and have—by
degrees—the light of Christ) (Lewis, 2009; John 1:9).
As I discussed previously, this epistemology is an epistemology of practice within ever-changing context,
not a de-contextualized certain knowledge proposed
by naturalism.
This issue, certainty vs. uncertainty, lies at the core
of the split between psychology (arising from naturalism) and Mormonism (sharing a history with Christianity). Both groups value fundamentally different
things epistemologically, so although the Book of
Mormon presents an epistemology, those who value
the certainty naturalism promises cannot get on board
with the epistemology of Mormonism. Likewise, Mormons cannot authentically embrace the epistemology
of naturalism, because the assumptions of naturalism
imply consequences for how we should think of our
fellow man and treat them which Mormons would
object to (man as a determined natural object rather
than a moral agent). Basically, the study of psychology assuming naturalism is the study of the natural
man, and the implications for how we research and
treat others are likewise natural-man centric (Smith
& Draper, 2005).
In the second example, my supervisor felt concerned
that I did not reflexively persuade the client to embrace his sexuality by finding same-sex partners. Indeed, APA has offered unilateral organizational support for same-sex relationships (APA 2010). While
we may admire the APA’s attempt to fight for justice,
some of us worry about the lack of organizational lan20
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guage around reconciliation of sexual minorities and
Christianity, a language of sexuality tempered with
spiritual faith, and looking to the greater good of others by tempering personal desire. Because of this, we
find very little organizational help for our clients who
struggle with same-sex attraction (or even those who
have embraced their sexual identity) as they attempt
to understand their place within Mormonism. This
process seems highly uncertain and fraught with emotional and spiritual peril.
In this schism between the need for certainty and the
embrace of uncertainty psychology needed to discard
certain values in order to keep others. They kept the
values associated with certainty (objectivism), and discarded those associated with subjectivity (like moral
religiosity). As Richardson (2005) described, “Much
of modern culture has been marked by this kind of
‘give me certainty or give me death’ attitude, which
upon reflection seems to be neither realistic, mature,
nor wise” (p. 25). Because an objectivist science fails
utterly to give us morally subjective guidance, morals are regarded as individual, relative, and subjective.
Indeed, the fundamental moral position of modern
psychology is moral relativism and liberal individualism
(Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999).
Moral relativism, in this case, entails the assumption
that morals, by nature subjective and uncertain, will
vary greatly across individuals. For example, you can’t
“know” that Christ’s atonement redeems us all in our
suffering in the same way that you “know” that mixing baking soda and vinegar will cause a reaction. One
knowledge (atonement) seems highly idiosyncratic
and uncertain compared to the other (chemical reaction) which you could prove to anyone. Because morals
vary greatly from this perspective, and people feel their
morals are true to themselves, people should be free to
believe what they believe in their individual lives and
apply those beliefs in a way that does not harm others.
This liberal individualism involves freedom to believe
(liberal) and proves highly individualistic (individualism), assuming that moral understanding occurs
within an individual, and not across individuals or inrelation. Because moral values and a sense of “good”
and “evil” mainstream psychologists view as subjective
and individual, it does not fit within their need for certainty in their science. Indeed, when you examine introductory psychology textbooks, references to moral

“good” and “evil” are entirely missing (see for example
Myers 2011 or Cacioppo & Freeberg 2013 two popular introductory psychology texts). Psychotherapy, an
outgrowth of this form of reasoning, always already
entails moral relativism (thou shalt not impose thy
values upon thy clients) and liberal individualism
(thou shalt view thy clients as self-enclosed entities
responsible only unto themselves).
With the value of certainty and hence relativism
and individualism embraced by psychology on one
side, and the value of uncertainty, moral contextualism, and obligation to others embraced by Mormonism on the other side, Mormon psychologists and psychotherapists find themselves trapped between two
incommensurable moral positions. In my experience,
many throw their hands in the air in the face of the
incompatibility of these two positions. Years ago, during my clinical training, I had another supervisor who
professed devotion to his LDS faith (and indeed faithfully maintained a leadership position within his congregation), yet simultaneously described himself therapeutically as a behaviorist. I queried as a supervisee
how he reconciled the moral agency presented in the
Book of Mormon with the determinism he assumed
in his psychotherapy practice. His response proves
typical in my experience—he presented a dualism in
his life, in that his church life was his church life, and
his professional life was his professional life, each with
a different truth. When I asked if the atonement applied to his clients, he shrugged and waved the question off as “irrelevant” because that’s a “totally different
issue.” In my opinion, indifference is the truest form
of contempt, so I pressed gently about how he might
reconcile his professional life with his personal life. At
that point he expressed his frustration and ended the
conversation. His frustration arose (I’m assuming, as
it does for others) from the incommensurability of
these two moral positions, that of mainstream psychology and that of the Gospel of Christ. Because of
their seeming irreconcilability they pull for this intellectual hypocrisy, for this personal/professional dualism rather than holism.
But all is not lost—there is hope for LDS scholars
who wish to holistically research, practice, worship, and
serve within and without our field. Although rife with
new tensions that will grow in focus as we attempt this
process, tentatively I would like to offer compassion
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as one way of bridging the schism between the personal and professional moral assumptions, and to give
the epistemologists of the Restored Gospel a tentative
hold in the world of psychology by which they may
work. This endeavor proves risky, however, because
psychology, as a field rejecting of the truthfulness of
religion, will not listen to scripture. Hence, I will use
the philosophies of men that are more commensurate
with scripture to demonstrate how we might bridge
this divide. I find this endeavor risky, because I risk
the admonition not to mingle the philosophies of men
with scripture. So, to work against that admonition I
will start with scripture and will attempt to demonstrate how we can use these ideas to reach out to our
colleagues in the world.
The field of psychology, particularly psychotherapy,
makes it clear that when there is a difference in moral
values (particularly religious moral values) the burden
is on the part of the psychologist to either bracket her
issues or handle the problems caused by a difference
of values. However, when it comes to becoming atone with another, differences can often prove helpful
rather than detrimental, and we do not need to in-authentically “bracket” our values away. We see the most
beneficial effect of difference in our relationship with
Christ, as manifest through the atonement. Christ
gave his life for all people (including our colleagues, research subjects, and clients) to reconcile us with God,
and as different as we are from Him and each other,
the atonement provides a model for reconciliation.
Atonement, in the case of Christ, represents the ultimate propitiation, a word which indicates the process
of bringing two people who disagree into agreement,
reconciling conflict, or bringing together those who
have been estranged (Talmage, 2012). Christ propitiated our relationship with the Father, and offers His
sacrifice as a model we can follow to do likewise with
our fellow man, especially our colleagues in psychology (“as I have loved you,” says Christ, “love one another” [ John 13: 34-35]).
The key to understanding this process of propitiation is love, which motivates God and Christ to reconcile all people to Them and to one another ( John 13:
34-35; John 3:16; John 15: 13; D&C 42: 29; D&C 34:
3; Moroni 7: 47). In Romans 13: 10, Paul counsels the
saints, “Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: therefore
love is the fulfilling of the law.” Love is so powerful an

act that it satisfies the law and brings us closer to God.
Love also motivated Christ to condescend into mortal
form, so that by experiencing the vicissitudes of the
flesh like us he could better reconcile us with the Father (Mosiah 15: 5–9). In his letter to the Hebrews,
Paul offers, “Wherefore in all things it behoved him
to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be
a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make a reconciliation for the sins of
the people. For in that he himself hath suffered being
tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted”
(Hebrews 2: 17-18). The Father built into His plan
from the beginning the process of embodiment for all,
including His beloved Son. For it is in and through
the flesh that we are connected with one another compassionately granting us the ability to understand one
another in important ways, allowing others to matter
to us deeply (in sharp contrast to the assumptions of
individualism and relativism).
Secular thinkers, perhaps independently of scripture, noted the importance of embodiment as well,
and the relationship between embodiment and compassion (Levinas, 1998; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012;
Marion, 2004; 2007; Mensch, 2003; 2009). Although
an extended analysis of these philosophies would detract from my current presentation, a simple sketch of
these philosophies relative to the incommensurability
of the Gospel and Naturalism should suffice.
To these thinkers, our bodies link us and prompt
us to share experience through two simultaneous processes, namely imagination and shared embodiment.
For example, when we read the journal of one of our
forebears, and she writes of her struggles with faith
and survival, we can imagine that experience and relate to it. When she writes, “Today was blistering hot
and dusty, the soil bucking the plow,” we relate to that
sentence imagining extreme heat, the smell feel and
grit of dust, the hard ground impenetrable despite our
efforts. Likewise, when we hear the story of another,
whether joyful or tragic, we relate to the experience of
that other, through their story.
Similarly, we relate to another through their visceral
presence, and as they register embodied feeling, we
co-experience it with them to a degree. Imagine working with a friend, for example, roofing a house. As you
stand to ask him a question, you see him strike his finger with his hammer with some force, and recoil from
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the pain. You will probably wince as well. In fact, often
times our bodies mirror the experience of others, as
reflected in what some scientists call “mirror neurons,”
the neural tissue that, when scanned, mirrors the same
neural activation as the person whose pain we observe
(Gallese, 2001). Although the naturalists within psychology have attempted to reduce our nuanced and
complex empathic experience to these mere biological processes, they miss the richness that the whole
context offers. In essence, we are beings in the world
with others and alongside things all informing the rich
context of our experience (Polt, 1999). As MerleauPonty argues (1945/2012), there can be no discussion
of human beings without referencing the body and
the social world from which it is inseparable. When
I see another, I do not see them separable from our
shared social world, like a de-contextualized object,
but instead I view the body of another as a body like
my own, capable of its own potentiality and of fulfilling its own projects. Because of this “the-other-likeme” experience, I can feel the same moral obligation
toward another that I do toward myself. My existence,
in this sense, is not a solitary one, but rather a shared
co-existence with others within our social world. This
being-with others in this whole context relates us to
them deeply. As Mensch, (2003) argues,

on the roof, or the hunger of a child as we attempt
to eat our bread, we suffer mortality and undergo all
it brings together. As Mensch describes the process,
“in its basic etymological sense, empathy is a feeling (a
suffering or undergoing) of the world in and through
another person. Flesh is our capacity to suffer and undergo. Tasking myself as another in empathy, I take up
the other person’s standpoint, letting myself be determined by his situation” (2003, p. 172). This determination is not an agency-removing determination, but
one that entails visceral feeling and experience. One
that requires us, should we wish to avoid this experience, to actively objectify or dehumanize the other
(Draper, et. al, in press).
Although these philosophers present a thoroughly
worldly interpretation of the phenomenon of empathy,
we see important parallels that may help us bridge the
incommensurable gap between mainstream psychology and the Gospel of Jesus Christ. As I stated above,
Christ undertook the harsh vicissitudes of mortality
which required him to undergo the sometimes brutal coils of the flesh with its incumbent temptation
and suffering. Because of this experience of the flesh,
Christ serves as a perfect advocate for us with the Father (Hebrews, 7:25; 9: 24; 2 Nephi 2: 9; Mosiah 15:
8; D&C 29: 5). Embodiment proves so important and
so powerful that even Deity condescended Himself
into this frail mortal form to better love His people.
So powerful was this experience of embodiment for
Christ, so powerfully did it connect Him with all
people, that He relates infinitely well with all people.
In this relation, He commands that we then exercise
compassion for one another as well, to the extent that
such love for one another fulfills the law (as mentioned
above). This implies that the ways in which we become
caught up in moral differences between us and others
pale in the importance of the moral virtue of love and
compassion.
Empathy, a thin version of this deep compassion,
stands as a core tenet to much of psychology and psychotherapy, offering LDS researchers and therapists
a tenuous connection by which to resolve this morally incommensurable divide. The APA ethics code
(2002) already entails aspirational virtues informed
by a deep concern for the welfare of others. These virtues are autonomy (promoting self-determination in
others), non-maleficence (doing no harm), beneficence

Such universality springs from our condition of plurality. We are always already with others. To work with
them, we have to anticipate their action; but this requires that we regard the world, not just from our own,
but also from their standpoints. It involves our letting
ourselves be imaginatively shaped by the latter. Given
our lack of immediate access to their memories and
anticipations, the attempt to do this is never entirely
successful (p. 172).

Although never entirely successful, our connection
to others through our mutual experience of having a
body can prove very powerful to how and why we relate to, love and serve others. Levinas, for example,
in Otherwise than Being describes how I resonate with
the hunger of another, and I feel as though the bread I
eat was “snatched from my mouth” as I share my bread
to ease the pain of his hunger (1998, p. 100).
En-pathein lies at the heart of these experiences.
En-pathein, the root of the word “empathy” comes
from the Greek, and it means to “suffer” or “undergo.”
Whether we observe the injured thumb of our friend
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(promoting the dignity and welfare of others), justice
(treating all people fairly), fidelity (loyalty, dependability), and veracity (truthfulness). The authors of the
ethics code, inspired by these virtues, then attempted
to codify specific ethical rules relative to each one.
LDS therapists and scholars can contribute morally
to research and practice of this ethical code by living
out these higher virtues in their work and encouraging
their colleagues to do the same. Too often people follow the letter of the law (the letter of the ethical code)
and fail to live up to the aspirational virtues behind
the law (or code, in this case), which can lead to great
suffering (Mensch, 2003).
However, just pointing to, and living out, these
higher and aspirational values does not mean that
there are no differences in how an LDS scholar and a
non-LDS scholar interpret and understand these virtues. For example, the value of autonomy stands as a
central value in Mormonism and key to understanding moral agency. In the Book of Mormon Moroni
raises the Standard of Liberty, a rallying call to all who
follow Christ in those difficult times, which read, “In
memory of our God, our religion, and freedom, and
our peace, our wives, and our children” (Alma 46:12).
Freedom creates autonomy, or the ability to self-govern. Even today, we see the modern Church emphasize
freedom from debt, addiction, dependency and the
importance of self-sufficiency (see http://www.lds.
org/topics/welfare for an example of the importance
of these principles for Latter-day Saints). For a mainstream psychologist, however, autonomy means liberal
individualism and a contradictory moral relativism (as
defined above), or the value of looking after one’s own
desires irrespective of the needs of others. The LDS
psychologist has an opportunity in this case to present
another understanding of autonomy.
Autonomy, to a Mormon, does not mean “I look after myself,” but rather “I am free from those things that
would prevent me from loving and serving others.”
This may seem directly contradictory to a mainstream
psychologist, but other non-LDS scholars have argued for similar principles. Erich Fromm, an influential figure in the history of psychology argues that we
need to concern ourselves not just with “freedom from”
(oppression, disease, addiction, suffering), but also
“freedom to” (love, grow, serve, develop, contribute)
(Fromm, 1941). To keep our valid place morally in the

field of psychology and to stand as a positive influence
on our colleagues, we can gently and consistently work
towards helping people become free to love, serve, and
grow. Compassion, for an LDS psychologist, does not
entail self-centered ways of being, which seem deeply problematic from a moral agency perspective, but
rather an other-oriented way of being which gives our
moral agency greater meaning.
We see this other-orientation in the LDS understanding of beneficence. To an LDS psychologist
informed by moral agency, beneficence means doing
good to others in a way that also increases their capacity to do good for others. “Good” then is not an
individual good (my personal needs and wants are
fulfilled) but a collective good (I’m healthy enough to
love and serve others, especially those too incapacitated to do likewise). Beneficence then, entails not just
seeing temporarily to the immediate wants and needs
of others, but rather a concern for what will contribute
to the collective welfare for as many people as possible
for as long as possible. Again, this seems to stand in
stark contrast with the assumed moral position within
mainstream psychology.
Liberal individualism and moral relativism, as discussed above, did not arise in a vacuum. To offer a very
brief sketch of another way of looking at the departure
of these morals from shared in the western tradition
to subjective and individual, I’ll start with Neitzche’s
observations that God is dead in the hearts of men,
and that rational people (like scientists) killed Him
(Nietzsche, 1974; Vanahain, 2011). As I mentioned
previously, the quest for certainty required those who
believed themselves rational to exclude uncertainty.
Although a rigorous history lies beyond the scope of
my current text, evolution of man seemed far more
certain and rational compared to the genesis of a deity-created man. Therefore, rational scholars observed
that evolution (being certain) informed their understanding of the human experience. Part of that human
experience is the cultural values of morality, which
vary significantly between groups. Therefore, they understood these values as relative to a degree.
Because all human beings are subject to evolution
however, the forces of evolution transcend culture.
Evolution entails survival as a universal value, and
those behaviors that lead to survival are rational, while
those that work against survival are irrational. Often,
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pleasurable or enjoyable activities (like eating, sleeping, lovemaking) also facilitate survival. Some difficult
or unpleasant activities work against survival (going
without sleep, fasting, and abstinence). Therefore,
pleasure became a “good” due to its association with
survival of the fittest. When we look at articles in psychology, we see this assumed good quite frequently. For
example, when examining studies on religiosity and
well-being, we see that religious people had an easier
time coping with lost loved ones, and better adapted
to the loss (Keeley, 2004); adolescents who are religious have greater social capital, and hence are more
academically successful than their non-religious peers
(Pamela & Furrow, 2004); religious people suffer from
less anxiety and have more coping resources than nonreligious people (Shreve-Neiger & Edelstein, 2004);
undergraduate students who are participating Christians are more mentally and physically healthy than
those who are not (Francis, et al. 2003); religious children demonstrate better coping skills after a divorce
(Greeff & Van Der Merwe, 2004); and people who are
actively religious forgive those that have traumatized
them at a higher rate than those who are not. Hence,
religious people become happy again sooner (Leach &
Lark, 2004).
In essence, this research demonstrates that religion is
good because it promotes pleasure (happiness, health,
success, etc.). Note that the authors in psychology do
not make the claim that religion is good because it requires great personal sacrifice and suffering at times—
that idea is contrary to their values. This has an unfortunate side effect in the field and in our culture. As
Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon observe, “The direct pursuit of security and happiness, when it defines
what life is all about, seems to increasingly dissolve the
capacity to respect and cherish others” (1999, p. 51).
The moral agency model of the Book of Mormon offers Latter-day Saints an opportunity to dialogue on
this issue. Granted, it requires a compromise of us, as
our place in this field often does, but we can support
the research and practice around volunteerism, altruism, and service-to-others (see Sneed & Cohen, 2013;
Haski-Leventhal, 2009; Musick & Wilson, 2003 for
examples of research and theory in this area). Granted, for LDS scholars, the good of others stands as a
good in-itself, regardless of the pleasurable or painful
effect it has on us personally or collectively, but even

within a field focused on the pleasure of the self we
might offer a better way as we define it.
We find ourselves in good company within psychology, relative to looking out for the good of others as
a value in-itself. Alfred Adler argued for a form of
compassion and concern for others he called “social
interest.” “Social interest” according to him “means
feeling with the whole, under the aspect of eternity. It
means striving for a form of community which must
be thought of as everlasting, as it could be thought of
if mankind had reached the goal of perfection” (Rychlak, 1981, p. 137). Although Adler uses the term
“eternity” and “perfection” from the perspective of social evolution rather than the LDS understanding of
these terms, we still see that LDS psychologists do
not stand alone valuing compassion and beneficence
and how that requires us to look farther ahead than
an immediate need or desire. We have a position from
which we might validly engage with mainstream psychology without deluding ourselves that psychology
as a field will change its moral position.
If we examine the other four moral virtues (nonmaleficence, justice, veracity, and fidelity) as Latterday Saints, we find that we can share those values in
good conscience and non-hypocritically. However, we
value these virtues for different reasons and toward
different ends than the mainstream. Our end, as LDS
psychologists, entails doing Christ’s work to love and
serve others compassionately, with a long-term view
of what will do the best good for the largest number
of people over the longest time. “Good” in this case,
means Christ-like attributes He has commanded all
of us to embody. For example, as I teach classes, write,
research, and work in therapy I do so not just concerned with the immediate happiness of those who
I serve, but rather the welfare of those they come in
contact with.
A potential philosophy that might help us as we attempt to wrestle with these incommensurable values
between Mormonism and mainstream psychology
is dialogue (Bakhtin, 1984; 1986a; 1986b; 1986c;
Moreson & Emerson, 1990; Baxter, 2004, Draper,
Green, & Faulkner, 2009). Dialogue entails people
coming together and communicating in such a manner wherein both are transformed to a degree. Given
that LDS psychologists stand greatly outnumbered, it
seems unrealistic that we can affect the field to a large
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degree, but often times the small differences can matter. A method of facilitating this dialogue is to adopt
an attitude of openness, even if our colleagues do not
(Polizzi & Draper, 2013). Openness, in this case, does
not entail giving up our integrity, but rather looking
to how our deeply held values can fit into a given context. For example, how might we research in a more
Christlike fashion? We would probably formulate our
questions, gather our data, and interpret our results in
a slightly different way, one with greater compassionate concern for the research subjects and interpreted
from the frame of facilitating greater compassion.
Likewise, for therapy we would counsel compassionately in a way that models compassion for our clients
and therefore serves more people than just the clients
themselves, while acknowledging that the best course
of action for ourselves and our clients will not necessarily lead to immediate relief or happiness, but rather
an appreciation for, and an acceptance of, some forms
of suffering insofar as it facilitates compassion and
service.
We could also model openness by humbly embracing uncertainty. The Liahona serves as an example of
this. Lehi’s family found themselves wandering in the
wilderness, much as we wander through our lives. The
Liahona served to guide them in the way they should
go in a day-to-day manner. Alma clearly states that
this compass works like the word of Christ, which
can guide us in a moment-to-moment fashion as we
engage with the world (Alma 37: 42-45). As Latterday Saints we can certainly use this guidance as we
engage with our secular colleagues who will not tolerate references to scripture because it will point us
the way to make the greatest good out of our research
or practice in a way they can understand or tolerate.
By doing so, we will actually exercise the moral agency
that Gantt and his colleagues discuss, a moral agency
that can inform the field through our efforts, and can
certainly inform our own theoretical, research, and
clinical work.
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to explore the possibility of a psychology grounded
in the teachings of the Book of Mormon” (p. 4). Accordingly the authors considered three pervasive assumptions in psychology: philosophical naturalism,
(its attendant) determinism, and moral relativism;
and contrasted these with three incompatible alternatives supported by Book of Mormon doctrines: God’s
activity in the world (theism), moral agency, and moral
accountability. They also included an excellent exploration of the meaning of the “natural man” as described
in the Book of Mormon, contrasted with psychological assumptions about human nature.
Other contributions of the article by Gantt, et al.
(2014) might include (but of course are not limited
to) opening a dialogue on the topic, providing a framework for LDS psychologists that is compatible with
their core beliefs, and providing an opportunity to
flesh out, challenge, and push some of these ideas a bit
farther. I appreciate the opportunities thus presented
and so will make use of my response by employing
the following question in an effort to explore further

eading Gantt, Wages and Thayne’s (2014) “The
Keystone of our Science: Exploring the Premises
and Promises of the Book of Mormon for Psychology
and Psychotherapy” was something like a breath of
fresh air for me, and I am pleased with the opportunity to write a response. I appreciated the unapologetic and yet scholarly manner in which the authors
placed the Book of Mormon at the center of their proposed framework for psychology and psychotherapy.
I understand that these authors might be considered
part of the “choir,” but from my perspective it is about
time that psychologists (and not just LDS or religious
ones) begin to openly and honestly acknowledge the
values that inescapably structure their work. Religious
psychologists should no more be ashamed of how
their beliefs—about human nature and relationships,
the purpose of life, the possibility of change, etc.—inform their work any more than the psychoanalytic, behavioristic, humanistic, or otherwise naturalistic psychologists are ashamed of their foundational beliefs.
In my opinion, the authors made good use of their
available space by articulating some of the dominant
assumptions of naturalistic psychology and presenting
alternatives derived from, or at least compatible with,
Book of Mormon (and thus LDS) beliefs. Their approach was necessarily somewhat general, as they acknowledged, but as the authors intended, it does provide a good “conceptual [place] where one might begin
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some of the topics raised by the authors: “How is this
a uniquely Book of Mormon approach?” I will be
drawing on many of the same Book of Mormon verses
highlighted by Gantt et al., but hopefully considering
them through the lens of this question will yield additional insights. Exploring ways in which the principles
outlined by Gantt et al. might be more or less unique,
as described in the Book of Mormon, might help
clarify how this approach could make a difference in
addressing the very old tensions between naturalistic
and theistic assumptions about human nature, development, and healing.

“[remain] firmly in the minority” or “make little headway in changing the [discipline]” (Gantt et al., 2014, p.
17). Relegation to the fringe might be a real possibility
if this approach were uniquely “Mormon.” But illustrating the possibility of widespread agreement with
the principles highlighted by Gantt et al. is also not
the primary intent of my question. I want to dig a bit
deeper into these teachings from the Book of Mormon
to find out ways in which they might indeed be unique
in their ability to: 1) help heal theisms and theists that
have arguably been weakened by their long association
with naturalistic science and psychology, in ways that
more common formulations of these ideas have not,
and 2) make inroads with the same healing influence
to a world and people long saturated with naturalism
and naturalistic psychology.
I believe the Book of Mormon is uniquely designed
to challenge the naturalistic assumptions prevalent in
our society for at least two reasons: First, it was written for our day (Mormon 8), when miracles (vs 26),
the power of God (v. 28) and accountability would be
denied (vs. 31). Even in the modern Christian world,
including among LDS people, these truths are often
downplayed or misunderstood. For example, miracles
are often believed to be rare supernatural (outside of
nature) incursions into the natural world from an otherwise separate spiritual reality. The power of God is
often relegated primarily to a first cause, such as the
creation, with a mechanistic nature largely running on
its own after an initial act of God. And accountability is often downplayed through a misunderstanding
of love, grace, and forgiveness. Second, as President
Benson taught (Benson, 1988), the Book of Mormon
brings people to Christ both by testifying of Christ
and by exposing anti-Christ philosophies of the sort
highlighted by Gantt et al. (2014). So with the intent
of further exploring unique ways in which the Book
of Mormon challenges these naturalistic philosophies,
I use the remainder of my allotted space to dig a bit
deeper into theism, moral agency, and accountability
as described in the Book of Mormon.

How is this a uniquely Book of Mormon approach?

I do not ask this question to imply that the approach
described by Gantt et al. (2014) must draw on doctrines unique to the Book of Mormon in order to be legitimately called “a psychology grounded in the teachings of the Book of Mormon” (p. 4). There are other
reasons than creating a uniquely LDS psychology for
supporting theism, moral agency, and moral accountability with teachings from the Book of Mormon—
for example, to insure compatibility of our work with
our beliefs and thus avoid “sloppy compatibilism or
naïve hypocrisy” (Gantt et al., p. 18). It might also
help some avoid the years of angst (experienced by
myself ) associated with being a serious theist working
in a predominantly non-theistic, if not atheistic, field.
I ask the question because I think it might be useful in fleshing out the foundational beliefs underlying
this approach, and perhaps pushing these ideas a bit
farther. One does not have to look far to find serious
theists outside of the LDS faith who believe strongly
in moral agency and accountability. In spite of the influence of Calvinism, many of our Protestant neighbors hold not only to the serious theism inherent in
Christianity (if Christianity is taken seriously), but
also to a belief in moral agency and accountability.
And although they may vary in the degree of emphasis
placed on God’s ongoing activity in the world, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and some religions that grew up
farther to the East tend to acknowledge if not emphasize moral agency and accountability.
One response might be: Great! Then a psychology
grounded in these teachings from the Book of Mormon might speak to a wider audience and not always

Theism (and non-dualism)

Gantt et al. (2014) have articulated well the Book of
Mormon doctrine that “the Creator is not a hypothesis…but an actual person, the living Christ who is con30
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tinually involved…” (p. 11). There are many throughout the world who embrace this theistic premise, but
a closer look at how it is described in the Book of
Mormon might help us understand unique ways in
which the Book of Mormon challenges naturalistic
alternatives.
In the Book of Alma (chapter 30) we find an interesting dialogue that seems to prefigure some of the recent debates between the “new atheists” and believers.
Korihor is brazen in using naturalistic arguments in a
predominantly theistic society. It seems unlikely that
such arguments would emerge in the imagination of
a young Joseph Smith in the context of the religious
fervor in which he found himself in the early 1800s,
but a brief internet search today will reveal an abundance of such arguments—supporting the idea that
this book was “written for our day” (Benson, 1988, p.
58; see also Mormon chapter 8).
Korihor’s arguments centered on the idea that one
cannot know that which is not experienced with the
physical senses, prefiguring today’s narrow empiricism, and he relegated religious belief to the “effect of
a frenzied mind” (verse 16). This is a psychological
claim! A similar claim was made by the likes of Freud,
who described religious belief as “a system of wishful
illusions” analogous to a collective “neurosis” (Freud,
1961, p. 43). Skinner was only slightly kinder in describing religious views as a function of positive and
negative reinforcement, with God and heaven being
simply an imaginary personification of positive reinforcement, and hell and the devil a personification of
punishment (Skinner, 1953).
From his naturalistic beliefs, Korihor also derives a
philosophy of living, pointing to some of the possible
implications of naturalism for contemporary applied
psychology:

distant from spiritual realities. This latter assumption
slides toward the deistic belief that God is no longer
involved with the world, and the dualistic idea that the
spiritual and physical realms are so separate that interaction between them is rare and inexplicable at best, or
perhaps non-existent. These influential philosophies,
deism and dualism, which seek to reconcile naturalism and belief in God by granting each its separate
space, have been described as little more than functional atheism (Slife & Reber, 2009; Richardson &
Slife, 2013). In the words of Gantt et al. (2014), such a
deistic or dualistic God “might as well be non-existent
because He is, for all meaningful intents and purposes,
so profoundly passive as to be entirely uninvolved with
the world” (p. 11). In contrast, Alma claims:
Thou hast had signs enough; will ye tempt your God?
Will ye say, Show unto me a sign, when ye have the testimony of all these thy brethren, and also all the holy
prophets? The scriptures are laid before thee, yea, and
all things denote there is a God; yea, even the earth,
and all things that are upon the face of it, yea, and its
motion, yea, and also all the planets which move in
their regular form do witness that there is a Supreme
Creator. (verse 44)

In Alma’s view, God’s activity is inseparable from the
material universe as well as lived experience. God
speaks to humankind—to Korihor’s living brethren
as well as to prophets as recorded in scripture—and
created and upholds the universe as evidenced both in
its existence and continuous motion.
Alma also links his theistic beliefs to a philosophy
of living, which includes service on behalf of others
without expectation of monetary reward, a valuing of
truth, and rejoicing in the joy of others (verses 33-34).
Korihor’s philosophy of living is focused on management of the self, whereas Alma’s is focused on service
to others. Alma’s theism highlights the tendency of belief in a divine Father, who both transcends and unites
mortal beings, to bring us out of ourselves.
This contrast in worldviews does not require the
therapist or theoretician to preach one worldview or
the other to his or her non-believing clients or students. However, there is nothing to prevent us from
articulating these contrasting worldviews and their
implications for living to our clients, students, or colleagues. Those we associate with are then equipped
to consider or adopt theistic alternatives if they so

Every man fared in this life according to the management of the creature; therefore every man prospered
according to his genius, and that every man conquered
according to his strength; and whatsoever a man did
was no crime” (verse 17)

We see in Alma’s response, a potential pathway for
bringing healing to clients and to a discipline long
steeped in philosophies similar to Korihor’s. Alma’s response contrasts both with Korihor’s naturalism and
with the view, prevalent among many modern theists,
that the present world is so fallen as to make it quite
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choose, whereas a thoroughly naturalistic psychology
obscures such an alternative. This method of juxtaposing alternative worldviews and their implications
for living can, of course, be derived from other sources
outside of the Book of Mormon. However, it is rarely
articulated in so clear and plain a fashion.
When working with clients, students or colleagues
who may be less antagonistic to religious belief, the lessons we can derive from the Book of Mormon become
increasingly unique when taken as a whole. Speaking
to King Lamoni, whose mind had been opened by
Ammon’s dedicated service (his theistic philosophy
of living), Ammon searched for common beliefs that
would facilitate communication and understanding.
“Believest thou that there is a God?” Ammon asks
(Alma 18:24). Lamoni responds that he doesn’t understand the question. But Ammon has done his
homework. He is culturally literate. Using the terminology of his “client”, Ammon rephrases the question:
“Believest thou that there is a Great Spirit?” (verse 26).
On receiving an affirmative answer, Ammon proceeds
to build his bridge of influence and ultimately healing: “This is God” (verse 28). He continues building
on and extending Lamoni’s belief, not only in the existence of God, but also in an active God whose “Spirit
dwelleth in me, which giveth me knowledge, and also
power according to my faith and desires which are in
God” (verse 35).
Rarely do we find this sort of ecumenical building on
common beliefs across diverse faith traditions. Even
though common ground in philosophies of living has
been found and emphasized across theistic traditions,
the idea that the “other” is worshipping a different or
even false god remains prevalent. Atheists have capitalized on such divisions to undermine confidence in
theistic approaches. In order to provide a convincing
alternative to the prevalent naturalism in the world, it
would be valuable for theists to follow Ammon’s example and build on common beliefs—creating a more
unified voice and vocabulary.
Outside of a religious example, such as the above,
the technical aspect of this bridge-building approach
is not foreign to psychologists who are often skilled
in beginning with what clients, students, or colleagues
know and believe before attempting to expand those
beliefs. Drawing theistic understandings into this dynamic process may begin to illustrate the potential

strength of using the Book of Mormon as a unique
“keystone of our [psychological] science” (Gantt et al.,
2014).
Further, and perhaps even more unique, possibilities in this regard are revealed in Book of Mormon
accounts of how prophets address people who already share beliefs, but who seem hampered by fears,
doubts, or apparent tensions within their faith. As I
hinted above, some of those tensions may result from
the notion that spiritual things are separate from temporal things. This view, followed to its logical end,
might suggest to some that although God exists he is
likely so far removed from us as to have little concern
for our personal struggles. This belief prevents many
from fully drawing on God’s power of healing and atone-ment (re-union).
If spiritual things are so separate from temporal,
how can I ever be at one within myself—mind, spirit
and body—much less with others? Nephi’s brothers
believed in God, but had a difficult time imagining
that God would be interested in their personal questions and struggles (1 Nephi 15:8-9). They also apparently struggled to understand the relevance of spiritual things for their temporal existence, which might
have caused them to ask whether Nephi was speaking
of only spiritual realities, or whether his explanations
also included “things which are temporal” (1 Nephi
15:31). Nephi responds in part that he was speaking
of things “both temporal and spiritual” (verse 32), refusing to buy in to an absolute division of these aspects of reality. He also has reminded them:
Do ye not remember the things which the Lord hath
said?—If ye will not harden your hearts, and ask me in
faith, believing that ye shall receive, with diligence in
keeping my commandments, surely these things shall
be made known unto you. (verse 11)

God is described as imminent, responsive; and spiritual and temporal realities as interwoven. This latter
idea is expounded in the Doctrine and Covenants
(29:31-34), where all things are described as spiritual
unto God, reminiscent of Alma’s claim that all things
testify of God. There can be no serious dualism or deism in this framework; God is readily accessible for the
process of healing as well as learning and understanding. With the combination of these elements of truth
about God and spiritual realities—including insights
into how we might speak about them with people with
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whom we share beliefs as well as those who believe
differently—we may be approaching a psychology
uniquely grounded in the Book of Mormon.

that were created to act, and things that were created
to be acted upon (2 Nephi 2:14). This description fills
in a conceptual hole that exists when either agency or
determinism are described as mutually exclusive descriptions of the whole of reality. In fully deterministic
accounts, there are certainly things being acted upon
by causal antecedents, but the antecedents are themselves described as pre-determined—as things acted
upon by other acted upon things. So there is a kind
of infinite regression of non-teleological causality with
no agent. Everything in the universe is rolling around
being acted upon, and only incidentally (or accidentally) “acting” upon other things. We essentially have
effects acting upon effects accidentally, which is really no meaningful action at all—and no meaningful
cause. There are things to be acted upon, but nothing
to act upon them in any meaningful sense.
A fully agentic universe has the reverse problem, everything is acting and nothing is being acted upon. If
even the rocks might choose to respond to or resist
what could be no more than persuasive attempts to
fling them, we would have an interesting universe indeed—but it would be quite different than the one we
currently observe. In reality we observe exactly what
the Book of Mormon describes, things that act, and
things that are acted upon. In the former we find agency, in the latter determinism; these things acted upon
have no other options available to them. This distinction is described also by Isaiah (10:15) and reflected in
2 Nephi (20:15) where the Lord asks rhetorically, and
almost humorously, whether axes and saws and staffs
can act against the human agents that use them.
However this simple contrast between agentic and
determined things becomes more complicated when
we understand that the Isaiah metaphor is using these
“acted upon” objects to symbolize humans who try
to resist God’s power (e.g. the Assyrian king). At the
same time the agentic human wielding the ax, saw and
staff is used to symbolize God. One begins to understand the apparently irreconcilable conflicts, even confusion, among Bible-only believers regarding agency
and determinism as they apply to the salvation of the
human race.
Here the Book of Mormon brings much needed
clarity by describing ways in which actions are in some
sense both freely chosen and pre-determined by antecedents, and ways in which the truly agentic actions

Moral agency (and accountability)

Testimony of the existence and nature of moral agency and accountability is indeed one of the gems of the
Book of Mormon, and although an emphasis on these
principles can indeed be derived from other sources, it
is rarely so clearly articulated. For example, Bible-only
believers have debated the nature of human agency
for centuries and there remain many who profess to
believe firmly in the Bible and yet largely deny moral
agency. Some Christians support the notion that an
individual is saved by their choice to exercise faith in
Christ, which includes obedience to his commandments. Others assert that humans have little if anything to say about whether they are saved or damned,
the choice is God’s, not ours (e.g. Calvinist).
Gantt et al. (2014) link a belief in moral agency to
the Book of Mormon assertion that human beings are
“free to act” (2 Nephi 10:23) in at least one regard:
“to choose the way of everlasting death or the way of
eternal life.” This assertion that agency exists is helpful
in anchoring a psychology compatible with the Book of
Mormon, but it may not go far enough in describing
an approach that is uniquely grounded in the Book of
Mormon.
A closer look at agency in the Book of Mormon reveals an astonishingly rich understanding of the relationship between agency and determinism, and among
antecedents, choices and consequences. The Book of
Mormon can be interpreted as describing three aspects of what might be called a type of determinism:
1) Some things are created to be acted upon, 2) Some
antecedents are predetermined from the beginning,
but these fixed and predetermined antecedents enable,
rather than constrain agency, and 3) consequences
are inescapably determined by actions—even though
those consequences apply to agentic beings (the Law
of Justice). Rather than being set up as mutually exclusive descriptions of reality, agency and determinism in
the Book of Mormon are described as co-constituting
one another.
The first aspect of Book of Mormon determinism
mentioned above describes a contrast between things
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that follow these antecedents result in predetermined
consequences. The agency that takes place in between
pre-determined antecedents and pre-determined consequences is not unlimited, but it is the fulcrum of
meaningful existence. Little is said about particular
“lifestyle” choices. The Book of Mormon centers agency on what can be described as a single but enormous
choice: that between life and death (2 Nephi 10:23),
or between atonement and separation and isolation.
This choice is alternatively described as being between liberty and captivity (2 Nephi 2:27), which
helps clarify the meaning of “life” and “death” and provides greater insight into the relationship between
agency and determinism. Captive, or dead, things cannot choose; they have no liberty. Free, or living, things
can choose; and thus remain in the category of things
that act. In this sense, the Book of Mormon teaches
that the question of whether or not human action is
determined or agentic depends on a choice. Nephi
suggests that we are able to choose between agency
(life) or determinism (death).
In this description we find a rather ingenious solution to the agency versus determinism problem,
echoed in William James’ deceptively simple decision
(Perry, 1935/1974):

haps one of the most troubling descriptions of captivity and death.
This description of the possibility of losing agency
by denying it is a damning indictment of deterministic psychologies; but the reverse possibility, which also
constitutes this description, has powerful therapeutic implications. We may be constrained in many of
our lesser choices, but in this one central choice—between being an actor and being an object to be acted
upon, between living in an agentic or a deterministic
world—it is our choice alone that can determine the
outcome.
In this understanding that our choices determine
outcomes or consequences we find another way in
which the Book of Mormon acknowledges determinism: In the inescapability of Justice, or moral accountability, and our inability to redeem ourselves from the
demands of justice. But to understand how such demands make sense in light of agency, we also need to
understand how predetermined antecedents enable,
rather than constrain, choice.
The Book of Mormon is clear that humankind could
not act, we would indeed live in a deterministic world,
if it weren’t for the existence of opposition. As Gantt
et al. (2014) mentioned, Lehi explains that, “man
could not act for himself save it should be that he was
enticed by the one or the other” (2 Nephi 2:16). These
two possibilities for action, choosing life or death are
represented by the antecedent existence of the tree of
life and the forbidden fruit (vs. 15)—the former giving life and the latter leading to death. Since Adam
and Eve were already alive, the tree of Life offered no
additional opportunities for growth or agency until
after death came into the world, at which time the
tree of life became central to the possibility for growth
and agency. So it was the forbidden fruit that initially
offered the possibility of choice, and the tree of life
(Christ) that finished the job of bringing meaningful
agency into the world.
With the introduction of the tree of knowledge
(representing possibility for agency), God warned that
Adam and Eve would “surely die” (choose death) if
they partook of the fruit; “nevertheless”, he said, “thou
mayest choose for thyself, for it is given thee” (Moses
3:17). In the commandment not to eat this fruit, perhaps as much as in the fruit itself, God gave Adam and
Eve the possibility for free will in this world. In the

I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished
the first part of Renouvier’s second Essais and see no
reason why his definition of free will—the sustaining
of a thought because I choose to when I might have
other thoughts’—need be the definition of an illusion.
At any rate, I will assume for the present—until next
year—that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall
be to believe in free will. (p. 323).

This view contrasts with the deterministic unconscious forces of pyschodynamic theory, the deterministic environment of Thorndike and Skinner, and
perhaps even the ubiquitous (and so in some senses
deterministic) self-actualizing tendency described by
the humanists. James humorously chooses to believe
at least “until next year” that the choice to sustain a
particular thought when others are possible is not an
illusion. If James can choose to believe in agency, it
exists. If he can choose to deny it, it still exists. But in
choosing to deny one’s ability to choose, one would essentially have to “say that the sun does not shine while
he sees it” (Smith, 1965, p. 358)—which may be per34
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act of giving this commandment, the possibility for
disobedience presented itself for the first time, free
will emerged, and knowledge of good and evil had already entered the world in some sense. Interestingly,
the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who strongly influenced developmental and moral psychology through
Piaget and Kohlberg, also recognized the connections
between the ability to reason (knowledge), the ability
to choose, accountability for action, and meaningful
human existence (Kant, 1797/2002).
Still, these choices were predetermined: Adam
and Eve could either choose to live with ignorance
or choose to die with knowledge. And so as William
James came to understand, choice itself was unavoidable. That a choice would be made was pre-determined. Somewhat ironically, and like the rest of us,
Adam and Eve did not even have the choice to refrain
from making a choice. Presented with the ability to
choose, and the awareness that choice was possible
(through the commandment not to partake), even
the choice to refrain from choosing must be a choice.
The emergence of knowledge of good and evil, enabled through agency (choice), seems almost to have
been inevitable once the commandment was given.
But rather than constraining agency in any meaningful sense, these pre-determined antecedents enabled a
choice—and an important one.
Indeed in a somewhat odd, but pragmatic sense, the
existence and awareness of predetermined options
force free will. There would be no meaningful choice
if Adam and Eve were simply given everything without the possibility of disobedience or resistance. They
would have been like the plants and animals in Eden’s
garden, growing perhaps under God’s care, but not by
meaningful choice. So the Book of Mormon explains
that it was by this initial choice that agency entered
the world. This aspect of human agency seems lost
on many theists who deny the necessity of Eve and
Adam’s choice.
However the job was not complete, and here is
where even Kantian psychologists, and many others
who affirm a kind of freewill, have fallen short. The
deterministic Law of Justice (known elsewhere as
the law of cause and effect, Karma, or the Law of the
Harvest) prevented Adam and Eve, and all of us, from
altering the consequences of their choices. The consequences were as predetermined as the antecedents:

ignorant life or knowledgeable death. This dynamic
plays out throughout the world today, individually
and collectively, in the tension between a static safety
and a dangerous freedom. It seems that the more freedom that is granted, the greater the risk of harm, evil
and death. This creates a temptation to unduly restrict
freedom, not only in act, but often even in thought:
parents toward their children, teachers toward their
students, governments toward the governed, and
sometimes even therapists toward their clients. But
overly restricting freedom involves enormous psychological and emotional risks as well, and often rebellion
and conflict—a reassertion of freedom—and thus an
increased danger of violence, disease, mental illness
and death are right around the corner.
It seems the best we can hope for on our own is a
kind a tenuous and temporary truce between danger
and captivity—a delayed choice. And like our first
mortal parents, in the end most of us end up trading
one of these deaths for the other: ignorant safety for
knowledgeable suffering. Since the fall of Adam and
Eve many of our cultural narratives have been infused
with the theme, from Exodus to the American Revolution, and on to The Truman Show. And although much
of naturalistic psychology could be considered compatible with a utilitarian ethic of maximizing pleasure,
even the utilitarian John Stuart Mill acknowledged
this bleak choice (Mill, 1863/1906).
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different
opinion, it is because they only know their own side
of the question. The other party to the comparison
knows both sides (p. 14)

To Mill, the sting of knowledge—of knowing both
sides—is a greater pleasure than the bliss of ignorance.
So the tree of life was guarded, and Adam and Eve
were driven out to experience knowledge and death
(Gen. 3: 22-24).
But what sort of agency is that which, following
the acquisition of knowledge and thus a meaningful choice, only ends in death? Yet that is the way we
would experience mortality, if we knew nothing of redemption. All of our choices would be rendered impotent and meaningless by our impending death, collectively and individually. In the words of Abinidi: “Thus
all mankind were lost; and behold, they would have
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been endlessly lost were it not that God redeemed
his people from their lost and fallen state” (Mosiah
16:4). So yes, agency exists for humankind, through
the commandment and subsequent choice God gave
in the garden, but without redemption it would be a
meaningless sort of agency—we would be hopelessly
lost in meaningless choices with ultimately equivalent
predetermined consequences. No wonder non-theistic psychology becomes hopelessly deterministic. Even
when choice is acknowledged, it means little in comparison to what appears to be oppressive determinism
in both antecedents and consequences.
However, it is in this dance between agency and determinism (which might also be rendered as between
“mercy” and “justice”) that the beauty of the gospel
is revealed—not in the absence of one or the other.
By Adam and Eve’s one meaningful choice, captivity
and death came into the world, and ironically, further meaningful choice would have been lost if that
were the end of the story. One choice, and then determinism would have had the victory by enacting the
fixed and inevitable consequences: either ignorance or
death, which are more alike than different. But Christ,
symbolized by the tree of life (1 Nephi 11: 25-33),
reconciles justice and mercy—as well as determinism
and free will—and finishes the job of bringing agency
to humankind. The words of Lehi (2 Nephi 2), mentioned by Gantt et al. (2014), may bear a second look
in this light. Agency (limited) and determinism part
one:

Wherefore, men are free according to the flesh; and all
things are given them which are expedient unto man.
And they are free to choose liberty and eternal life,
through the great Mediator of all men, or to choose
captivity and death, according to the captivity and
power of the devil . . . . (verses 26-27)

So Adam and Eve, after God grants them a choice,
overcome an initial determinism of perpetual stasis—ignorant safety. Humankind is initially denied
the ability to partake of the tree of life, so that they
can experience the predetermined consequences of
their choices (death) and learn the need for a Savior.
They have knowledge now, but remain in captivity to
a type of determinism: limited choice and fixed, essentially equivalent, consequences. But ultimately they
are allowed to partake of the tree of life (in Christ’s
atonement), another choice. We may experience the
full weight of predetermined consequences if we so
choose, or we may choose to believe, and gain a witness by experience, that the law of Justice has been
satisfied in Christ.
And thus mercy can satisfy the demands of justice, and
encircles them in the arms of safety, while he that exercises no faith unto repentance is exposed to the whole
law of the demands of justice; therefore only unto him
that has faith unto repentance is brought about the
great and eternal plan of redemption. (Alma 34:16).

So through Christ a second choice between life and
death, liberty and captivity, is enabled, but with very
different implications. Rather than being left only
with a choice between ignorant life and knowledgeable
death (a bleak but necessary choice), with Christ we
are give a meaningful choice between knowledgeable
life, and a death that may eventually bring with it a
loss of even that knowledge we had once gained (Alma
12:10-11). Rather than between death and ignorance,
our choice is now between life and ignorance. Now
that is a real choice!
As with the idea of God’s existence and the imminence of spiritual realities, the Book of Mormon suggests ways in which the joyful prospect of agency, accountability, and redemption can be articulated both
to believers and non-believers. For the non-believer
we can create conversations that reveal these alternative philosophies and their implications, allowing
them a greater choice by considering truly alternative
ways of understanding, acting, and being. In these

If Adam had not transgressed he would not have fallen, but he would have remained in the garden of Eden.
And all things which were created must have remained
in the same state in which they were after they were
created; and they must have remained forever, and had
no end. And they would have had no children; wherefore they would have remained in a state of innocence,
having no joy, for they knew no misery; doing no good,
for they knew no sin. (verses 22-23).

Agency (completed) and determinism part two:
And the Messiah cometh in the fulness of time, that
he may redeem the children of men from the fall. And
because that they are redeemed from the fall they have
become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act
for themselves and not to be acted upon, save it be by
the punishment of the law at the great and last day, according to the commandments which God hath given.
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conversations with non-believers we can “speak by way
of invitation” (Alma 5:62). For example, inviting them
to first consider the possibility that we can choose to
experience life in ways that acknowledge and celebrate
real choices: first between knowledge and ignorance,
between agency and determinism; and then between
unity (at-one-ment) and isolation, between life and
death.
We can also acknowledge the possibility that one
might choose to deny agency, in which case one has
also made a choice (albeit one made at best under the
illusion that there was no choice made, and at worst
under false pretenses). Unless we change our minds
about the existence of agency, which would be a reaffirmation of choice, we would thereafter live an existence of self-imposed determinism—indecisive (lacking decision). And thus “carried about by every wind
of doctrine” (Ephesians 4:14), or “driven with the wind
and tossed” ( James 1:6). Alternatively, as the apostle
James explains, it is the person who has decided (chosen), unwaveringly, to seek understanding from God
(acknowledging His existence and influence) that
receives true wisdom ( James 1:5-6). Of course, for
this choice to be meaningful, those we engage in such
conversations have to first be aware that such a choice
exists. Once that awareness is established, we can invite them to decide (see also Joshua 24:15). At that
point, some kind of choice becomes inevitable. They
will be determined to make a choice, even if it is only
the choice to deny the possibility of choice. They will
be brought into the thick of living or dying.
When speaking to the believer, Jacob’s words to his
“beloved brethren”, quoted by Gantt et al. (2014), provide a possible model that we can follow with believing clients, students and colleagues. Jacob (2 Nephi
10) emphasizes the joyful act of remembering the gifts
of agency and redemption offered through God’s divine power, and manifest in Christ’s atonement:

Conclusion

The Book of Mormon does indeed provide a unique
grounding for a psychology that acknowledges divine
influence, agency and accountability. It also provides
unique insights into how these important truths might
be communicated to both believers and non-believers.
I hope that others will take up the challenge presented
by Gantt et al. (2014), and further explore and extend
“a psychology grounded in the teachings of the Book
of Mormon” (p. 4).
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Therefore, cheer up your hearts, and remember that
ye are free to act for yourselves—to choose the way of
everlasting death or the way of eternal life. Wherefore,
my beloved brethren, reconcile yourselves to the will of
God, and not to the will of the devil and the flesh; and
remember, after ye are reconciled unto God, that it is
only in and through the grace of God that ye are saved.
(verses 23-24)
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I

am honored to provide a response to the important
work of Gantt, Wages, and Thayne. As a specialist in scripture and its ancient historical setting I use
work and insights from the social sciences as required,
but I am not primarily a social scientist and will not be
looking at their work through a social scientist’s eyes.
I find very little to disagree with in the article. It is
refreshing to see that the authors have not taken that
“comforting, not to say professionally advantageous”
path “to imagine that no paradigm or assumptions
frame our approach to psychology or sociology or political science or literary criticism, or at least that it is
not our job to exhibit or to question those assumptions” (Hancock, 2014, p. 49). I would like to add to
some of the arguments from an outside perspective.

seriously the commandment to worship God with all
their mind (Matthew 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27;
Mosiah 2:11; 7:33; Moroni 10:32; D&C 4:2; 20:31;
59:5) and who take seriously the inspired nature of
their scriptures ought to consider seriously what those
scriptures might say about their subjects of study.
The Book of Mormon is both a scriptural record that
forms part of the canon of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints and an ancient Mesoamerican
document. Basing a social scientific theory on the
Book of Mormon has a number of advantages as well
as some potential pitfalls. Among the advantages the
following are instructive. As a canonical text, the Book
of Mormon has the advantage of being widely read
and widely believed among members of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. It thus serves as
both a common point of reference among those accepting its canonical status, and is considered true, authoritative, and binding. As a historical account covering a thousand years that pays particular attention
to how the gospel (as it defines it) interacts with the
lives of individuals, it provides a thousand years’ worth
of data. As has been argued (Hamblin, 1994) accepting the antiquity of the Book of Mormon requires an
acceptance of its inspiration. As an inspired text, the
Book of Mormon’s value for presenting truth is increased even though it admits on multiple occasions
that it might contain mistakes (Title Page, 1 Nephi
19:6; 3 Nephi 8:1-2; Mormon 8:12; 9:31-33).
These advantages have a reverse side. Those who
wrote the Book of Mormon wrote what they were

Potential Positives and Potential Pitfalls

I applaud Gantt, Wages, and Thayne for addressing
the “hesitancy among some LDS scholars to seriously
engage the Book of Mormon for the possible intellectual contributions it might have for our work as professional scholars and researchers.” They rightfully decry
those who “see the Book of Mormon as primarily, if
not solely, a religious document meant to ground religious practice and belief, a work of scripture whose
purpose is only to provide spiritual comfort and understanding to those in emotional or spiritual need,
and not as a legitimate resource for shaping and guiding academic research, professional practice, or scholarly thinking in our various disciplines.” The Book of
Mormon is a rich resource. Latter-day Saints who take
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interested in, and not necessarily the things we might
be interested in (e.g. 1 Nephi 1:16-17; 6:1; 19:5-7).
The record, furthermore, was abbreviated and not
complete (e.g. Words of Mormon 1:5; Helaman 3:14;
3 Nephi 5:8-9). Thus our thousand years’ of data are
incomplete, and we might potentially be missing significant information that might change the theories we
develop from the data or provide important nuances.
Furthermore, although the Book of Mormon seems
particularly interested in showing how obedience or
rejection of the gospel message in the lives of ancient
individuals, these were individuals who lived in a particular ancient American context and this context occasionally appears in the story (Sorenson, 1985, 2013;
Clark, 2005a, 2005b). Using the Book of Mormon as
a basis potentially risks importing cultural norms that
may not be appropriate for another culture. An example of such practices might be seen in courtship practices in the Book of Mormon. The account of Nephi
and his brothers courting their wives is as follows: “we
went up unto the house of Ishmael, and we did gain
favor in the sight of Ishmael, insomuch that we did
speak unto him the words of the Lord. And it came
to pass that the Lord did soften the heart of Ishmael,
and also his household” (1 Nephi 7:4–5). So the obtaining wives consisted of speaking the word of the
Lord to the women’s father. This is a cultural feature
that might work well in some cultures but not others.
A different version of courtship appears among the
Jaredites: “Now the daughter of Jared was exceedingly
fair. And it came to pass that she did talk with her
father, and said unto him: Whereby hath my father so
much sorrow? Hath he not read the record which our
fathers brought across the great deep? Behold, is there
not an account concerning them of old, that they by
their secret plans did obtain kingdoms and great glory? And now, therefore, let my father send for Akish,
the son of Kimnor; and behold, I am fair, and I will
dance before him, and I will please him, that he will
desire me to wife; wherefore if he shall desire of thee
that ye shall give unto him me to wife, then shall ye
say: I will give her if ye will bring unto me the head
of my father, the king. And now Omer was a friend to
Akish; wherefore, when Jared had sent for Akish, the
daughter of Jared danced before him that she pleased
him, insomuch that he desired her to wife. And it
came to pass that he said unto Jared: Give her unto me

to wife. And Jared said unto him: I will give her unto
you, if ye will bring unto me the head of my father, the
king.” (Ether 8:9–12). So this courtship is initiated by
the daughter who proposes to seduce the man who
will bargain with the father and be required to murder someone as a bride price. The Book of Mormon
actually condemns this particular episode. These are
the only examples of courtship given in the Book of
Mormon and may not have even been common among
their respective societies, and it would probably be
culturally inappropriate to build a universal theory of
proper courtship based on these isolated examples.
Similar problems can beset the use of the Bible and,
in fact, are more prevalent among certain Christians.
These Christians believe that “the Bible represents the
totality of God’s communication to and will for humanity,” and that “the divine will about all of the issues
relevant to Christian belief and life are contained in
the Bible.” Consequently, they believe that “the Bible
teaches doctrine and morals with every affirmation
that it makes, so that together those affirmations
comprise something like a handbook or textbook for
Christian belief and living, a compendium of divine
and therefore inerrant teachings on a full array of subjects—including science, economics, health, politics,
and romance” (Smith, 2011, p. 4-5; cf. Noll, 2011, p.
127-130). “Masses of American Christians are biblicists who expect the Bible to be able to speak with
authority on a nearly limitless range of topics” (Smith,
2011, p. 10) even though “on important matters the
Bible apparently is not clear, consistent, and univocal
enough to enable the best-intentioned, most highly
skilled, believing readers to come to agreement as to
what it teaches” (Smith, 2011, p. 25).
A similar problem has found its way into Islam. J.
al-Khalili (2010, p. 126) notes the problems that come
from “the literalists’ view that the text of the Qur’an and
Hadith (the recorded conversations of the Prophet)
gave Muslims everything they would ever need to
know about their faith, and so the sort of philosophical
debate and reasoning as practised by the Mu’tazilites
and the scholars of kalām was not only unnecessary,
but un-Islamic. This view has since broadened in some
quarters to the erroneous belief that all knowledge is
contained in the Qur’an; that anything God felt it was
worth mankind knowing, including the laws of nature
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and our place in the universe, can be found written in
the Qur’an, so there is no point in scientific enquiry.”
Gantt, Wages and Thayne, however, seem to have
avoided the potential pitfalls in their study. The terms
psychology and psychotherapy both come from the
Greek term ψυχή meaning soul. The soul is a concern
of the Book of Mormon. Nephi may have decided
not to write many things on the plates that might interest one, but he did say of the plates, “upon these I
write the things of my soul” (2 Nephi 4:15). We might,
therefore, expect the Book of Mormon to have some
important things to say on the topic, particularly when
the authors say that they “have none other object save
it be the everlasting welfare of your souls” (2 Nephi
2:30). It would be surprising if the Book of Mormon,
with its concern for the soul, did not have anything to
say that would be of use in the study of the soul.
Gantt, Wages and Thayne specifically target three
presuppositions of modern psychology that they
correctly see as running counter to the Book of
Mormon—naturalism, determinism, and relativism—and address each of them in turn. I will add
some comments to each of these subjects in the same
order.

modern science was built consists of some highly culture-bound assumptions about the nature of the material universe, its relation to the nonmaterial universe,
and the value of studying it” (Marks, 2009, p. 36-37).
Naturalism started off in science, more or less, as a
necessity. Since we cannot force God into the laboratory perhaps we might be safer assuming he is not there.
“This bracketing off of nature from supernature became
the signature of science.” (Marks, 2009, p. 5). The bracketing assumptions, however, become a self-fulfilling, circular argument and thus logically fallacious.
The Book of Mormon, however, argues against naturalism: “Believe in God; believe that he is, and that he
created all things, both in heaven and in earth; believe
that he has all wisdom, and all power, both in heaven
and in earth; believe that man doth not comprehend all
the things which the Lord can comprehend” (Mosiah
4:9). The Book of Mormon explicitly claims that its
purpose is the “convincing of the Jew and Gentile that
Jesus is the Christ, the Eternal God” (Book of Mormon
Title Page). Not only does the Book of Mormon argue
that God does exist but it also argues that from time
to time he interferes in the natural world. “he ceaseth
not to be God, and is a God of miracles. And the reason why he ceaseth to do miracles among the children
of men is because that they dwindle in unbelief, and
depart from the right way, and know not the God in
whom they should trust.” (Mormon 9:19–20). While
most of the time, God lets the universe go its own way,
from time to time, he will do “whatsoever thing is expedient in [him]” (Moroni 7:33).

Naturalism

I think Gantt, Wages and Thayne are correct when
they observe, “Oddly, despite the high value that most
academics place on skepticism and critical reflection,
many seem to experience something akin to an allergic
reaction when critical examination is offered from a
serious and believing religious perspective.”
Naturalism—the idea that everything in the natural
world can be explained by the natural world, and no
supernatural forces are necessary or desirable in explanations—has long been an axiom of science. One need
only recall Pierre-Simon de Laplace’s declaration that
he had no need of the hypothesis of God to explain
the universe to see that “aggressive atheism” has been
with science a long time (Bell, 1965, p. 181, 173). “The
most fundamental statement we can make about science stretches directly from Newton to Popper: that
science involves building a wall around the physical
universe, or the natural world, and shielding it as far as
possible from the universes of values, morals, and spirits.” (Marks, 2009, p. 61). “The bedrock upon which

Determinism

Historically there has been a tendency among
people to want to absolve themselves for responsibility for their actions. Thus one finds that Western
Christianity after Augustine adopted theological positions that made God responsible for all their actions.
As Augustine put it: “Who will be so foolish and blasphemous as to say that God cannot change the evil
wills of men, whichever, whenever, and wheresoever he
chooses” (Augustine, Enchiridion 98, in Schaff, 1887,
p. 3:268). “Behind all of this was a particular conception of God’s sovereignty, a conception which in the
case of Augustine owed something to Manicheanism,
and fatalism” (Witherington, 2005, p. 87). Islam too,
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Intellectual defenses of determinism tend to come
from two sources: theology and physics. The theologi–cal defense of determinism tends to come from
those who want to emphasize the power or sovereignty of God. Calvanism, for example, emphasizes
“the total, absolute, meticulous sovereignty of God in
providence by which God governs the entire course
of human history down to the minutest details and
renders everything certain so that no event is fortuitous or accidental but fits into God’s overall plan and
purpose” (Olson, 2011, p. 40). This does not necessarily hold up biblically, since, “in the very texts where
God’s sovereignty is stressed, there is also a stress on
viable human choice when it comes to moral matters”
(Witherington, 2005, p. 60). We have already seen a
Muslim version of this argument that is essentially the
same.
From the physics side of things, “In the Newtonian
(or Hamiltonian, etc.) scheme, ‘determinism’ means
that initial data at one particular time completely fix
the behaviour at all other times.” (Penrose, 1990, p.
214). More modern versions of physics alter the situation slightly. “Determinism, in special relativity, can
be formulated as the fact that initial data on any given
simultaneous space S fixes the behaviour in the whole
of the space-time . . . . If we want to know what is going to happen at some event P lying somewhere to the
future of S, then we only need the initial data in some
bounded (finite) region of S, and not on the whole of
S . . . . This is actually much more satisfactory than
the situation that arises in the Newtonian case, where
one would, in principle, need to know what was going
on over the entire infinite ‘slice’ in order to make any
prediction at all about what is going to happen at any
point a moment later” (Penrose, 1990, p. 214-15).
Thus, in physics, “ontological determinism claims that
the evolution equations which govern the time development of the ultimate constituents of the world are
deterministic; that is, the state of these constituents
at a given time in the future is determined uniquely
by the state of these constituents now. All theories of
physics which have ever been proposed as fundamental—Newtonian particle physics, the electromagnetic
field equations of Maxwell, Einstein’s general relativity theory for gravity, and even quantum mechanics—
all of these are ontologically deterministic theories.
They differ only in the nature of the entities which

after the decline of the Muʿtazilites, took the position that man’s power (qadar) to decide for themselves
was subordinate to God’s omnipotence (jabr). “Since
God is omnipotent,” the standard Muslim argument
runs, “everything must be pre-ordained and directed
by God, and humans can logically therefore have no
free will.” (al-Khalili, 2010, p. 126). So much of the
Muslim world “still sees the universe running its predestined course, determined by the will of Allah, who
not only guides the world at large, but also predestines
the fate of each and every man individually” (Patai,
1967, p. 157). Large proportions of the religious world
consider determinism a sacred dogma
Of course, determinism is older than either
Christianity or Islam. One ancient Egyptian text puts
it succinctly: “Nothing ever happens on earth except
that which God has ordained on the horizon” (de
Cenival, 1988, pl. 14; Spiegelberg, 1917, Tafel XIII;
Hoffmann and Quack, 2007, p. 218). Another ancient
Egyptian text advises the constant refrain: “God is the
one who brings the future and fortune that come.”
(Lexa, 1926; Hoffmann and Quack, 2007, p. 23973). Not all Egyptians, however, believed that. Some
considered determinism as a philosophy so dangerous that when one defendant in a trial before the
king sought to defend his actions by saying, “When it
pleased [the god] Re to command me he put the wellbeing of Pharaoh in my heart, but when it displeased
Re to command me, he put the misfortune of Pharaoh
in my heart.” The Pharaoh, however, did not accept the
man’s attempt to avoid responsibility and had him executed (Glanville, 1955, pl. 3-4; Hoffmann and Quack,
2007, 278). The reason for the extreme punishment
is that determinism is incompatible with accountability. If your actions are determined then you cannot be
held accountable for them. Ancient society demanded
accountability for one’s actions. Modern society is
double-minded on the matter. On the one hand, the
individual does not want to be held accountable for
his own actions but on the other hand he wants other
individuals held accountable for theirs. We see some
of this in the tendency to absolve individuals from the
consequences of their actions and blame other individuals, society, culture, or the system. Some go as far
as wanting to hold other individuals accountable for
the consequences of their own actions.
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are claimed as fundamental . . . . To the extent that
we believe the fundamental equations to be true, we
are forced by the evidence to be ontological determinists” (Barrow and Tipler, 1986, p. 138-139). For
physicists, “in most of our SUPERB theories there is
a clear-cut determinism, in the sense that if the state
of the system is known at any one time, then it is completely fixed at all later (or indeed earlier) times by the
equations of the theory. In this way there seems to be
no room for ‘free will’ since the future behaviour of a
system seems to be totally determined by the physical laws.” (Penrose, 1989, p. 431). And yet, for all this,
“Biologists can rarely predict the future states of the
systems they study” (Marks, 2009, p. 62).
Starting with general relativity, things begin to get
more complicated. “’Determinism’ in general relativity
is a good deal more complicated a matter than in special relativity . . . . In the first place, we must use a spacelike surface S for the specification of initial data (rather
than just a simultaneous surface). Then it turns out
that the Einstein equations do give a locally deterministic behaviour for the gravitational field, assuming
(as is usual) that the matter fields contributing to the
tensor ENERGY behave deterministically. However,
there are considerable complications. The very geometry of the space-time—including its light cone ‘causality’ structure—is now part of what is being actually
determined. We do not know this light-cone structure
ahead of time, so we cannot tell which parts of S will
be needed to determine the behaviour at some future
event P. In some extreme situations it can be the case
that even all of S may be insufficient, and global determinism is consequently lost! . . . It would seem to be
highly unlikely that any possible such ‘failure of determinism’ that might occur with ‘extreme’ gravitational
fields could have any direct bearing on matters at the
human scale of things, but we see from this that the
question of determinism in general relativity is not at
all so clear-cut as one might wish” (Penrose, 1990, p.
215-16). So there are some potential problems with
ontological determinism. That, however, is not the only
form of determinism.
“Methodological determinism holds that in the study
of complex phenomena, such as living beings, we
should always look for deterministic laws governing
the phenomena.” But as a practical matter, “this form
of determinism is much too strong. It is often the case

that complex phenomena are better described by statistical laws in which chance is fundamental” (Barrow
and Tipler, 1986, p. 139). So when living beings are
being discussed, the complexity renders determinism
unusable.
Living beings are not the only example where determinism is impractical.“Behaviour that appears random
to us—for example, fluid turbulence—is described by
mathematical models that exhibit a very sensitive dependence on initial conditions. These mathematical
models are deterministic in principle but not in practice: in order to know the state of the system precisely
at any future time one must know its initial state exactly. In practice, there always exists some minute error in our knowledge of the initial state, and this error
is amplified exponentially in the evolution time of the
system, so that very soon we have no idea where the
state of the system resides. Laplacian determinism is
impossible” (Barrow and Tipler, 1986, p. 119).
Barrow and Tipler also provide an explanation of
why determinism, from a psychological point of view
is so impractical as to be impossible:
“It seems likely that such a purely causal, non-teleological and complete explanation of purposeful biological behaviour would be so complex that no such
explanation will ever be achieved. That justification
for this assertion is a simple numerical estimate of the
complexity of living beings. The amount of information that can be stored in a human brain is estimated
to be between 1010 and 1015 bits, with the lower number assuming there is one bit stored on the average for
each of the brains 1010 cells. Now about 1% to 10% of
the brain’s cells are firing at any one time, at a rate of
about 100 hertz. This gives a computation rate of 10
to 1000 gigaflops (a gigaflop is 109 floating point computations per second. The lower bound of 10 gigaflops
is about the rate at which the eye processes information before it is sent to the brain . . . .
“But only the information which a human being
can process consciously, or hold in the forefront of the
mind, can be used in forming a humanly acceptable
explanation. We don’t know exactly how much this
would be, but it is comparable in order of magnitude
to the information coded in a single book, which is
typically 1 to 10 million bits. No explanations humans
have ever dealt with has been as complex as this . . . .
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“This argument assumes of course that we require
at least 1010 bits—the lower bound of the brains capacity of the human mind—in order to carry out a
numerical simulation of a human being. If anything,
this is a wild underestimate, because it ignores roundoff errors. Even more important, in fact the essential
point in estimating the difficulty of carrying out at
numerical simulation of a living creature, is that the
actions of living creatures are unstable from the causal
(numerical simulation) point of view: a tiny change
in the initial input or stored information can lead to
a drastic change in the macroscopic behaviour. For
this reason it is not possible to reduce substantially
the amount of data required in a simulation much below 1010 bits.” (Barrow and Tipler, 1986, p. 136-137).
Barrow and Tipler argue that complex systems cannot be completely understood or explained by causal
arguments, but “we will find teleological explanations
of its actions more useful than causal ones, at least in
understanding its most complex behaviour.” (Barrow
and Tipler, 1986, 137). Thus, Schwartz, Stapp, and
Beauregard maintain, “Until recently, virtually all attempts to understand the functional activity of the
brain have been based, at least implicitly, on some
principles of classic physics that have been known to
be fundamentally false for three-quarters of a century.”
(2005, p. 1310)
Determinism also runs into problems from quantum mechanics. “Even the U part of quantum mechanics [the evolution process described by Schrödinger’s
equations] has this completely deterministic character. However, the R ‘quantum-jump’ part [formed by
the squared moduli of quantum amplitudes to obtain
classical probabilities] is not deterministic, and it introduces a completely random element into the timeevolution.” (Penrose, 1989, p. 431).
“Epistemological determinism holds that it is possible,
using the deterministic fundamental evolution equations (which are assumed to exist), to compute and
hence predict the future behaviour of complex systems,
in particular the future behaviour of living organisms.
This form of determinism we also deny. The theory of
quantum mechanics itself tells us that it is impossible
to get the necessary information to predict the future
wave function, even though the future wave function
is in fact determined. We have argued at length above
that the behaviour of living organisms like ourselves

is too complex to be predictable by beings of similar
complexity” (Barrow and Tipler, 1986, p. 139).
Roger Penrose (1990) has provided an argument
for the impossibility of determinism in the human
brain from quantum mechanics. Penrose (1990, p.
400) notes that “there is, in fact, at least one clear
place where action at the single quantum level can
have importance for neural activity, and this is in the
retina. (Recall that the retina is technically part of the
brain!) Experiments with toads have shown that under suitable conditions, a single photon impinging on
the dark-adapted retina can be sufficient to trigger a
macroscopic nerve signal. The same appears to be true
of man.” Penrose (1990, p. 400) then goes on to ask,
“Since there are neurons in the human body that can
be triggered by single quantum events, is it not reasonable to ask whether cells of this kind might be found
somewhere in the main part of the human brain?”
Since single quantum events (which are not deterministic) can trigger macroscopic nerve signals in the
brain, we cannot say that the brain behaves in a deterministic fashion (cf. Gardner, 2013, p. 23-24). More
recent work argues that “certain structural features of
ion conductance channels critical to synaptic function
entail that the classic approximation fails in principle
to cover the dynamics of a human brain. Quantum dynamics must be used in principle.” Thus non-deterministic quantum mechanics definitely plays a role in “the
conscious choices by human agents” (Schwartz, Stapp,
and Beauregard, 2005, p. 1310).
Other arguments have been made from neuroscience against determinism (Balaguer, 2009; Schwartz,
Stapp and Beauregard, 2005).
Using quantum mechanics as an example provides
a way to talk about probable outcomes. We can see
a range of possible reactions and even chart probable
outcomes given initial constraints but that does not
determine the decisions of any particular individual.
Quantum mechanics can determine the probabilities
that certain outcomes will occur given the way the experiment is constructed and these probabilities match
the aggregate data of many particles but they cannot
predict the behavior of a particular particle. In the
same way, one might construct correlations and probabilities for outcomes given initial constraints and
predict the aggregate results for large numbers of individuals but still be unable to predict the result for any
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given individual. The individual still has agency and
still chooses. This is not a Book of Mormon model per
se, but it is a model that is compatible with Book of
Mormon hypotheses.
The Book of Mormon, of course, repudiates determinism. According to the Book of Mormon, “men
are free according to the flesh; and all things are given
them which are expedient unto man. And they are free
to choose liberty and eternal life, through the great
Mediator of all men, or to choose captivity and death,
according to the captivity and power of the devil” (2
Nephi 2:27). They are thus not forced to choose but
allowed to choose. Along with that comes the accountability for the choices made. Men “have become free
forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves
and not to be acted upon, save it be by the punishment
of the law at the great and last day” (2 Nephi 2:26; cf.
2 Nephi 10:23; Alma 13:3; 30:8-9; Helaman 13:29;
14:31).
Finally, data does not necessarily support determinism. For example, the typical pattern for adolescent
sexuality in the United States is that the first sexual
experience occurs about the age of sixteen (Regnerus,
2007, p. 127-128). “Teens are likely to either not have
sex at all until late adolescence—the most common
pattern—or to have it more often and with more
than one partner. One-timers and steadies are not the
norm. Once sexual activity has commenced, it usually
continues, and with age the sexual network branches out” (Regnerus, 2007, p. 134). This is the general
pattern, and under determinism we would expect
that pattern to hold regardless of situation. And yet,
“Mormon youths are unlikely to have sex before age
18 in the first place, but if they do have sex, they’re
more likely to try it once and then refrain from further
sexual activity.” (Regnerus, 2007, p. 132-33). Of those
who have sex before marriage only 44% of Latter-day
Saint youth follow the general pattern whereas at least
82.7% to 100% of other groups do. Although the author of the study did not explore the reasons for the
difference, it is clear that some thing or combination of
things in Latter-day Saint teaching or practice made a
significant difference in the behavioral patterns. This
both defies determinism and provides an area where
further research might shed light on what is likely to
make a difference. Other religious groups may behave deterministically (and many of them believe in

determinism) but Latter-day Saints (who do not believe in determinism) do not.
Relativism

Albert Einstein published the special theory of relativity in 1905. By 1930 Squires could already talk about
“a new movement in psychology with the principle
of relativity made current and popular by the great
physicist Einstein” (Squires, 1930, p. 156). This was
explained as follows: Because “For Einstein, these
[space and time] values depend directly on the position of the observer” (Squires, 1930, p. 162) so in
Gestalt psychology “every perception, whether of a
person’s face or of anything else, exists in its own right,
is itself ” (Squires, 1930, p. 162). “Just as Einstein gave
an impetus to physics by expounding the relative nature of space and time, so the champions of the configuration psychology have been assiduously engaged
in the attempt to demonstrate the relative character
of our mental life” (Squires, 1930, p. 156). Whereas
“the traditional psychology taught that a color possesses a more or less absolute, unchanging character
. . . [the newer psychology] would seem to show conclusively that color quality is a matter relative to the
meaning borne by the quality” (Squires, 1930, p. 157).
The relativism imported into psychology was explicitly anti-religious: “Primitive man saw in human purpose the expression of the will of good and evil spirits. In nature, the lightning and the whirlwind voiced
the wrath of a god. The coming of modern science
has enabled us to understand the events of physical
nature in terms of natural causes, but the struggle to
interpret human action without reference to supernatural agencies has been long drawn out and severe”
(Squires, 1930, p. 160-161). Relativism was brought
into psychology explicitly to support naturalism. This
is yet another example of how “from its very inception
modern science was used to underpin political ideologies” (Marks, 2009, p. 47).
Relativism thus denies that there are absolute
truths. Under relativism there is only truth from a
certain point of view, and a change in that point of
view changes truth. One of the results of this philosophy, taken to its logical conclusion is that science
is not a way of discovering truth. “Through a lens of
cultural relativism, [science] becomes another way
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of producing knowledge . . . . While this should not
seem terribly threatening, it nevertheless proved to be
surprisingly threatening to one segment of the scientific community—the segment that had grown accustomed to having its authority on virtually all matters
stand without scrutiny. Presumably this was because
such relativistic approaches to knowledge contain an
implicitly repudiation of science as a source of unquestioned truth about the world. They certainly
highlight the role of science as a cultural authority.”
(Marks, 2009, p. 63). Not only does relativism undermine science, it undermines itself. If there are no privileged points of view, there is no particular reason to
privilege relativism. Relativism cannot be used to say
that a religious point of view is wrong. If all points of
view are valid, certainly any particular religious point
of view must be valid as well.
Most individual practitioners of a discipline are
happy to work within the confines of a discipline
without questioning the basic presuppositions of the
discipline. This is true in the social sciences as well as
elsewhere. It is unusual to find critiques of relativism
in disciplines like psychology. The humanities seem
to have produced more of them. Social scientists who
wish to provide a robust critique of relativism might
need to look outside their discipline.
The Book of Mormon does provide critiques of relativism. It asserts that the Spirit “speaketh of things
as they really are, and of things as they really will be;
wherefore, these things are manifested unto us plainly,
for the salvation of our souls. But behold, we are not
witnesses alone in these things; for God also spake
them unto prophets of old” ( Jacob 4:13). In spite of
various competing claims, the Book of Mormon asserts that some things are real (cf. Alma 32:35) and
that we can learn of them through the Spirit and
through various witnesses provided by God, including
prophets of old. Through these means we can come to
know of the truth ourselves (Alma 5:45-46, 48; 34:8;
36:4-6; Helaman 7:29; 15:7-8). These assertions of
the existence of an absolute truth contradict the assertions of relativism that no such truth exists.

pointing out some problematic presuppositions in
psychology that contradict the Book of Mormon. It
is a healthy thing to be aware of conflicts and potential conflicts between our academic disciplines and
the Gospel. If we really believe that we must serve
God with all our heart and mind (Deuteronomy 6:5;
1 Chronicles 28:9; Matthew 22:37; Mark 12:29-30;
Luke 10:27; Mosiah 7:33; D&C 4:2; 59:5) then we
need to use our whole minds, not just a fragmented
or compartmentalized portion of them, and all our
knowledge and learning, not just the part pertaining
to our discipline, to determine how best to serve him.
While there may be disciplines where this is not possible or appropriate, if we do not fashion a distinctively
Latter-day Saint approach to our disciplines we risk
exposure to every wind of doctrine in our academic
disciplines. We will then not be able to see when our
academic disciplines bring us in conflict with the
Gospel and be instruments in leading ourselves and
others “carefully down to hell” (2 Nephi 28:21-31).
Gantt, Wages, and Thayne have done a great service in
calling attention to the issue.
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antt, Wages, and Thayne correctly identify a
number of implicit (it could be argued explicit
as well) assumptions that accompany psychology and
psychotherapy in their current state today—naturalism, determinism, and moral relativism. These
assumptions are accurately shown to be especially
problematic to the development of a psychology and
method of psychotherapy based on the truths contained in the Book of Mormon and, as an extension,
the Restored Gospel of Jesus Christ. We concur with
the authors as they quoted Richard Williams (1998),
that the truths contained in the Book of Mormon and
the Restoration have the power to enact a “turning of
things upside down”. The existence of an active and
loving God, humanity defined by their nature as moral agents, and the idea of being accountable for how
we live in accordance to truth, are powerful coursechanging ideas. Our main concerns and perhaps the
themes of our criticism are wrapped up in two important questions: Why do we assume psychology to be
the best vehicle of delivery for the precious truths of
the Gospel? And why do we assume that psychology
can be “saved” through the infusion of the Gospel at
all?
Psychology largely appeared and became established
in response to the breakdown of basic/traditional values. Williams (2003, p.4) spoke about the field of psychology as being “. . . thrust into the cultural breach to
give meaning and stability in those very areas of life
where religion and even the family used to function.”
The problem is that psychology has chosen a delivery

system rife with questionable values—as Gantt et al.,
have pointed out in some detail. This is where we find
ourselves having much in common philosophically
with Gantt and his fellow authors. We wholeheartedly
support the efforts of Gantt et al. and others to challenge the underlying assumptions and questionable
values espoused by the field of psychology. Another
commonality we believe we share with the authors is a
commitment to Elder Neal A. Maxwell’s (1976) suggestion given to LDS social scientists nearly 40 years
ago to “become more of a link and bridge between revealed truth and the world of scholarship.” While we
commend the authors to envision that link using the
restored truth contained in the Book of Mormon, there
are some important questions left unaddressed—even
in an article designed to be sweeping and general.
How can the precious truths of the Book of Mormon
be conveyed through a discipline that takes pride in an
objective and relativistic approach to human experience? What motivation does psychology have to work
its way out of business by reinstating values that it
was designed to replace? It seems a strong temptation,
especially for LDS professionals, to attempt to infuse
the gospel into psychological practice–with hope to
improve it. The title of the article attempts to suggest
that the “keystone” provided to the LDS religion can
be translated and imported to become the keystone
of psychology. Can the keystone, therefore, be used in
this way to shore up an earthly endeavor that is actively trying to replace its inspired tenets with empirically supported treatments? What motivation might
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God have to bless the continued existence of a human
endeavor that has actively tried to usurp a measure
of influence in His children’s lives? Whether moving
from one language to another or from the religious to
the secular, the work of translation and importation
involves collateral loss. In the context of language, the
history and cultural significance is often lost or never
fully captured as a word is translated. Something new
is born, a counterfeit that tries to show its equivalence
by pointing you in the same direction—to a similar
experience—that was conveyed by the original. We
contend that a similar process takes place as we try
to take religious truth to a secular realm. Much of the
power and eternal context (of the religious truth) is
lost in the form of collateral damage in the constraining and reducing processes required by a secular science such as psychology. We once again call Williams’s
assertion to attention that psychology is thrust into a
breach where it tries to counterfeit truths and experiences far too potent and sacred to fully imitate.
We must be careful, though, not to set religion and
psychology as the poles of a false dichotomy—one is
completely true and the other completely false. We
take the stance that each is necessary, and taken together they make a more complete picture of mortality. Yet each approach stands on sufficiently different
premises that complete concordance is unlikely {e.g.
the creation/evolution}. Religion generally holds out
guiding principles, context, and aspirational ideals
without much attention to mechanisms of action or
causal relationships. These are the macro-level ideas
that provide a foundation and direction to our lives
as well as an overarching framework that allows us to
comprehend the vicissitudes of mortal life. Psychological science, on the other hand, concerns itself with
micro-level ideas without much to say about the macro—although a stated goal is to discover the macro by
examining the micro. Psychology is more concerned
with delineating order and predictability in the world
concerning human behavior (and functioning results
from micro-level realities) than it is in the origin of
that order. It is hard to argue that attention to either
the macro or the micro can be complete without attention to the other, but that is not to say that attempts
should be made to study both at the same time and in
the same ways. The authors identified three key macro-level ideas (existence of God, agency, and account-

ability) that should be incorporated into psychology.
The complication is that in order to translate macrolevel ideas into a micro-level science you have to acknowledge the collateral loses that will be incurred.
This shines light on a dilemma faced by LDS psychologists: Do we pare down eternal principles like
the phenomenon of human agency to incorporate
gospel truths into our professional work? If so, how
do we “institutionalize” agency—making it a tenet of
a theory (and defining it in terms of mechanisms of
action or causal relationships)? Or, do we ask psychology to gut and rip out its own foundation? This seems
to be the crossroads at which the authors would like
to place psychology. A tall order for a young discipline
that still after 100 years of existence has yet to solidify
a common definition of its primary subject matter—
the human being. Business as usual—compartmentalizing our faith and our profession seems to be the
easiest and least painful solution. This issue is beyond
the scope of this paper, but this example serves to illustrate how easy it is to let psychology continue to be
a counterfeit of religion, a necessary evil that pays our
bills. We cannot forget, though, that we do live in a
fallen world and our friends do still suffer. We can use
our positions, training, and skill to alleviate suffering.
In spite of being a counterfeit, we can still use psychology to help people improve their circumstances. Even
the worst counterfeit bears some semblance to the
original, and there are benefits to be gained in the application of psychology. The therapeutic relationship
has been shown to be a significant therapeutic factor.
And even when the spirit is absent in therapy, we still
have some things we can do. Let us remain humble,
however, and not make claims beyond our abilities.
{Let’s not think to create another system, or different
deliveries within the existing system, (perhaps better,
yet also/still a counterfeit) that we hold out as an approximation (substitute) for the original.}This paper,
and others like it, is essential in the ongoing dialogue
of professional psychology. We cannot do our duty,
and respond to our responsibility, without calling attention to what is missing in the counterfeit system
and asserting boldly what we believe will improve the
human condition.
As we sat down to write a response to this paper,
we found it relatively easy to compare and contrast
the strengths of religious gospel-centered truths with
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the shortcomings of psychological science. It would be
easy to let this critique end here, having only spoken of
the incompatibility between religion and science. But
that would not be very helpful. In fact, that would be
hypocritical on our part as we would be perpetuating
the “business as usual” cycle mentioned above. While
we cannot fully agree with Gantt et al., we believe this
article calls to attention an important conflict between
psychology and religion: Who are we going to allow
to define the world and what it means to be a human
being? The debate we will invite, but not finish, is to
engage these important issues using the language of
preference—because preference is the counter to contempt (Gottman, 1995) and the language of agency.
Privileging either Religion or Psychology sets in motion a competition/fight that may be irrelevant in the
end. While seriously presenting alternatives to be examined, and eventually chosen, seems useful. Stated
plainly, our call is for discussion to be held in the arena
of competing philosophies of what it means to be a human being on this planet, in this universe, at this time.
We understand that all sides of any debate ultimately
rest on unprovable beginning premises, and, therefore,
there will be no undisputed victor. The value of dialogue is not arriving at agreement that one or the other side is more correct, but rather understanding between the parties as to what the other values and then
the opportunity to choose a response to approach or
distance in the relationship. It is the ultimate expression of agency to choose the basic premises of our lives
and how we then express the operation of those premises in day to day decisions. This element of choice and
consideration needs to take a more prominent role in
ongoing debates.
We again acknowledge and applaud the authors’ skill
at articulating psychology’s underlying assumptions.
We also applaud the authors’ willingness and boldness
to counter these assumption with the truths contained
in the Book of Mormon, allowing us to envision a science informed by the keystone of the gospel. But, this
approach belies a subtle but significant problem. Trying to import revealed truth into the science of psychology situates the processes of implementation, application, and evaluation under a scientific paradigm.
We believe this will limit the importation process
because all discussion and action will be dictated by
the problematic methods and assumptions currently

plaguing psychology. In essence, we are trying to set a
keystone into an arch we knowingly identify as being
of dubious quality, and secretly (?) wish to see toppled!
This is why we suggest the scope of debate needs to be
both broadened, and engaged on a different level. In a
field with so many so-called foundational theories or
approaches vying for attention, we wonder if anyone
will care for the “Mormon” approach to therapy unless they understand, and choose, some measure of its
sacred Source and how it changes what it means to be
a being who is a child of God.
A good starting point may be questioning how psychology received the privilege of trying to define humanity in the first place: essentially trying to present
itself as a “religion.” Although psychology deflects its
action through deceptively decrying/denouncing its
objectives as religious, yet it engages the essential religious questions and takes adherents away from other
religions—essentially competing in the religious arena. Psychology arrived late to the conflict between science and religion as they have struggled for primacy
as a source of truth and knowledge. Psychology has
had to hit the ground running as it were in order to
keep up—a fact that is reflected in the field’s shaky
foundational premises. The assumptions underlying
psychology, as delineated by the authors, inform the
definitions of humanity as psychology attempts to understand the type of creature we happen to be. These
assumptions also play out in the therapy room in the
form of techniques prescribed to instill the values and
skills that will lead to the optimal performance of said
creatures. This is analogous to how the religious doctrines or revealed truths of the LDS church (or any
other religion) inform what it means to be a human
being. Principles, ordinances, and covenants based in
these religious doctrines inform how we are to live a
fully flourishing life. This is how psychology took advantage of the “breach” that laid before it—by mimicking and counterfeiting what held sway in the lives of
people before the discipline even existed. This is where
we need to challenge psychology and engage in the
debate for defining what is. We need to not only recognize that psychology is a late-comer trying to catch
up, but that psychology is openly rebelling against the
more established religious truth. This rebellion not
only calls attention to itself in order to garner some
sense of legitimacy, but like all rebellions, results in the
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creation of a new entity similar to what had been rebelled against. Rebellion against a government results
in a new type of government that will replace it. Similarly, rebellion against a religion will result in a new
type of religion—namely the field we call psychology.
Once we understand that what is at stake is larger
than merely adding new concepts to our professional
discipline; we are motivated to question psychology’s
legitimacy and authority to answer questions about
our eternal nature. We are also more able to question
whether it is possible, as psychology suggests, to compartmentalize our profession away from our religion.
Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of waiting for these great debates to be resolved when a client
shows up at our office door. Likewise, we are not all
left to do the deep philosophy. We each can (and do)
examine the ways the great debates and deep philosophy show up in the world. We can be swept along by
the cultural norms of the day, be constrained by the
traditions of our fathers, join with those we consider
our friends, experiment with multiple paradigms until we find one we find adequate, look for something
new when an old approach fails, or myriad other ways
to encounter and choose a paradigm for our individual lives and professional practice. Stated in the most
practical and pragmatic way: How do we get truth
into the therapy room? While we cannot endorse the
keystone approach, we do know that the most powerful tool a therapist has is himself in the therapeutic
relationship. And by being a gospel-centered therapist
(Gleave, 2012) who strives to live and embody the
truths of the restored gospel, something beyond our
capabilities can be brought to the therapy relationship.
On this note we end by echoing Elder Maxwell that an
LDS scholar should not only be building bridges, but
have “his citizenship in the kingdom, but [carry] his
passport into the professional world—not the other
way around.”

Gleave, R.L. (2012). Being a Gospel Centered “Therapist” Matters: A Response to Authors. Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy, 34(1), 53–59.
Gottman, J. M. (1995). In Silver N., John Gottman w. N. S.
(Eds.), Why marriages succeed or fail: And how you can make
yours last (1st Fireside ed. ed.) New York: Fireside.
Maxwell, N. A. (1976). Some thoughts on the gospel and the
behavioral sciences. BYU Studies, 16, 589–602.
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While extensive replies to each one of the authors
who so graciously responded to our work is unfortunately not possible given space constraints, we would
nonetheless like to briefly note some reactions to their
offered commentaries. We were especially pleased so
many of the respondents opted to take our analysis
as an invitation to further critical reflection on questions and issues in their own areas of psychological
theory and practice. In particular, we very much enjoyed the way in which our respondents chose to explore the expansive possibilities that Book of Mormon
teachings have for those seeking to ground their psychological thinking and practice in something other
than the philosophy of naturalism so pervasive in our
discipline. Thus, we very much welcome Richardson’s
meditation on the question of human agency and how
it might be more deeply articulated and appreciated
in both psychological theory and psychotherapeutic
practice. Similarly, we found Draper’s suggestions for
some very specific ways in which the LDS professional
might be able to live-out the Christian worldview of
the Book of Mormon in non-Christian/secular settings, and do so in ways that their non-Christian peers
can both understand and respect, to be quite helpful
and thought-provoking. His discussion of compassion
as a central guiding principle for genuinely Christian
therapeutic practice is important and worthy of careful consideration by all LDS therapists.

s a scholar it is always an honor to have one’s ideas
carefully considered by one’s colleagues, especially – as in this instance – when such consideration is
undertaken by those whose scholarly efforts have long
been so influential on one’s own thinking and whose
penetrating insights have consistently proven their
intellectual worth. We are, thus, truly grateful for the
time and energy and serious consideration the various respondents to our article (“The Keystone of our
Science: Exploring the Premises and Promises of the
Book of Mormon for Psychology and Psychotherapy”)
have invested in engaging the arguments and ideas we
presented there. We have been genuinely challenged,
edified, and enlightened by the thoughtful commentaries and critiques offered by Michael Richardson,
Matthew Draper, John Gee, and Robert Gleave in
their various responses to our exploration of the possible impact that taking the Book of Mormon more
seriously might have for LDS psychologists wishing to ground their research, practice, and theorizing
more explicitly in its teachings. We can only hope the
sort of intellectual dialogue initiated here may in the
end prove not only to be an opportune invitation to
greater discussion of these and related issues among
LDS scholars, but also an effective framework for how
to conduct such discussions in a manner that is both
sophisticated and charitable.
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Although his overall response was more critical of
our analysis and proposal than the other respondents,
we nonetheless found ourselves very much in agreement with Gleave’s caution against the all-too-common temptation among LDS practitioners to infuse
contemporary psychological science with doctrines of
the restored gospel of Christ in the vain hope of effecting some sort of harmonious reconciliation between
the two. Taking the gospel of Christ seriously, in both
the scholarly arena of our academic disciplines and in
our professional lives, is one that demands a high level
of sophistication, a very cautious tread, and an unfailing willingness to seek for the spirit of discernment
every bit as much as the gift of knowledge.
In addition to the contributions and comments offered by our fellow psychologists, we were particularly
heartened to see some of the ways Gee, as a non-social
scientist, was able to take up issues we identified and
broaden the conversation by offering a fresh perspective from outside the discipline of psychology. Gee’s
penetrating analysis demonstrates again that the
Book of Mormon embodies intellectual implications
that not only span across many academic disciplines,
but which also reach deeply into the very heart of the
modern world. In the end, for us, such critically reflective and positively expansive dialogue among LDS
scholars and practitioners is precisely what our article
was intended to stimulate in the first place.
In the spirit of continuing the dialogue our article
initiated, as well as in the hope of providing further
clarification of our own position, we would like to
briefly draw attention to a couple of the relatively few
instances in which we believe our respondents may
have misread or misunderstood our argument. Draper, for example, seems not to have fully appreciated (or,
perhaps, has not been fully persuaded by) our argument that naturalistic psychology is not, in fact, a study
of the natural man. Contrary to his assertion that “the
study of psychology assuming naturalism is the study
of the natural man” (see also Smith & Draper, 2005),
we believe that any reading of the nature of the natural man as a “determined natural object rather than a
moral agent” (Draper, this volume) reflects a common
misreading of King Benjamin’s famous discourse. We
are convinced, and believe we have clearly shown, that
the assumption of moral agency is pervasive throughout King Benjamin’s analysis of the natural man. For

example, according to King Benjamin, the natural man
is an enemy to God—not by his fundamental nature
as a determinately selfish object but as a willfully rebelling moral agent yielding to the invitations of the
Adversary. Further, the natural man is an enemy to
God only insofar, and only for as long as, he refuses to
“yield to the enticings of the Holy Spirit” and chooses
not to “putteth off the natural man” by being “willing
to submit to all things which the Lord seeth fit . . .”
(Mosiah 3:19). Clearly, whatever else may be the case,
for King Benjamin, the natural man is fundamentally
a moral agent and not a natural object whose behavior
and psychological life are merely subject to impersonal
natural forces and physical conditions. Thus our claim
is that naturalistic psychology does not even offer an
adequate understanding of “the natural man” because
it rejects the fundamental reality of moral agency in
all meaningful and purposive human behavior. At
best, then, we would say naturalistic psychology is not
in fact the study of the natural man (i.e., fallen and
sinful man), but rather the study of the natural man
from the sinful and falsifying perspective of the natural man. That is, man in rebellion against God seeking
justification for sin by denying his own moral agency
and accountability, as well as rejecting the reality of
genuine and transcendent moral distinctions.
On balance, however, this disagreement as to the
meaning of the concept of “natural man” is really a
relatively minor quibble when considered in the larger
context of Draper’s otherwise excellent and powerful article. Somewhat more serious, in contrast, is our
disagreement with Gleave’s reading of our argument.
Again, due to limited space, we will forgo offering any
lengthy analysis or full-blown response here. However, we do wish to note that we firmly believe that what
Gleave has identified as his main concerns and themes
of criticism are, in fact, misplaced since they seem to
be aimed at arguments we did not make and positions
we do not hold. Thus, when Gleave asks, “Why do we
assume psychology to be the best vehicle of delivery
for the precious truths of the Gospel?,” we can only
respond that we have no answer to this question because such is not what we assume, nor is it a position
for which we would wish to argue. We most emphatically do not believe that psychology is the best vehicle
for the delivery of the precious truths of the Gospel.
Rather, we believe sacred scripture and prophetic ut54
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terance, coupled with the soul-to-soul witnessing of
the Holy Ghost, to be the best vehicle of delivery for
the precious truths of the Gospel. Psychology, on the
other hand, is simply one avenue of interaction among
many in which we human beings attempt to serve and
understand one another.
Of course, we are fully aware that, even if grounded
in a thoroughly Latter-day Saint perspective, any psychology or psychotherapy by itself would be wholly
inadequate absent the soul-changing revelatory power
of the Holy Ghost. At best, then, we envision a psychology in which LDS (and other, like-minded Christian) practitioners and professionals can enjoy a conceptual and practical space wherein human agency and
moral accountability, as well as the gifts of the Spirit
and the healing powers of the Atonement of Christ,
have place to be manifest, be recognized for what they
are, and be defended in an intellectually sophisticated
and respectable manner. We do not seek to articulate,
or even advocate for, any particular LDS Psychology
or Psychotherapy, so much as to help our fellow LDS
psychologists recognize the many subtle—and sometimes not so subtle—ways in which a philosophy of
naturalism that is toxic to the reality of the Restored
Gospel permeates contemporary psychological theory,
research, and practice. Our hope is that in doing so
they might not only reconsider their intellectual and
moral commitments to such a psychology, but they
might also re-examine the teaching of sacred scripture as a means of re-envisioning what psychological
research and therapeutic practice might otherwise be
were it to be constructed on a vastly different intellectual foundation.
Similarly, we doubt we can provide a satisfying answer to Gleave’s second question (“And why do we assume that psychology can be ‘saved’ through the infusion of the Gospel at all?”) because we do not believe
that psychology can or ought to be “saved through an
infusion of the Gospel”—particularly if one maintains
that psychology must of necessity be understood only
as a study of human behavior grounded in and directed by naturalistic assumptions and serving naturalistic
aims and goals. The philosophy of naturalism and the
Restored Gospel of Jesus Christ are at root fundamentally incompatible worldviews, entailing profoundly
divergent truth claims and understandings of reality.

However, naturalistic psychology, or psychology
grounded in naturalistic assumptions, is not (or at
least need not be) synonymous in either content
or meaning with psychology, because psychological
theorizing, research, and practice can be grounded
in non-naturalistic assumptions. We have little hope
that psychology as a professional discipline will (in the
foreseeable future), as a whole, relinquish is deeplyrooted naturalism, but we do not feel the need to identify the profession as a whole by its prevailing naturalistic assumptions. Thus, while naturalistic psychology
may be fundamentally antagonistic to Gospel truth,
psychology need not be, if we can create space for an
ideological pluralism within the discipline. Psychology
as a research discipline and therapeutic practice has
lengthy history of creating room for a number of vastly different and competing philosophical paradigms
(consider, for example, the philosophical and theoretical differences between Behaviorism and Humanism,
or Psychoanalysis and Existentialism), as well as a
willingness to treat differing perspectives as legitimate
contributions to the ongoing discussion of what human beings are and how therapy could be conducted.
As such, our goal is not to “modify” existing theories
by inserting into them Gospel concepts, or to frame
naturalistic psychology in ways that we think are more
compatible with Gospel precepts.1 Our vision is not
to “save” these many competing traditions, but merely
to provide an alternative philosophical grounding to
them for both the research and practice of psychology
and psychotherapy, one in which moral agency, meaningful divine activity, and genuine moral accountability are taken seriously. Our hope is, rather, that our
colleagues can help us undertake such a project (and
many have already striven to do just that), and to articulate and defend the theoretical foundations of such
a perspective in a way that earns a place at the table
of discussion within the discipline. After all, if Carl
Rogers can carve out a space for his worldview in the
discipline—a worldview that in many ways departed
substantially from the deterministic theories of his
day, even if not in a way that satisfies (or should satisfy) Latter-day Saints—then so can we.
1. The many intellectual and spiritual dangers of such an endeavor
have already been amply articulated by Sorenson in his masterful
and still deeply relevant 1981 article, “The Shotgun Marriage of
the Psychological Therapy and the Gospel of Repentance.”
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In short, then, the purpose of examining psychology from a perspective grounded in the truths of the
Restored Gospel and the Book of Mormon is not so
much to rescue naturalistic psychology from some set
or subset of its excesses, nor is it merely to provide
some religiously sensitive minor correctives. Rather,
we propose an alternative will challenge and overturn
it by providing an intellectually viable and spiritually
honest alternative to naturalistic models of psychological theorizing and practice. It is in that spirit that
we chose to open our article by stating the wish to
examine some of the ways in which the teachings of
the Book of Mormon “might invite Latter-day Saint
scholars to conscientiously dissent from the prevailing
tenets of psychological research, and offer an alternative perspective instead” (Gantt, Wages, & Thayne,
this volume). Likewise, it is why we bring our paper to
a close by again stating:

of the assumptions, doctrines, and worldview of the
Restored Gospel of Jesus Christ, particularly as found
in the keystone of our religion.

we wish only to draw attention to the fact that the
Book of Mormon contains certain basic and significant truth claims about the nature of human nature
and that LDS psychologists would do well to carefully
and deeply consider such claims as they evaluate rival
claims of the naturalistic psychologies in which they
have been trained. Such consideration would seem to
require, at the very least, a thoughtful and penetrating sifting of theories, methods, and practices that are
founded upon (often hidden) naturalistic assumptions
that deny or minimize the reality of moral agency and
meaning. Somewhat more expansively, it may also require the formulation and championing of alternative
modes of research and practice that are not only more
attentive to the fundamentally moral and meaningful
nature of human agency, but which also rigorously articulates a genuinely theistic framework within which
to approach the study of human behavior.

Richardson, M. J. (2014). Book of Mormon premises in psychology and psychotherapy: A unique approach? Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy.
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In other words, we are not in the business of seeking
to “save” psychology by infusing it with Gospel practices, ideas, or ideals. Rather, we simply wish to encourage LDS psychologists to engage in deeper reflection
on the nature of the intellectual and spiritual commitments of their chosen discipline, and to do so in light
of the profound truths about God, man, and the universe that are contained in the Book of Mormon. We
believe it is well past time when LDS psychologists—
long accustomed to examining their faith in the light
of theories and therapies of naturalistic psychology—
began to carefully examine their psychology in light
56

Scrupulosity: Practical Treatment Considerations

Weir, Greaves, Denno, Kelm, Ragu

Scrupulosity: Practical Treatment Considerations Drawn
from Clinical and Ecclesiastical Experiences with
Latter-day Saint Persons Struggling with
Religiously-oriented Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
Kyle N. Weir, Ph.D., LMFT
Mandy Greaves, M.S.
Christopher Kelm, M.S.
Rahul Ragu, B.S.
California State University

Rick Denno, M.S.

Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences

Scrupulosity, a religiously-oriented form of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), is both a clinical matter for
treatment and can be an ecclesiastical concern for members, therapists, and priesthood leaders of the Church
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S

crupulosity is emerging as a recognized subtype of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) pertaining to religious-oriented obsessions and compulsions (Abramowitz
et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2006; and Olatunji et al., 2007).
Essentially, scrupulosity is a form of obsessive-compulsive
disorder, which manifests as religious symptoms. Both
scrupulosity and obsessive-compulsive disorder have two
features that must be present in order to make an accurate
diagnosis; (1) intrusive thoughts (obsessions) and (2) actions to neutralize the intrusive thoughts (compulsions).
While many individuals suffering with OCD may experience a wide range of symptoms or issues, such as contamination obsessions, pathologic doubt, need for symmetry,
sexual obsessions, and compulsive hand-washing/cleaning
among others (see Ciarrochi, 1995 for a complete review of
symptoms), people who struggle with scrupulosity primarily manifest their symptoms through religious-based issues
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argues that the individual must experience fear from
the obsession and simultaneously attempt to prevent
the compulsion.
Ciarrocchi (1995) describes the symptoms of scrupulosity as “seeing sin where there is none,” (p. 5).
Prominent symptoms of scrupulosity include excessive and inappropriate guilt, worry, and doubt.
Although these symptoms are perceived to be related
to the individual’s religious beliefs, these persons often find no solace in seeking reassurance or guidance
from religious officials. This inability to be reassured
results in significant impairment in the individual’s
daily functioning (Hepworth et al., 2010). As stated
in Steketee, Quay and White (1991), Rosen suggests
that the excessive guilt experienced by the scrupulous
person is what perpetuates the compulsive behaviors
and fearful obsessions.
Ciarrocchi (1995) illustrates in his book, The
Doubting Disease: Help for Scrupulosity and Religious
Compulsions, how symptoms of scrupulosity are exhibited and perpetuated by fears and anxiety. Ciarrocchi
(1995) offers a case example of a symptom theme of
causing harm or injury to other people, which is considered a sin. In this example, the obsession is a “nurse
[who] worries he will miscalculate medications and injure [the] patient” (Ciarrocchi, 1995, p. 46). The compulsion is the nurse will “check [the] dosage frequently.
[Who] eventually gives up nursing” (Ciarrocchi, 1995,
p. 46). He continues by explaining that this may be
why patients are resistant to sharing these feelings and
urges (Ciarrocchi, 1995).
Earliest known cases of scrupulosity are found in early prominent religious reform leaders and founders of
religious societies. These cases include Martin Luther,
English Puritan writer John Bunyan and Spanish
founder of the Jesuits, Ignatius Loyola. Luther’s symptoms became evident when he celebrated his first mass
in 1517. He feared that an act of omission during the
mass would be a sin, even if this was an accidental
omission (Cefalu, 2010). Based on early cases, Freud
theorized that religion was an “obsessional ritual” and
further recognized a similarity between religious rituals
and defense mechanisms” (Zoher, Goldman, Calamary,
& Mashiah, 2005, p. 858; Ciarrocchi, 1995). Theorists
today on the other hand, agree that scrupulosity is a
psychological disorder as opposed to Freud’s theory of

(though they may exhibit other OCD symptoms, as well).
Often scrupulosity is described as “the doubting disease” or
“seeing sin where there is none” (Ciarrochi, 1995; Nelson et
al. 2006). The symptoms of this disorder are invasive and
distressing in the individual’s daily functioning and can impair occupational, social, and family relationships.

Often a person exhibiting scrupulosity will first seek
help from a religious official believing that the symptoms are a religious-based issue, as opposed to a mental health issue. This is the first obstacle that clinicians
face in the treatment of this disorder. Furthermore, religious officials may make the mistake of inadvertently
reinforcing the distress and anxiety associated with
scrupulosity by viewing the concerns solely through
a religious perspective. In addition to this obstacle,
people living with scrupulosity are often suspicious
of mental health professionals, believing that the clinician is ignorant of their religious beliefs or will attempt to convert them to anti-religious practices. For
this reason, appropriate co-consultation between the
individual’s religious leader and the treating clinician
is advisable. This study presents practical treatment
considerations to assist therapists, counselors, and
other clinicians treating LDS persons who are struggling with scrupulosity based on the research and our
clinical experience working with this population.
Literature
Definitions and Symptoms

Scrupulosity has two essential features of diagnostic criteria; “(1) recurrent intrusive thoughts, urges,
doubts, or images that, although perceived as senseless, evoke anxiety (obsessions); and (2) repeated
urges to perform excessive overt or covert rituals to
neutralize the anxiety” (Abramowitz, Deacon, Woods,
& Tolin, 2004, p. 70). The religious manifestation of
the obsessions and compulsions distinctly identifies scrupulosity from obsessive-compulsive disorder.
The obsessions (thoughts), for scrupulosity take form
as “persistent doubts and fears about sin, blasphemy,
and punishment from God” (Hepworth, Simonds,
& Marsh, 2010, p.1). The compulsions (actions),
take the form as “excessive religious behavior such as
repeated praying and seeking reassurance about religious beliefs” (Hepworth et al., 2010, p.1). In order to
meet the criteria for scrupulosity, Ciarrocchi (1995)
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using religion to escape “unconscious impulses” (Zoher
et al., 2005, p. 858).

(2001) believe that it may be the culture that places
more emphasis on religion, which contributes to the
expressions of these types of religious symptoms.
Yorulmaz, Gencoz, and Woody (2009) and Zohar
et al. (2005) agree that religiosity contributes to the
symptoms of scrupulosity. Yorulmaz et al. (2009) discovered an association between the level of religiousness and the symptoms experienced by scrupulosity.
Zohar et al. (2005), states that although the relationship between the obsessions and compulsions and
religiosity is vague, those individuals who practiced
religious beliefs and who have strengthened their religious beliefs demonstrate higher obsessive-compulsive
behaviors. Sica, Novara, and Sanavio (2002) add that
individuals with high devoutness experienced higher
levels of obsessions and cognitions then individuals
with low levels of devoutness.
Moral thought-action fusion (TAF) is one theory
that attempts to explain the source of scrupulosity symptoms. Moral TAF is the association that immoral thoughts are the equivalent to immoral actions.
Since scrupulosity exhibits symptoms based on fears
of sin and fears of God, moral TAF drives these fears
and anxiety further by equating thoughts with behavior (Hepworth et al., 2010). Christian bible passages
such as Matthew 5:27-28 (King James version), support this theory stating, “Ye have heard that it was said
by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery:
But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her
already in his heart” (Matthew 5:27-28 KJV). Thus
to a scrupulous person, the consequences of immoral
thoughts are construed to be the same as the consequences of immoral behavior, and this again perpetuates the anxiety associated with these symptoms (Siev,
Chambless, & Huppert, 2010).
One problem with this theory is that it may only
applicable to Christian based religions. According to
a study conducted by Siev, Chambless, and Huppert
(2010), moral TAF is culturally normative to Christian
religions, and may not readily apply to religions such
as Judaism or Islam. These authors continue to say,
moral TAF varies by religion and is inconsistently associated with religious symptoms (Siev et al., 2010).

Distinguishing Between Normal Religious Behavior and
Pathological Behavior

A challenge for most clinicians working with scrupulosity is distinguishing the line between “normal” religious behavior and pathological neurosis. The term
“normal” is based on the particular religion in which
an individual practices, due to the varying amount of
beliefs and rituals between religions, denominations,
and sects. Some signs distinguishing pathological
symptoms from normal behavior include: 1. If the
behavior exhibited by the individual exceeds what is
required set by religious doctrine, 2. If the behavior
is focused on insignificant religious rituals, thus ignoring other important aspects of their religious beliefs, and 3. If the symptoms resemble signs of OCD,
for example, compulsions for checking or cleansing
(Ciarrocchi, 1995).
Ciarrocchi (1995) argues that symptoms are frequent, intense and last much longer than religious
rituals ought to. Similar to OCD features, the scrupulous person imagines a more horrible outcome
then it is in reality and resists the obsessions by attempting to neutralize them. The primary distinction
between OCD and scruples, is the religious nature of
the symptoms and its effects on the cognitive process.
The efficacy for treatment of scrupulosity also appears
more controversial then treatment for OCD. While
OCD treatment methods include behavioral therapy,
behavioral therapy alone (without attention to spiritual aspects of belief and behavior) may not be effective
treatment for scrupulosity (Ciarrocci, 1995).
Causes of Scrupulosity

The cause of scrupulosity is one of the most controversial topics associated with this disorder. Researchers
have examined whether the degree to which the individual believes in a religion is the cause of religious
obsessions, or if it is caused by cultural influences.
Tek and Ulug (2001) argue scrupulosity is not associated with religiosity, but is simply the manifestation
of symptoms. In their study conducted in 2001, Tek
and Ulug found no association between the religious
practices of the person and the obsessive-compulsive
symptoms. Instead of religious practices, Tek and Ulug
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Clinicians face several obstacles in identifying and
treating patients with scrupulosity. Often, the first
contact made by a scrupulous person will be a church
leader based on the nature of this disorder (Hepworth
et al., 2010). This may be detrimental to the individual, if the church leader is unaware of scrupulosity and fails to refer the church member to a therapist. Another possibility is the clergy member may
say something to the scrupulous person to perpetuate the anxiety and fears associated with scrupulosity
(Huppert & Siev, 2010).
From the perspective of the scrupulous person, they
believe this is a religious issue they are experiencing,
not a mental health issue. They also may feel that the
therapist does not have sufficient knowledge of their
religious beliefs to state whether these behaviors are
healthy or if they are obsessions. Scrupulous persons
may also feel suspicious of psychotherapists and the
mental health field, believing that the therapist is going
to try to convert them from their religion (Huppert &
Siev, 2010; Hepworth et al., 2010). Due to the fear of
being converted from their religious beliefs and their
suspicions of the therapist, one study conducted by
Greenberg and Shefler (2002) discovered that in general, people with scrupulosity would rather seek medication for the interfering symptoms, than to attempt
traditional therapy. Scrupulous people would rather
engage in a treatment they believe will not intrude
on their religious beliefs and practices (Greenberg &
Shefler, 2002).

this increased awareness of mental health issues among
the LDS population was the publication of the book
Valley of Sorrow from an emeritus General Authority
on the topic of mental illness in the church (Morrison,
2003). Emerging from this increased awareness and
acceptance of treatment for mental health and family problems among LDS people has been a small increase in research on the topic of scrupulosity among
church members (Twohig & Crosby, 2010; Dehling,
Morrison, & Twohig, 2013). These two studies are
the only recent studies that could be found on scrupulosity that specifically focuses on treatment efficacy with LDS populations. Dehling, Morrison, and
Twohig (2013) recently published their results from
using Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT),
which is a form of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy
(CBT), with five LDS people struggling with scrupulosity. Their study indicated that use of ACT helped
reduce scrupulous-based compulsions by 74% at posttreatment and 80% at the 3-month follow-up. One of
the primary reasons they attributed to the success of
ACT with this disorder is that ACT causes the individual in treatment to address the symptoms at the
meta-cognitive level, thus helping them break out of
the anxiety-provoking thought process loop characteristic of scrupulosity. Dehlin et al. (2013) describe
ACT in the following:
ACT for OCD seeks to address the context in which
obsessions are experienced through the teaching and
practice of such concepts as acceptance of thoughts
and feelings, learning to disempower thoughts and
feelings by not giving them more significance than
they merit, mindfulness, and values-based committed action. These skills are taught through exercises,
discus¬sions, and experiential exercises and metaphors in the therapy sessions. Through weekly homework assignments, clients are able to further apply the
techniques learned in session to real-life situations and
problems. (p. 411)

Latter-day Saints and Scrupulosity

As a religious group and culture, members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints are not
immune from mental health concerns. Despite the
research indicating that active, faithful Latter-day
Saints (LDS) have significantly lower rates of suicide
(Hilton, Fellingham, and Lyon, 2002) and either lower or comparable rates of anxiety, depression, divorce,
and other mental illnesses or family problems (Bergin,
1992; Decker & Chatlin, 2000; Judd, 1999), LDS persons may experience mental health concerns like any
other group of people. Historically, LDS people were
somewhat reticent to seek counseling or therapy for a
variety of reasons (Koltko, 1992), however in recent
years there has been an increasing openness to seeking
treatment for mental health needs. One example of

Practical Treatment Considerations
Expanding the Treatment Approach Options for
LDS Persons

The lead author of t this article is currently both an
ecclesiastical leader in the church (bishop) and a parttime clinician at LDS Services, in addition to being
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a professor of marriage and family therapy. This has
granted him a rich opportunity to examine this issue
of scrupulosity from both the perspective of a clergyman and a mental health professional. Deriving from
these combined experiences, the current treatment
approach our team recommends builds upon the
previous use of ACT and CBT approaches with individuals suffering from scrupulosity by adding LDSspecific spiritual perspectives, as well. Though Dehlin
et al. (2013) recommend avoiding religious content in
their use of ACT in order to focus on metacognitive
processes, our team’s approach sees initial religious
and spiritual content discussions in the early phases
of treatment as essential for building a therapeutic
alliance and establishing a foundation of trust. This
may seem counter-intuitive to address spiritual concerns and have doctrinal/spiritual discussions while
concomitantly maintaining a goal to help the client
engage in a metacognitive break from the religiouslyoriented, anxiety-provoking thought process loop, but
experience has shown that such spiritual discussions
are a necessary precursor to any progress through
other interventions. Without establishing this spiritual foundation, the scrupulous are simply too anxious
to pursue the metacognitive work of ACT/CBT approaches. Primarily, this addresses the issue of joining
or building a relationship of trust with the client at a
spiritual level as well as other dimensions of the therapeutic relationship. Once the client is able to trust that
the therapist has expertise in religious/spiritual matters (and some authoritative experience in addressing
similarly intertwined religious/mental health concerns
as a result of one’s church service, experience, and professional training), the client suffering from scrupulosity is generally more open to receiving new ideas and
suggestions that may assist them. Once the client and
therapist have an established relationship that demonstrates respect for the client’s faith and a capacity
on the part of the therapist to speak intelligently (if
not quasi-authoritatively) on religious matters, then
the mental health treatment from a psychotherapeutic
perspective can commence.
The following steps outline our basic approach to
treating scrupulosity:
1.
Joining/Building a Relationship of Trust
2.
Assessment - Including the Penn Inventory
of Scrupulosity (PIOS)

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Ecclesiastical Consultation
Diagnosis (Including Client Acceptance of
the Diagnosis) and Treatment Plan
Medication Evaluation Referral
Spiritual Doctrine Review/Reframes
Bibliotherapy–Church/Mormon
publications; Ciarrocchi (1995) The
Doubting Disease; and Schwartz (1996)
Brain Lock among Others
ACT/CBT

Joining/Building a Relationship of Trust

Common factors research (Lambert & Barley, 2001;
Sprenkle, 2002; Sprenkle, Davis, & Lebow, 2009)
indicates how essential establishing a relationship of
trust or “joining” (Minuchin, 1974) is to the success of
any therapeutic process. With LDS persons suffering
from scrupulosity, establishing a strong clinical working relationship is crucial. Because earlier generations
of psychologists and other mental health professionals were skeptical, if not antagonistic, towards religion,
people of faith were often wary of receiving therapy.
They feared their faith would be ridiculed and were
concerned the clinician would seek to dissuade them
from being faithful to their religious tenants. For the
scrupulous believers, their worldview or perspective is
fundamentally religious, therefore any attempts to address their difficulties from a secular approach would
be suspicious, at best, and sacrilegious, at worst. So
it is essential that in the initial sessions of treatment
with a faithful believer suffering with scrupulosity
that the therapist be extremely “faith-friendly” and can
demonstrate that they understand the client’s religious
views.
Among the LDS who have a history of persecution
in the early foundational periods of the church’s rise in
the 19th century, an “us vs. them” mentality toward “the
world” sometimes persists. Thus previous generations
of Latter-day Saints were often unwilling to go to a
therapist or interpret their problems through a mental
health perspective (Kolto, 1992). Although competent therapists, regardless of their religious affiliation,
can be helpful in treating LDS OCD sufferers, scrupulosity often requires an LDS therapist—given the
high level of religious distrust that a scrupulous client
would likely feel towards an non-LDS client—or at
least consultation with an LDS therapist on the part
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of a non-LDS counselor regarding some of the unique
nuances of belief in the LDS faith. Additionally, an
LDS person with scrupulosity will likely be wary of
even an LDS therapist until the therapist has passed
some sort of client-imposed “secret test” (Broderick,
1992) that the therapist is “orthodox” or “faithful” as a
Latter-day Saint and not a “Jack-Mormon” whose religious opinions are not to be trusted. Thus some limited self-disclosure may be appropriate (for example, as
part of introducing myself—the lead author—to a client struggling with scrupulosity, I include my current
calling as a bishop1 to help ease their concerns about
“what kind of Mormon” I am). While this is not necessary with all LDS clients, persons with scrupulosity
seem to need that initial assurance they are in “spiritually-safe” hands with their new therapist. Sometimes,
as part of their “secret testing” the client will want to
discuss doctrine or ask questions about spiritual matters. While the therapist must use one’s clinical judgment as to what pieces of information would be useful
to explore and which ones are irrelevant tangents, it is
important to understand this initial penchant for the
scrupulous person to focus on spiritual questions in
the early phases of treatment as an attempt to reduce
their own anxiety about whether or not they can trust
this therapist spiritually, rather than interpreting their
questions as the client’s incapacity to resist their obsessions and compulsions (as one might conclude if
these behaviors continue in the later phases of treatment). Thus joining on a religious and spiritual level is
essential at the outset of therapy and ample time (perhaps multiple sessions) should be devoted to this early
aspect of therapy. In fact, one of the keys to success we
have seen is patience in the early phases of treatment.
Joining, assessing, consulting, diagnosing, and treatment planning cannot be rushed with the scrupulous
client. Their propensity to doubt, obsess, and vacillate
(as symptoms of OCD/scrupulosity) determines the
necessity of slow, and patient foundation building in
these early steps. In supervision, we find that therapists who rush through these early foundational stages
have poorer outcomes.

Assessment

In addition to the traditional assessments one might
use with cases of anxiety (e.g. Outcome Questionnaire,
Beck Anxiety Inventory, the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory, Family Assessment Device, and so forth),
when working with cases of scrupulosity, the Penn
Inventory of Scrupulosity (PIOS) is a requisite assessment tool. Developed by Abramowitz et al. (2002),
this 19 item self-report instrument assesses the level of
scrupulosity utilizing a Likert scale from 0-4 with zero
representing no scrupulous thoughts or behaviors and
four representing constantly experiencing scrupulous
thoughts or behaviors. Six of the 19 items pertain to
“Fears of God” and thirteen items pertain to “Fears of
Sin” (Olatunji et al., 2007). Examples of questions in
the PIOS include: “Item 1. I worry that I might have
dishonest thoughts, Item 2. I fear that I might be an
evil person, Item 3. I fear I will act immorally, Item 4.
I feel urges to confess sins over and over again, Item
15. I worry I will never have a good relationship with
God, Item 16. I feel guilty about immoral thoughts
I have had, and Item 17. I worry that God is upset
with me” (see Abramowitz et al., 2002). The PIOS has
been shown to have high levels of validity and reliability (see Abramowitz et al., 2002; Olatunji et al., 2007).
Ecclesiastical Consultation

Obtaining a release of information for purposes of
co-consultation with the LDS person’s bishop, branch
president, stake president, mission president, or other
appropriate priesthood leader is essential. Latter-day
Saints have an ecclesiastical structure that emphasizes
priesthood keys and specific responsibilities pertaining to revelation, counsel, and accountability for ward
members under the priesthood leader’s stewardship.
Therefore, consulting with the scrupulous client’s
proper priesthood leader can be a source of reassurance for the client that the therapist is not providing
counseling along a course that significantly differs
from their priesthood leader. The practice of coconsultation by LDS Family Services and other LDS
therapists with priesthood leaders consistently conforms to ethical and legal requirements (e.g. consistently obtaining signed written releases of confidential
information from the client prior to co-consultation),
and is sound clinical practice that significantly aids the
client’s treatment prognosis.

1. I often have to ensure throughout the course of treatment that
the client realizes I am not their bishop and that they must address any confessions or authoritative, ecclesiastical-requiring
concerns with their bishop who holds the keys of stewardship
for them.
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Ecclesiastical consultations have demonstrable value
in our experience with scrupulous clients. In some cases, educating priesthood leaders (who serve as clergy
from the laity and often do not have formal training in
counseling or therapy) about mental illness, OCD in
general, and scrupulosity in particular, is the first step.
Such priesthood leaders may not understand why a
member of their congregation is constantly confessing sins they have already addressed previously or just
cannot seem to stop focusing on praying “just right.”
Explaining scrupulosity gives content and context to
the priesthood leader so they can lovingly and compassionately counsel the scrupulous person.
Ecclesiastical consultations also serve the valuable
purpose of lending credibility or authority to the
therapist in the eyes of the client. If the scrupulous
person places a high value on doing what is right in the
sight of God (often as interpreted by the priesthood
leader’s perspective in whom the LDS scrupulous
person likely has high confidence), then having the
therapist and the priesthood leader on the “same page”
regarding treatment lends some borrowed trust and
credibility from the priesthood leader to the therapist.
Essentially, if the therapist can demonstrate that the
bishop and the therapist are in agreement, then client
compliance on the part of the LDS scrupulous person
increases significantly.

doubting disease” it is no wonder that doubts about
the “correctness” of the diagnosis will also ensue. This
undulation between acceptance and non-acceptance of
the diagnosis is symptomatic of their overall undulating “ups-and-downs,” “back-and-forth” of their anxieties and thought processes in their lives. Both the scripture 1 Kings 18: 21 “How long halt ye between two
opinions?” and chapter 8 of C.S. Lewis’s (1942/2001)
The Screwtape Letters, which explains why the up and
down undulation pattern in life is normal and common to all (as well as a valuable, purposeful tool God
uses in our lives to develop us) can be very helpful at
this stage of treatment.
As their confidence, acceptance, and ownership of
the diagnosis of scrupulosity is strengthened and emboldened, the therapist then proceeds to develop a
mutually agreed upon treatment plan involving medication evaluation, spiritual discussions/reframes, bibliotherapy, CBT, and ACT.
Medication Evaluation Referral

Referral to a competent medical physician (preferably
a psychiatrist) for medication evaluation and possible
prescription is another key element to treatment success. Research (Bloch et al., 2010; Shin et al., 2014) has
shown that anti-depressant medications in the classification of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors
(SSRIs) generally have positive outcome results for
improving the health and functioning of people suffering from OCD. Should a physician choose to prescribe a medication, the therapist’s role most often involves medication compliance review.

Diagnosis (Including Client Acceptance of the Diagnosis) and
Treatment Planning

Once the assessments and clinical judgment of the
therapist lead him or her to suspect a diagnosis of
OCD/scrupulosity, the therapist should work in
concert with the client to mutually agree upon the
scrupulosity diagnosis. It is crucial to remember that
the client will likely have an oscillating waxing and
waning in their confidence in the diagnosis of scrupulosity. They have usually interpreted their struggles
as primarily religiously-based for several years, so accepting a new perspective of their trials and tribulations pertaining to their symptoms as being primarily
a mentally-health-based issue with religious nuances
will take some time to assimilate and adapt to in their
thought process and emotional capacity to accept this
shift. Thus their ebb and flow of acceptance and nonacceptance of the diagnosis is understandable and predictable. Given that scrupulosity is often termed “the

Spiritual Doctrine Review/Reframes

Therapists must address the spiritual and doctrinal content of the client’s concerns and help reframe
them to a more positive and helpful perspective. The
client’s anxiety-based perspective of God may tend
to overemphasize fear, strict obedience, vengefulness,
and austerity. They may have blasphemous thoughts,
inadequate perspectives about sin and righteousness,
or feelings and compulsions towards apologizing or
confessing sins that were not really sins in the first
place (or will not believe they have been forgiven of legitimate sins for which they have truly, fully repented).
Additionally, their religiously-oriented obsessions and
compulsions may be compounded by other forms of
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OCD behaviors, including excessive washing, compulsive gambling, compulsive pornography usage and
masturbation, hoarding, or other similar, common
compulsive behaviors. Addressing some of the spiritual aspects and reframing/cognitive restructuring
along the lines of religious perspectives, may reduce
anxiety sufficiently that other treatments may begin to
be tried for those associated problems.
In terms of reframing doctrinal understandings
while counseling LDS persons with scrupulosity, it
has been helpful to emphasize the role of pre-mortal
creation and the organization of intelligences into
spirit sons and daughters of a loving Heavenly Father
who saw value in these unique intelligence and chose
to create them into His children. Further, we emphasize that God nurtured, tutored, and developed all
of us in the pre-mortal realms. A quote from Pres.
George Q. Cannon describing us pre-mortally enjoying God’s “presence and His smiles” (see Pace, 2005) is
emphasized to reframe God as a loving, smiling God
who cares about us individually and is easily pleased
with us. Reframing the spiritual perspective from
what could best be described in the classic sermon of
Jonathan Edwards’ (1741) Sinners in the Hands of an
Angry God (which the person suffering from scrupulosity probably obsesses over and personalizes) to a
more loving, benevolent, and merciful Deity as taught
in the LDS theology and tradition is thus conceptually linked with “correcting false doctrine” and therefore the scrupulous person is caught in a bind where to
continue their unhealthy, self-prosecutorial perspective would be to continue down a path that contains
the errors of the Apostasy era. This strategic juxtaposition is a catalyst for their openness to accept more
positive and healthy reframes of God and themselves.
Often clients are projecting flaws and problems
they experienced with their mortal parents onto God.
Vitz’s (2000) work regarding the psychology of atheism and faith in God as being linked with one’s early
childhood experiences with earthly parents is helpful
to further counter oppressive notions of a God who
carries the capriciousness, austerity, and judgmentalism that may have existed in the client’s earthly parentage. In exploring the client’s family of origin, we
seek to separate their feelings about their parents from
their perspective on God. We seek to help them come
to see and know God and His love through a clear

lens rather than through the cloudy and dark lens that
comes from projecting one’s earthly parents’ characteristics onto Heavenly Father. Once the client is in this
position of accepting a more loving and tender view of
God (and a Being who desires a compassionate and
understanding relationship with the client), further
scriptural and doctrinal evidence can be given adding “line upon line, precept upon precept” depending
upon the level of resistance the client raises to such
doctrinal reframes. Typical examples of scriptures
about both God’s loving nature and our non-anxious
emotional state He seeks from us that are commonly
used would be:
• D&C 18:10—“Remember the worth of souls is
great in the sight of God;” (emphasis added)
• D&C 112:4—“Let thy heart be of good cheer before my face;”
• D&C 6:36—“Look unto me in every thought;
doubt not, fear not.”
• Philippians 4:6–7—“Be careful for nothing; but in
every thing by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known unto God.
And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through
Christ Jesus.” (Also, the footnote in reference to
“careful” states that the Greek translation of the
phrase suggests “Don’t be unduly concerned about
anything.”
• Jeremiah 29:11–14—“For I know the thoughts
that I think toward you, saith the Lord, thoughts of
peace, and not of evil, to give you an expected end.
Then shall ye call upon me, and ye shall go and pray
unto me, and I will hearken unto you. And ye shall
seek me, and find me, when ye shall search for me
with all your heart. And I will be found of you, saith
the Lord.”
Bibliotherapy

Clients with scrupulosity are given certain readings to
reinforce these new spiritual concepts about a loving
God who delights in His children and wants them to
have self-worth as He sees worth in them. Elder Glenn
L. Pace’s “Confidence and Self-Worth” (Ensign, Jan.
2005, p. 32) article is a typical starting reading assignment. Much of the client’s scrupulous anxiety stems
from their feelings of low self-worth before God. Thus
building of self-esteem and confidence is valuable
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toward reducing this anxiety that underlies scrupulosity. Using authoritative sources (e.g. scriptures, general
conference talks from General Authorities, and publications from Church Magazines) helps aid the process
because the scrupulous individual finds these sources
credible.
From both an ecclesiastical and a professional position, the lead author generally asks the LDS scrupulous individual who is seeking repentance (in an
ecclesiastical role) or help (in a professional role) to
read other church-related material that will not exacerbate their condition and will reinforce the new positive spiritual paradigm about a loving God and their
personal worth that we are attempting to build. Books
such as Wilcox’s (2009) The Continuous Atonement
or Robinson’s (1992) Believing Christ are extremely
useful and powerful with the scrupulous or otherwise discouraged saints. While an impressive and
powerful work regarding repentance and forgiveness,
Pres. Spencer W. Kimball’s (1969) The Miracle of
Forgiveness (particularly his early chapters) tends
to induce greater guilt and therefore is not normally
recommended to the scrupulous persons who already
have excessive and inordinate spiritual guilt. Such
a reading assignment is used for people who are far
too comfortable in their sins and need the motivating
warning of repentance found in Kimball’s (1969) classic work. But the scrupulous are almost always motivated to repent—often they seek repentance when
they have not actually sinned. So prescribing such a
reading assignment is contraindicated in this instance.
Once the emerging new (more positive, tender,
loving, and accepting) spiritual paradigm begins to
be tentatively accepted, we will begin to assign some
readings specific to OCD and scrupulosity. Two essential books in this regard are Ciarrocchi’s (1995) The
Doubting Disease and Schwartz’s (1996) Brain Lock.
Ciarrocchi’s (1995) is a unique work from the perspective of both an associate professor of pastoral
counseling in the Catholic tradition and a clinical psychologist. His very readable text carefully reviews both
historical and contemporary examples of scrupulosity,
discusses the philosophical and theological teachings
of the centuries of religious thought concerning the
subject, and then outlines a treatment plan of CBT
interventions coupled with religious perspectives that
he finds useful in his work. His descriptions of both

OCD/scrupulous behavior and of the intricate moral
reasoning used in religious writings and teachings over
the Christian Era centuries is exceptionally well done.
Clients find that this normalizes their experiences to a
degree. They also find hope in the understanding that
treatment, though new and emerging for scrupulosity,
is available and generally effective.
In Schwartz’s (1996) book Brain Lock and Schwartz
and Gladding’s (2011) You Are Not Your Brain, this
leading research psychiatrist on neuroplasticity offers
a four-step process for the OCD/scrupulous person
to use in response to their obsessions and compulsions: 1. Relabel, 2. Reattribute, 3. Refocus, and 4.
Revalue. These steps introduce some of the concepts
of cognitive and behavioral restructuring we do with
clients in the ACT/CBT phase of treatment.
In one rare instance, a television show, Monk
(Breckman et al, 2004), was recommended to a client
struggling with OCD/scrupulosity. In fact the mother
(who was the primary client) and her two sons—literally half of the family—all suffered from this mental illness. They were very unfamiliar with OCD and
the mother, in particular, was resistant to any consideration of medications. Sensing their need for some
visual understanding of the OCD illness (though admittedly in an extreme format to create humor for the
show), I (the lead author) recommended they watch
the show Monk. I particularly hoped they would see
that although the main character (Mr. Monk) suffered with OCD, the illness was actually a unique
part of him that made him so good at what he does.
Rather than portraying someone with mental illness
pejoratively, the show highlighted his positive qualities during his struggle with OCD. I also wanted the
family to enjoy some clean humor together that might
allow for some of the tension in their relationships to
be diffused. After watching the show for a number of
weeks, the mother came to a session, thanked me for
introducing the show to her family, talked about how
much it helped them, and discussed an episode where
Mr. Monk had tried an experimental medication and
it completely relaxed him to the point of totally changing his behavior in very uncharacteristic ways. Though
she knew such a television portrayal was an exaggeration, it helped her ponder over her own situation and
she determined she was finally ready to try medications. Eventually, through medication and counseling,
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her two sons were able to improve to the point of being able to accept missionary calls and faithfully serve
in the mission field. The mother also improved significantly with treatment.
Such exposure to new ideas and possibilities to
a person previously lacking of hope can be powerful. Through articles, books, and even television or
films, persons struggling with scrupulosity can begin
to accept new perspectives that are more positive and
healthy.

the emotional and spiritual feelings. In fact, the opposite is usually the case. They have so blended their
affective issues with spiritual ones that their capacity
to differentiate is greatly impaired. Relabeling the unwanted thoughts, urges, and behaviors as OCD rather
than revelation actually begins to help them differentiate between the two and actually frees them up to have
quite different, legitimate spiritual experiences that
are affirming of them and positive. It is the first step
to being free to truly come to know God as He really
is and establishing a healthy, loving relationship with
Him without the murky lens of anxiety impeding. In
relabeling, clients are encouraged to identify their false
brain messages for what they really are: obsessions and
compulsions—not spiritual promptings or warnings
that they have sinned or might sin. Identifying their
inner emotional experience as their own mental processes frees them to truly experience spiritual experiences later on that are genuine. Relabeling begins the
metacognitive process of standing objective to one’s
self and watch or view one’s thoughts and actions from
a position of mindful awareness. Schwartz (1996)
cites Adam Smith’s concept of the “impartial and wellinformed spectator” to describe standing “meta” to
one’s self. This strengthens the LDS scrupulous person’s capacity to build healthy discernment. This step
often requires patient and persistent practice on the
part of the client. Techniques involved with relabeling and expanding the client’s metacognitive capacity
might include journaling, telling one’s obsessions to a
tape recorder in the most extreme fashion (e.g. fear of
germs—imagine falling in mud) and playing it over
and over to the point of boredom, or engaging in useful activity (because passivity is a key component of
OCD continuing to plague the individual).
Reattributing these obsessions and compulsions
to one’s OCD/scrupulosity is the next crucial step.
Clients are taught to say to themselves, “It’s not me,
it’s my brain” or “It’s not sin, it’s my scrupulosity” or
other similar refrains. Helping the client attribute
their problem to something that is totally “in their
head”—a mental process that is a false alarm rather than something to pay attention to—is the goal.
Encouraging the client to consider the metaphor
that their brain is simply “stuck in gear” and needs
some action to get it unstuck helps them prepare
to take that necessary action (step 3—refocus) and

Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy/Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy

Bibliotherapy can be a starting point for treatment
sessions. Clients who engage in such readings are given a basic framework of new language and novel ideas
to talk about their experiences. This quickly enables
the ACT/CBT work to begin in earnest.
Building upon Schwartz’s (1996) four-step model,
clients are encouraged to discuss their specific scrupulous obsessions and compulsions and then the therapist and client can explore how to relabel, reattribute,
refocus, and revalue them.
Helping the client to recognize and relabel the unwanted thoughts, urges, and behaviors as obsessions
and compulsions rather than some type of spiritual
impression that something is amiss in their life is
particularly difficult in a religious culture that consistently emphasizes heeding spiritual promptings as
revelation from God. It takes considerable practice
and life experience for the average LDS person to
distinguish between an actual spiritual prompting,
inspiration, or revelation from Heaven and a random
thought, emotional impulse, or affective experience
common to our mortal experience. But consistent
familiarity with legitimate spiritual experiences does
bring into one’s life a refinement of discernment and a
heightened capacity to differentiate between inspiration and emotion. The LDS person with scrupulosity,
however, has experiences with religion and spirituality
that have further intertwined complex emotional issues with spiritual ones to the point where their ability to judge between the two is severely impaired. It is
true they may have heightened anxiety and sensitivity about religious matters and dilemmas of right and
wrong, but that does not necessarily equate to greater
discernment and clarity about distinguishing between
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eventually dismiss the urge as undeserving of their
attention and interest (step 4 —revalue).
Refocusing is the key to helping the client move forward. Just as faith is a “principle of action and power”
(Lectures on Faith 1:10–13) that affects “both physical
and mental” exertions (verse 10), refocusing toward
wholesome activities and thoughts unrelated to the
obsessions and compulsions takes faith on the part of
the scrupulous and will bring the benefits of peace and
clarity. As the LDS person with scrupulosity engages
in other thoughts and actions and ignores the scrupulous urges, even for as short a period of time as ten to
fifteen minutes, they become empowered and become
better able to differentiate reality from obsession.
Much like the native American story of a boy with
two wolves in his heart—a good wolf and a bad wolf
—who is taught that whichever wolf will eventually
win depends on which wolf the boy chooses to feed,
persons struggling with scrupulosity are faced with
having to choose to feed one perspective or another.
As they erode the OCD based paradigm of obsessions
and compulsions, they must “starve” their obsessions
and compulsions by “feeding” the thoughts and actions
that are healthy. Refocusing gives the client the tools
to choose to focus on healthy thoughts and actions.
Revaluing is the final step in Schwartz’s (1996)
model, and is, in essence, the result of persistent and
diligent application of the first three steps. By relabeling, reattributing, and refocusing, the client comes to
see the obsessions and compulsions for what they really are—false, deceptive brain messages that are of
no value or worth. This enables the client to dismiss
them. The unwanted thoughts and behavioral urges
will likely continue to come, but the client will be able
to quickly dismiss them as of no worth or value over
time with consistent effort.
Adding to Schwartz’s (1996; Schwartz & Gladding,
2011) model, Ciarrocchi’s (1995) approach adds the
importance of keeping a record or journal of daily
dysfunctional thoughts, feelings, and behaviors along
with the power of exposure and response prevention
therapy. For example, one client, a young college age
man, was consistently ten to fifteen minutes late to
sessions. When asked why this was happening, he admitted he was trying to get his prayers “just right” and
then that would delay his preparation and travel time.
In fact, he had daily struggles with excessive praying

as well as daily fears that when he noticed a pretty girl
at work he was “lusting” after her. His prayers often
involved repenting for looking at her and thinking she
was attractive. We explored places in the scriptures
where prophets had prayed in a manner that does
not fit with the modern LDS format of beginning
prayers by addressing Heavenly Father and ending in
the name of Christ (e.g., in Alma 31:26 the prophet
Alma begins his prayer, “O, how long O Lord . . .” and
the ending of his prayer in verse 35 does not even include an “amen”). The client was asked if he felt God
had heard and accepted Alma’s prayer even though it
did not follow the formulaic model of prayer that he
(the client) is seeking to rigidly follow. He was then
asked to follow the counsel in Philippians 4:6–7 and
make his simple, heartfelt prayers of thanksgiving and
requests be made “known unto God” in whatever inarticulate manner they may be and then resist the temptation to pray again and again with the promise that
if he did so he would find the “peace which passeth
all understanding.” He might not know or understand
why such imperfect prayers work, but he would find
peace and the knowledge that they are indeed heard
and answered. This exposure to the thing he feared
the most coupled with the response prevention of not
allowing himself to pray repeatedly was exceptionally
helpful to him. Regarding the “repentance” for noticing a pretty girl at work, we carefully discussed the
distinction between righteously noticing attractiveness in a potential romantic interest and “mentally
undressing” and imagining specific sexual actions with
a person. He was encouraged that he was already resisting temptations of lust by avoiding pornography
and averting his eyes when scantily clad women were
portrayed on television, films, or magazine covers, and
so he was to be commended for his efforts to be pure.
But in avoiding the righteous attractiveness of a potential dating companion, he was “looking beyond the
mark” (see Jacob 4:14) and taking a good thing too far.
In modern terms, he was allowing a “strength” to become his “downfall” (Oaks, 1994). He was encouraged
to take action and talk to her to develop a friendship.
In time, he was encouraged to ask her out on a date.
This exposure to the very thing he was afraid of was
very helpful because he had to take action and dismiss
his former perceptions that held him bound.
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Lastly, from Dehlin et al. (2013) we suggest specific,
weekly, active homework assignments idiosyncratic
to the clients particular concerns. Getting the client
to “stay busy” (Schwartz, 1996) and avoid passivity is
essential. Whether it is physical exercise, socializing,
attending church social events, or engaging in some
other meaningful labor or effort, active homework assignments help them to consistently and repetitively
refocus and revalue.

Journal of Medical Humanities, 31(2), 111–125.
Ciarrocchi, J. W. (1995). The Doubting Disease: Help for Scrupulosity and Religious Compulsions. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.
Dehlin, J. P., Morrison, K. L., & Twohig, M. P. (2013). Acceptance and commitment therapy as a treatment for scrupulosity in obsessive compulsive disorder. Behavior Modification,
37(3), 409–430.
Edwards, J. (1741). Sinners in the hands of an angry God. (Retrieved from http://edwards.yale.edu/research/majorworks/sinners-in-the-hands-of-an-angry-god, 9-23-13).

Conclusion

Greenberg, D., & Shefler, G. (2002). Obsessive compulsive disorder in ultra orthodox Jewish patients: A comparison of
religious and non religious symptoms. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 75(2), 123–130.

LDS persons with scrupulosity experience a great deal
of suffering. Fortunately, emerging treatment trends
show great promise. The model described in this article builds on the recent trends in ACT/CBT treatment for OCD, but adds several practical treatment
considerations. A careful and patient emphasis on
joining, assessment, ecclesiastical consultation, diagnosis and treatment planning, medication evaluation,
spiritual and doctrinal reframes, bibliotherapy, and
ACT/CBT can yield positive clinical outcomes.

Hepworth, M., Simonds, L. M., & Marsh, R. (2010). Catholic
priests’ conceptualisation of scrupulosity: a grounded theory
analysis. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 13(1), 1–16.
Huppert, J. D., & Siev, J. (2010). Treating scrupulosity in religious individuals using cognitive-behavioral therapy. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 17(4), 382–392.
Koltko, M.E (1992). Latter-day myths about counseling and
psychotherapy. Dialogue, 25(4), 32–43.
Kimball, S.W. (1969). The miracle of forgiveness. Salt Lake City,
UT: Bookcraft.
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Perceived attitudes between mental health therapists and local congregational LDS religious leaders regarding
the value, function, and efficacy of mental health therapy were qualitatively examined. Qualitative data emerging from 4 LDS religious leaders (all male; 3 bishops and 1 stake president) and 7 mental health therapists (5
females, 2 males) were analyzed. Results showed differences in attitudes related to the collaboration process as
well as the efficacy and process of counseling between local mental health therapists and LDS religious leaders
in a specific Southwest region of the U.S. Additional results are reported. Implications are discussed related to
these findings.
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T

2011; Allen & Wang, 2013; Yeh, Arora & Wu, 2006;
Yeh, Inman, Kim, & Okubo, 2006).
It is somewhat common for highly religious individuals in need of mental health services to first seek
help from their religious leaders. Consequently, this
religious setting can potentially become a channel
through which referral to professional mental health
assistance can be considered (Kloos, Horneffer &
Moore, 1995). The perceptions that religious leaders
and clergy may have toward mental health therapists
and vice a versa may also be impacting this potentially
collaborative healing process. Such perceptions could
enhance or diminish the treatment opportunities and
positive outcomes of people seeking help. Kloos and
colleagues (1995) suggested that, overall, religious
leaders are willing to collaborate with mental health
professionals.
In a two-part study (Foskett et al, 2004) involving
both mental health professionals and religious leaders,

he general view of mental health professionals toward
religion and its contribution to positive mental health
has fluctuated over the years. This is shown as early as
1927, in Sigmund Freud’s book titled, “The Future of an Illusion” in which he refers to religion as a form of childhood
neurosis (Freud, 1927). Albert Ellis (1958) suggested that
“Religious creeds encourage some of the craziest kinds of
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors and favor severe manifestations of neurosis, borderline personality states, and
sometimes even psychosis.” Concurrently, up until the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV, 1994), religious and spiritual experiences were referenced as characteristics of psychopathology
such as paranoia, delusions, hallucinations and schizotypal
symptoms (Levin, 2010).

Despite early psychotherapists who supported religion and spirituality (i.e., Carl Jung), the negative view
of religion held by psychotherapists was widespread.
Only more recently have the relationships among religiosity and spirituality been examined with significant
emphasis on efforts to strengthen its positive impact
on mental health (Witztum, 2011; Allen & Heppner,

Please address all inquiries to Inquiries to Kawika Allen, PhD, 273
MCKB, Provo, UT 84602, GEKawika_Allen@byu.edu.
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researchers gathered and quantified a portrayal of the
perceptions of both mental health professionals and
religious leaders toward each other. In general, mental health professionals reported that there is a significant and meaningful link between religious belief
and mental health when working with some clients,
and this could possibly help therapists better understand clients’ religious framework in session. A majority of religious leaders also identified a significant link
between mental health and religion. However, over
half of all religious leaders thought that exposure to
mental health therapy could also confuse individuals
about their religious faith and practice. These results
suggested that mental health professionals are more
understanding and open to collaborating with religious leaders and the beliefs of religious clients than
are religious leaders toward mental health professionals (Foskett, Marriott, & Wilson-Rudd, 2004).
The perceived attitudes of mental health therapy/
therapists by religious leaders, and mental health therapists’ attitudes of religious leaders’ beliefs and practice are essential to examine. There may be incorrect
assumptions and biases of each other, which then can
negatively impact the referral process that could otherwise potentially assist either a client or church member in distress. There is very little research regarding
these perceived attitudes among mental health therapists and Latter-day Saint (LDS) religious leaders.
Thus, this study seeks to answer these following questions:
1. What are the LDS religious leaders’ attitudes that
may delay the referral collaboration process between mental health therapists and LDS religious
leaders?
2. What are LDS religious leaders’ perceptions of and
attitudes toward mental health counselors?
3. What are the perceptions of mental health professionals towards LDS religious leaders’ function
when working with members who struggle with
psychological difficulties?
4. What differences might exist in LDS leaders’ perceptions of LDS therapists/LDS Family Services
therapists and Non-LDS therapists/non-LDS
Family Services therapists?
5. What perceptions do mental health therapists have
toward LDS religious leaders’ referral processes?

Method
Participants

Qualitative data for this study were collected in a southwest region of the U.S. Participants were specifically
targeted and recruited for 2 specific participant groups:
(1) LDS religious leaders [3 bishops and 1 stake president] and (2) mental health therapists (5 females, 2
males; consisting of licensed psychologists, clinical social workers, and professional counselors). Therapists’
religious affiliation was not assessed. The mean ages for
the 2 groups were 51.6 for LDS religious leaders and
42.8 for mental health therapists. All therapists have at
least 10 years of clinical experience.
Procedure

The following is a 6-step data gathering and qualitative
analysis process by interviewing participants through
a method called Narrative Research Analysis (NRA;
Ollerenshaw & Creswell, 2002; Clandinin and Connelly, 2000): (1) Sharing personal experiences, (2)
Identify significant statements, (3) Group into “meaning units” or themes, (4) Describe verbatim examples,
(5) Describe “how” they experienced it, and (6) Integrate descriptions, meaning units, and themes into the
“what” and “how” they experienced it, culminating into
the “essence” of their experience. This analysis allowed
the authors to elicit personally meaningful and rich
experiences from these two groups regarding information about their perceptions, attitudes, and assumptions of each other. Below are the questions posed in
the interviews.
Questions for LDS Religious Leaders:

1. What is your overall view on mental health therapists and psychology in general?
2. What is your overall view on mental health therapists in this region?
3. What has been your experience when you have
been working with a member of your congregation
who is also seeing a therapist or who has seen a
therapist?
4. What has been your experience with referring the
members of your congregation to the local therapists in this area?
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5. To whom do you usually refer your members; to
non-affiliated LDS Family Services therapists or
those who directly work for or affiliated with LDS
Family Services? And why to either?
6. At what point during your counseling meetings
with your member do you feel like it’s time for the
member to seek out professional counseling services? In short, how do you assess when it is time to
involve a therapist?

Bishop 1:
“I think it’s beneficial to certain people. But I don’t always think that the person being diagnosed in need of
counseling is accurate, because I’ve seen a lot of counseling for individuals with no results. As an untrained
professional it’s hard to see someone struggling so
much go through counseling and see no results.”

Bishop 2:
“Yes, I think it’s helpful to people, but only if that individual is willing to accept the help and put in the work.”

Questions for Mental Health Therapists:

Bishop 3:

1. What is your overall view of LDS religious leaders
in this area related to helping their members with
psychological or emotional difficulties?
2. What has been your experience with the referral
process when working with the local LDS religious
leaders, either referring your clients to or receiving
referrals from them to work with their members in
session?
3. If you had an active LDS client who struggled with
religious issues in his/her life, would you send your
client to their bishop or stake president for further
help that they may need? If so (or not), why?
4. In what ways has working with these local LDS
religious leaders related to the referral process been
(or not been) helpful?
5. At what point during your counseling sessions with
your client do you feel like it’s time for the member
to seek out ecclesiastical counseling services from
their LDS religious leader? In short, how do you
assess when it is time to involve the bishop or stake
president?

“I think it’s a very valuable asset for those who need it.
I think that the quality level of therapists is in a broad
spectrum based upon training and clinical experience,
but I generally have a very high view of the industry.”

Stake President:
“I think there is certainly a need for that, I think
there’s a need for mental health and psychology and it’s
needed. There are those that need it and those that are
trained can help those that need the process.”

2. What is your overall view on mental health therapists in this region?
Bishop 1:
“I’ve only worked with a handful of them, but in my
opinion the ones in this region that I have worked with
have been extremely skilled and wonderful to work
with for the most part.”

Bishop 2:
“I think they are very competent. I haven’t worked with
tons of therapists, but the ones who have worked with
my family have been experts and the ones I worked
with since being a Bishop have been successful for the
most part.”

Results
Qualitative Analysis

The following are the questions and corresponding
transcribed responses to each question for both LDS
religious leaders and mental health therapists.

Bishop 3:
“I think generally there’s a limited amount of quality therapists in this region, that’s a function of the
population. There are exceptional therapists that I’ve
worked with as a bishop, but there’s I think a bit of a
shortage, especially I think as it relates to adolescent
and teen mental health, as well as addiction.”

LDS Religious Leaders

1. What is your overall view on mental health therapists and psychology in general?
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Stake President:

Bishop 3:

“From the experience that I’ve had I feel very comfortable. There’s been a lot out there to offer I think in this
area we’ve been blessed with a lot of directions to go
where to go.”

“Well I have generally only referred members of my
congregation to a couple of therapists, that I have comfort level with and it’s been good as a result and I’ve
been a bishop for a little over four years and I’ve generally determined where the best fits lie, and so it’s a fairly
limited number of therapists that I’ve referred.”

3. What has been your experience when you have
been working with a member of your congregation who is also seeing a therapist or who has seen a
therapist?

Stake President:
“You know in my area I probably refer them to LDS
family services. Many of them have been missionaries,
with a variety of problems-depression, some addictions, and some eating disorders. Those are some of
the things that we have seen and we’ve had some good
success. Not always are they solved, immediately, and
you know that, it’s not a go and take a pill and they’re
better like sometimes they are here [veterinarian hospital] but it would be a process that take some time in
route. I’ve felt very good about it.”

Bishop 1:
“I’ve been disappointed with the results in most cases.”

Bishop 2:
“I have seen mixed results, but my experience has been
mostly positive in most cases. A lot of the time when
results are disappointing I think it’s more because of
the individual than the therapists’ abilities.”

5. To whom do you usually refer your members; to
non-affiliated LDS Family Services therapists or those
who directly work for or affiliated with LDS Family
Services? And why to either?

Bishop 3:
“It’s been excellent actually, with permission of the
member of my congregation, or the client, we cooperate quite closely with the therapist and it helps a lot.”

Stake President:

Bishop 1:

“Well I think for the most part it’s been positive, it’s
been a positive thing. There have been a variety of different issues that we see and I think from many times
there are addictions and there can be some positive
things happen.”

“LDS Family Services is easier from our standpoint
because of the church connection. But I have not used
only those people. I’m not bound to that and I have
some members know who came in with a therapist in
mind and so we work with that therapist. I’ve seen better results when the member themselves wants counseling and already as someone in mind they can trust
and work with, so I am not bound with only Family
Services. I’ve enjoyed working with a mixture of therapists in the community.”

4. What has been your experience with referring the
members of your congregation to the local therapists
in this area?
Bishop 1:

Bishop 2:

“Again I’ve seen mixed results, like I said I have been
disappointed, but we do refer.”

“Well as I am a Bishop I have been given training. I
don’t know much about the therapy process so the
church has the LDS family services for us to refer to. I
usually go with what I know, like in anything. The connection with the church makes it easiest for me to refer
my members to LDS Family Services. I wouldn’t be
opposed of referring elsewhere necessarily, but when
my members come in and accept or want counseling
they know less than I do often. So I go with what I
know and with the ties of the church LDS services is
the easiest way and a good one I think.”

Bishop 2:
“For the most part it has been a good experience. Like
I said earlier, when things have been disappointing I
think it has been because the individual doesn’t really
have a desire to change their situation. That is hard
when that happens.”
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Bishop 3:

when it’s clear that the amount of time and the severity of the mental health challenge is significant then
I will bring a therapist in, not to pass the member of
my congregation off to the therapist, but to bring that
therapist in as a member of my team.”

“It depends on the circumstance. I would say I’ve referred more to non-affiliated therapists. I have made
referrals to affiliated therapists. It depends upon the
issue that’s being faced by the member of the congregation. There are therapists that are affiliated with LDS
Family Services that have specialties that are consistent
with the needs and I’ve referred them to that therapist
at the time.”

Stake President:
“In my situation, I’ve seen what’s there and many times
that’s written down and they will say “we’ve had this
issue, we’ve had that problem” and so as I look at those
things, there are certain things that require to be evaluated before they go on a mission-eating disorders for
example would be something that would need to be
evaluated by a therapist, and so we would, rather than
try to do the therapy ourselves, we would try to assess
how much it is and what’s going on there and then we
refer to them. You know there are some things that we
see that we will try to work with and help. For example,
an addiction for pornography would be something we
would try to work with and try to do the things that
we could do on the basis of just being a church leader
that we would try to help, and there are times that we
would, could see that we don’t necessarily give traction
in and maybe need help. So at that point after with
them a little bit and seen that we’re not making any
progress on what happened we refer them.”

Stake President:
“We typically refer to the LDS Family Services. Many
of those are pre-missionary evaluations and they require that for the mission. And so we have often times,
if they have been to another therapist, we have gotten
information and added that to what’s already there if
they have been working with a therapist outside of
LDS Family Services.”

6. At what point during your counseling meetings
with your member do you feel like it’s time for the
member to seek out professional counseling services?
In short, how do you assess when it is time to involve
a therapist?
Bishop 1:

Mental Health Therapists:

“There are a couple of things I’ve used as guidelines,
one is addiction. When I can identify that it’s an addiction issue, I think professional counseling is best. Or if
I think they are at risk to themselves or someone else.
It’s hard to analyze that with the few times you meet
with them as a church leader. Some you meet with a
lot, but a lot of the time I would prefer them to seek
out counseling themselves, but that’s usually when I
get people who just want the church to pay for it.”

1. What is your overall view of LDS religious leaders
in this area related to helping their members with psychological or emotional difficulties?
Female Therapist 1:
“They don’t refer to professionals as often as they
should. Too many LDS leaders try to counsel themselves and go into areas that they really should refer out
to professionals.”

Bishop 2:
“Now I am no professional, but I usually bring up counseling to a member when I think there is more going on
than just the individual seeking support or forgiveness.
When I start feeling like an individual’s problems are
psychological problems, that’s when I think they need
more help than just from me. It’s a hard thing to know,
but if I start worrying at all I ask my member if they
would like it or think it’s necessary.”

Female Therapist 2:

Bishop 3:

“Well, from my experience that’s one of the first things
they (leaders) ask is if they need counseling and help
with paying for therapy. I think their pretty good at
trying to get the individual to pay what they can and

“Reluctant, I don’t think they buy into the concept.
Not to say there aren’t several that are willing to help,
there are. I’m just not sure they understand what counseling is and that makes them fearful. They have a lack
of information.”

Female Therapist 3:

“Well I think a lot of that is dependent upon the bishop’s experience and capability in the area but as for me
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then their willing to help with the rest. From my experience religious leaders are open to it and willing to
help and support their members. With the information they have they are helpful in getting people the
help that they need.”

seen many leaders work with their members to help
them and they do, but sometimes I feel like they (leaders) try to deal with psychological problems too much.
It’s almost discredits the training I have received, well
that’s what I have felt and experienced a lot.”

Female Therapist 4:

2. What has been your experience with the referral
process when working with the local LDS religious
leaders, either referring your clients to or receiving referrals from them to work with their members in session?

“I think generally I worry that bishops and stake presidents are unskilled when they try to do too much in
the area of emotional and psychological therapy counseling and health. I have worked with bishops who
were really great at assessing, like ‘there is a problem
that goes way beyond the scope of what I am going
to do as your bishop, let’s get you into counseling.’ I
personally really appreciate when a bishop sort of recognizes that ‘this is beyond the scope of what I can do
to help you, so let’s get you into therapy.’ I think that
occasionally, I don’t know that I have necessarily ran
into this a lot, but I think occasionally bishops feel like,
‘yeah lets work on this together and I’m like no that’s a
bad idea, you are in over your head.’”

Female Therapist 1:
“I don’t think I’ve ever had a referral from an LDS leader. My own Bishop... I’ve counseled actually people in
my own neighborhood so to speak; ward area, and they
have come into me on their own, but not through a
recommendation from the church. I try really hard to
keep religion out of the office. If somebody asked me
directly I usually counter that with “Why do you need
to know that?” Because I have been a very traditional
LDS individual, but in my practice I think I’m really
liberal as far as bringing the church into it. I just don’t
do that.”

Female Therapist 5:
“I would say that in general my overall view is probably
that they, I have to say, that they try to keep in within
the context of religion, like mental health therapy. And
so probably want to, as much as possible to have the
bishop do most of the people thing, I guess with their
members. And partly I think that… I feel so weird
making blanket statements because my experience has
been kinda mixed. But I think that with religious issues that maybe contradict church teaching; I think
that definitely there is more of an attempt, a stronger
attempt, to keep things within the religion for mental
health or therapy.”

Female Therapist 2:
“It has been very good, to financially support that, that
is. LDS Family Services has been good at seeing clients, it’s a very comfortable process. It’s a very good educating process for them, at least that’s my impression.”

Female Therapist 3:
“I work under some other therapists, so they are the
ones that get the referrals and then give them to me. I
then will send an update every once in a while to the
Bishop who is also working with my client. You know
it seems like most of the time they just refer straight to
LDS Family services unless they knew a therapist who
is LDS also and he (the Bishop) knew that therapist
was a strong active member in the LDS church. That’s
been my experience and perception anyways.”

Male Therapist 1:
“I don’t have that much experience with dealing with
the religious leaders and so forth. Primarily I have
worked with bishops and taking overflow and people
that have requested to see me. But as far as religious
leaders being accepting and so forth I think they are
open to using myself and they don’t question us about
what we are doing and let us do what we are doing.
And I use different forms of therapy such as hypnotherapy and so forth and I’ve never had anything negative come back.”

Female Therapist 4:
“I have experienced it both ways, usually most of the
referrals I have received from bishops have been into
my private practice, when I was doing private practice,
and not through CAPS. Most of my experience with
bishops has been really supportive and I think really
interested in the people they work with and counsel in
sort of helping and supporting them in what they can

Male Therapist 2:
“LDS religious leaders feel they are over and almost
responsible for the members of their congregation. I’ve
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Female Therapist 1:

do. I have nothing but good experiences with bishops
who are supportive to counseling. I have had a couple
of occasions when a student who works with me who
has an institute teacher or a bishop who also wants to
touch base and just offer some support and help in the
experience. I think it has been a little more when I have
referred people to their bishops. Usually... I don’t think
I ever necessarily say, you should go to your bishop,
but I will sort of talk about; would it be helpful to go
to your bishop and maybe nudge people toward their
bishop in that way. And I think that sometimes bishops
are really great and really supportive and really helpful.
I think that other times students sort of feel like that
wasn’t helpful at all, I didn’t feel understood or I sort of
feel frustrated or judged or something like that.”

“Well that is going to depend individually. I wouldn’t
automatically, though. Because I think if they’ve come
to a private practice they’re not going to be really receptive to me sending them back to the church, if they
haven’t approached their church then that is their issue. I don’t think I should even go there. So no, I would
not I think that is crossing the boundary.”

Female Therapist 2:
“That’s a very hard question. It really depends on the
client and their needs, it’s not my call.”

Female Therapist 3:
“Yes for sure. If my client feels they need it that is a barrier I can’t help them with.”

Female Therapist 5:

Female Therapist 4:

“Well my experience has been kinda mixed. I have had
some good experiences where I have felt that bishops
have completely supported me regarding treatment of
individuals, without questioning of my religious background. And then completely the opposite, which is a
denial of referral or a denial from a client who requested to see me; through using church funds because I am
not LDS and that they should best go to, like LDS
Family Services. Tends to be the go to LDS Family
Services because they can provide better treatment for
you, with in the context of your religion. Now, on the
other side of that the support has been, like when it
is supportive, it is really supportive. It’s like black and
white.”

“Yes I would. I feel like I do pretty routinely. I am pretty
clear that I have no ecclesiastical authority, I am LDS,
but certainly I cannot help you repent from sin or clarify some sort of ecclesiastical or doctrinal sorts of issues. And I think that sometimes it is really helpful for
students to go in with somebody who has ecclesiastical
authority through that process. It kind of varies; I mean
it really kind of depends a lot on what the concern is.
So, if somebody comes in and they are struggling with,
for example, masturbating and pornography; I am not
going to necessarily refer them right to their bishop because I have had some really mixed experiences with
that. So bishops are really helpful and supportive and
some bishops are really punishing and severe. I don’t
know, I don’t necessarily see you need to go right to
your bishop with that. I think you can make progress
on it through counseling. But I am thinking about another student I worked with a few years ago who was
kind of going through a faith transition or a faith crisis.
Trying to figure out what do I really believe? I have
never really felt the spirit the way everybody says I
should feel the spirit and I have done everything right.
I have gone on a mission I’ve done it all. I don’t get it
and we talked a lot about where could you get support
and where could you get help with this? What would
some good resources be? And is there anyone that you
trust that you could talk to about these things, these
concerns and these question that you have, who could
maybe... had more wisdom and could provide some
guidance? And I think that’s been the best thing. You
know my bishop from my home ward is a really awesome guy; I really trust him and I would like to talk to
him. And so yeah.”

Male Therapist 1:
“Again, they have been open, flexible, I’ve only had like
one bishop request information. The rest of them have
pretty much allowed us to do what we need to do and
not added input and gotten into my business.”

Male Therapist 2:
“Well typically they refer their members to their own
counselors, but I have seen some clients who have been
members. I will discuss with them about seeing their
Bishop if I think it will help that individual. It all just
depends on my client.”

3. If you had an active LDS client who struggled with
religious issues in his/her life, would you send your
client to their bishop or stake president for further
help that they may need? If so (or not), why?
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Female Therapist 5:

abuse, its spiritual based and on a more spiritual track.
I think that may be caring, I think . . .”

“If it was my client? I think it would depend on what
they wanted. I think it would depend on their relationship with that religious leader, if they thought that it
would be helpful or not. I don’t know if I could say yes
or not to that. Yes, if it’s going to help, but I think that
sometimes they (client) have already seen that person
and they don’t feel like it would be helpful or useful.
So sometimes I am a more objective person, you know
because I don’t have the same religious beliefs.”

Female Therapist 3:
“It is helpful working with Bishops who know they don’t
have the education and training as we do as therapists to
help their members and they don’t act like they do, so I
can use my training to help that individual. At the same
time I can’t act like I have the authority of an individual
that their church leader does. It’s helpful when they refer
to us to just trust us in the process. I haven’t experienced
anything not helpful for the most part.”

Male Therapist 1:
“I was born and raised LDS myself and so forth, I am
not active, but if I got into some areas that I felt that
it would be beneficial I would get a signed release first
from the client to talk to that Bishop and see where
we’d go from there. In most cases I have always kept
my clients and the Bishops have not jumped in and or
whatever but if there is a need then I’m open.”

Female Therapist 4:
“I think that I always really appreciate it when a bishop
is just supportive, supportive of the counseling process.
I think a lot of bishops are really supportive in terms
of helping to pay for counseling, which is an incredible
resource. When bishops are willing to help pay for it,
willing to help support it, wants to check in and touch
base on how things are going, that’s really great. I think
probably something that would be less helpful would
be like: a lot of questions, wanting to know a lot of
specifics, or when will this wrap up and kind of pin
down a lot of details that I think are kind of hard to
do in counseling. Counseling is more of an art. It’s not
the same as going to a doctor asking, how long until
the broken arm fixes? It feels like there is pressure like,
when will this be fixed or what are you doing? How’s it
going? you know . . .”

Male Therapist 2:
“Again, it really just depends on the client. If they feel it
would help them or if I think they can’t get over something like guilt without seeing their Bishop, I may ask
if that is something they would see as beneficial for
them.”

4. In what ways has working with these local LDS religious leaders related to the referral process been (or
not been) helpful?

Female Therapist 5:
“I think that it has been very helpful. I don’t know if I
could provide a more elaborate answer than that. It’s
pretty easy, I could say that. It’s easy, useful and helpful.
I like getting checks from the LDS church.”

Female Therapist 1:
“I don’t think I’ve ever had a referral. I think that is
because most refer to LDS social services. I’ve had it
mentioned to me that I ought to get connected to them
but I am not sure if that is where I want to go.”

Male Therapist 1:
“Yes, I have worked with and known of a couple of
Bishops and so forth and received some referrals from
them. Primarily it is word of mouth from clients
that have asked questions to their friends and I have
received many clients that way, referrals from their
friends and recommendations for their friends and so
forth. Word of mouth.”

Female Therapist 2:
“There have been some struggles. The Bishops and
State Presidents approaches are very religious based.
They may be a good person, but if they haven’t been
trained properly, they lack the skill level in dealing
with large issues, like rape and incest. They can offer
guidance as a cleric but not “therapize” you correctly. A
cleric may say pray more, however, that may not be the
whole cure, very myopic view. It may be a piece but not
a cure all, not the big picture. Positives would be the
LDS 12 step program in relation to drugs and alcohol

Male Therapist 2:
“Well as I said earlier, I haven’t worked with the religious leaders much as they seem to always refer to their
counselors. But the few I have worked with been very
different. Sometimes it has been good and sometimes
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Female Therapist 5:

it has not been. It has been successful when the Bishop
has trusted me to do my job, but in all honesty that
hasn’t happen often.”

“Again I think that it really depends on what they
want and I don’t think that I can, I don’t think that it
is my job to make that call really. I think that’s their job
to decide. If they are doing something that they feel
is against the teachings of their religion and they are
going to continue to suffer guilt because of it, then I
might ask if they think that going to help by speaking
with their bishop. I usually ask them that question to
kinda assess when or not it might be useful or helpful.
But I think that it really depends on the person. I don’t
see it as something that has to be done. It is really up
to what they want.”

5. At what point during your counseling sessions with
your client do you feel like it’s time for the member to
seek out ecclesiastical counseling services from their
LDS religious leader? In short, how do you assess
when it is time to involve the bishop or stake president?
Female Therapist 1:
“I don’t. I think it is appropriate for the individual if
they ask for advice or for direction with that. To encourage them if that is what they need or want. If I
can see if that is a desire that they have then certainly
I would encourage them to go that direction but I certainly wouldn’t make a referral. I wouldn’t even ask to
get involved.”

Male Therapist 1:
“Either the request from the client / patient or else...
you like you know the first thing that popped into my
head was abuse issues and that and so forth but by law
I am supposed to record those. I would refer to the
Bishops as needed in general, but I would be cautious,
at the state of Utah, professional laws and so forth I
have to follow as a guideline but then also is that if this
person needs religious support and assistance and we
should check out that route, again get a release of information and making sure that the client is on board
and feels comfortable and I would go with if necessary
to support or provide assistance where needed.”

Female Therapist 2:
“That’s the client’s call, not mine. It comes up; each religion has a repentance process. I would be supportive
of whatever they chose.”

Female Therapist 3:
“From my experience ecclesiastical leaders have already been involved. If I had a client come that hadn’t
been referred I would see where the client is at. If I felt
like they needed it I would ask them if they wanted
to see their Bishop as well or ask if the client wants
their Bishop involved. It all depends on what the client
wants.”

Male Therapist 2:
“I feel that is usually completely separate from me
working with my clients. If they feel they should do
that great, but that is not my job. There have been
times clients have expressed this need to talk to their
Bishop, but they are too scared, so I will help them
work through that. It really just depends on what the
client wants to do. Often times clients I have worked
with in the LDS community have already involved
their Bishop and have come to me separately.”

Female Therapist 4:
“That’s a good question. It kind of goes back to that
therapy is more of an art than a science. I don’t have
that rubric I use to assess it more when it feels relevant
or feels pressing. Again I am not necessarily saying, you
should go talk to your bishop I am saying, would it be
helpful, like you have this fear that you have repented
of past sins, but maybe not fully enough. I don’t think
that’s the case when it helps you talk to your bishop
that you get somebody with ecclesiastical authority
that helps weigh in on the matter. And the client to
say, yeah I would like to do that or no I don’t think that
will be helpful.”

Below are the themes and meaning units that were
generated from the data responses of both LDS religious leaders and mental health therapists.
LDS Religious Leaders’ Attitudes of Mental Health
Therapists and Therapy

LDS religious leaders tend to:
• Have an overall positive attitude around therapy/
therapists and the assistance they can provide.
• See quality therapists as valuable/needed in some
limited circumstances. There may be a shortage of
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qualified, good therapists. However, most therapists are skilled and qualified.
• Feel somewhat discouraged with therapists/
therapy when “results” do not come or do not come
quickly.
• See therapy as a system for “symptom relief ” as opposed to understanding the developmental process
of therapy and the broader implications of therapy
(i.e., identity development or values clarification) as
indicated by being “disappointed” with the lack of
results.
• See the responsibility for change should lie mostly
with client.

• Show mixed results around collaboration.
• Helpful in supporting their members financially for
counseling.
• Could be a better resource with working with
“guilt” or “sins.”
• Tend to see referral as a one-way street with bishops referring to them, but not vice-versa.
Discussion

Some of the existing research suggests that mental
health professionals are more understanding and open
to collaborating with religious leaders and the beliefs
of religious clients than are religious leaders toward
mental health professionals (Foskett, Marriott, &
Wilson-Rudd, 2004). However, the qualitative findings in this study may not clearly support this result.
For example, among the mental health therapist participants, there appears to be specific discouragement
toward LDS religious leaders, particularly around (1)
their perceived belief that LDS religious leaders may
discredit their field, (2) lack of trust and increased fear
around counseling, and (3) the perception that they
may not be qualified to work with some members’
issues. These issues could potentially contribute to
a poor working relationship and stifle collaboration.
Although some results show a disappointing attitude
about the lack of “results” when their members go
through therapy (these LDS leaders may tend to misunderstand and oversimplify the process of therapy)
or that there may be a shortage of qualified therapists,
the themes also seem to be positive towards therapy
and therapists by LDS religious leaders. For example,
during the referral process, some LDS leaders have
observed, in most cases, that mental health therapists
are “skilled,” “competent,” and they feel “comfortable”
referring to therapists in their region.
However, there seems to be a positive bias held by
LDS leaders towards therapists affiliated with LDS
Family Services than therapists who are unaffiliated
with the LDS Church. It is possible such a bias is not
only due to the easiness of the referral or that LDS
Family Services therapists “understand” their members’ issues, but could also be based on leaders’ concerns, fears, and worries around the approach taken
by many therapy/therapists in this specific region.
Another potential explanation around this bias is that

Collaboration:
• Favor LDS Family Services as it’s easier, they
understand the needs of the members, and due to
the connection with the LDS Church, but would
refer out to non-affiliated therapists if needed or
if member chooses their someone outside of LDS
Family Services.
• Be selective with therapists because of “mixed”
results (poor therapeutic outcomes)
Mental Health Therapists’ Attitudes of LDS Religious
Leaders

Therapists believe LDS leaders tend to:
• Be helpful and supportive in general around
counseling.
• Lack skills, training, and competence, and may
go beyond the scope of their function with their
members related to psychological processes and
adjustments.
• Be reluctant and fearful about therapy/therapists;
may be specifically due to the local mental health
therapists in the region.
• Devalue the mental health field when they may not
use mental health therapists for their members, and
may try to work with members themselves.
• Lack trust around therapy/therapists, but in some
cases can be open to allow the therapist to do
their work.
Collaboration:
• Prefer LDS Family Services therapists as first
choice, or will refer to a therapist who they know is
active in the LDS Church.
80

Exploring Perceived Attitudes of Counseling

Allen and Hill

LDS religious leaders may also want to maintain the
reputable name and image of the LDS Church by
safeguarding and protecting it.
Conversely, attitudes of mental health therapists
about referring a client to a local LDS religious leader
to seek ecclesiastical guidance seems to be positive and
based on exploring this possibility further. Therapists
may be more open to the client deciding whether a referral to the LDS leader would be another resource for
help or not (i.e., be less likely to discourage collaboration with a religious leader), as indicated by the statement, “it’s the client’s call” or “if it’s helpful, it really
depends on the client.” In addition, therapists seem to
believe that it would be important that LDS leaders
take the lead and work more with spiritual struggles
such as “guilt” and “sin.” These results may suggest that
therapists in this study may hold less negative bias or
be less fearful about what local LDS leaders do to help
their congregations. However, a potential weakness of
this study is that therapists’ personal views of the religion were not assessed, therefore such a finding could
be due to therapists who are also active LDS members
and who also support their leaders.
The findings also show that therapists tend to believe some local LDS leaders may work beyond their
scope of expertise based on overlapping ideas between “psychological problems” and “sins.” While feeling competent in dealing with the sinful behaviors of
their members, leaders may need to refer out for those
experiencing significant psychological struggles. Thus,
a lack of trust and failure by local LDS leaders to collaborate may ensue around therapy/therapists due
to some of their perceived attitudes as well as their
negative experiences with therapists in this area. This
lack of trust may contribute to a poor LDS religious
leader/therapist collaboration and suggests that LDS
leaders in this sample may fear that therapists hold divergent worldviews about the developmental needs of
individuals seeking help. Although these results may
expand our thinking of cross collaboration and the
referral process between mental health therapists and
LDS religious leaders, the results may not be generalizable across all LDS congregations, LDS clients, and
mental health therapists due to the small sample size
as well as the unique and specific (seemingly unfavorable) experiences in this region between mental health
professionals and LDS religious leaders.

However, the results do help us to be aware of this
possible collaborative dialog and make potential implications. It is important that mental health professionals educate other helpers (clergy) about the process of mental health therapy and better understand
what it is that mental health therapists actually do
and don’t do. Likewise, it is vital for mental health
professionals to be open and understanding towards
religious diversity and the meaningfulness one’s spiritual life. For example, mental health therapists should
strive to practice cultural competence with highly religious individuals, the institution and their leadership
(i.e., LDS Priesthood structure), and how they view
spiritual healing. When mental health therapists are
able to be culturally sensitive to spiritual diversity, appropriate communication and education regarding
the therapy process between mental health therapists
and LDS religious leaders can be achieved. Productive
and effective conversations between clergy and mental health professionals are needed, but in a fashion
that fosters mutual understanding of each other’s role,
cultural sensitivity, religious respect, and establishing
a healthy and open dialog between the two healing
services to meet the client’s needs. First step could be
to begin with a discussion perhaps 2-3 meetings with
these 2 groups of helpers (or have ongoing meetings
when new mental health therapists are in the area and
new LDS leaders are called) examining underlying assumptions about the helping process so both mental
health therapists and clergy can better understand
each other’s roles. Then, moving to demystify and deconstruct certain assumptions and biases that may exist towards each other. This could entail mental health
therapists learning about the LDS church, their beliefs, and how they view psychological struggles, while
LDS religious leaders educate themselves in the general, ethical, and effective practices of psychotherapy.
Both can be familiar with and understand clearly what
will take place when the mental health therapist receives an LDS client and when the LDS leader refers
his members to a mental health therapist. Future research could explore how this cultural, mental health,
and religious education between these two groups can
be improved to raise more awareness, foster more cultural sensitivity, and establish healthy working relationships between mental health therapists and LDS
religious leaders.
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